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FOREWORD 
The work which follows is by no means a thorough or complete 
history of the Twenty First Infantry Regiment in World War II. To 
my knowledge no such history has yet been written. I have, however, 
a number of official accounts of some of our actions. These I have 
edited and put together with whatever other information available in 
order to have at least •me form of published-.. record. I am publish-: 
ing this work in responae to numerous requests from members and former 
members of the 21st Infantry as a chronicle of our days together in 
combat. 
Most of the description concerning the Hollandia Operation was sub-
mitted by Lieut. Colonel Roy W. Marcy. The sketches after Page 37 and 
Page 52 were dra1m by Mr. Lawrence E. Hickman another former 21st Infan-
tryman. Grea.t thanks are due to Lieut. Colonel Judson Maeivor Smith for 
-the mat.erial on Pages 3, 4, 5 and 6 which were taken from his book "The 
Story of .a Regiment" - a history of the 21st Infantry. Thanks are also 
due to Mr. Arthur Amos, Jr. for the cover, Miss Ruth Middleton for typing 
the manuscript and to Mr. T •· L. Tuggle for supervising the multilith op-
erations of reproduction. 
I would be glad to receive information from anyone who can furnish 
more complete data for inclusion in a future, more complete work. Also 
any corrections or suggested changes will be very welcome. 
1 
·/f(/~91~ 
WILLIAM J. ~~;d K 
Colonel, Infantry 
Commanding Officer of Troops 
U.S.M.A., West Point, N•Y• 
The narrative accounts of the 'work are, for the most part, taken 
from official records. The events narrated, although of some interest, 
lack color and descriptive effect. Ruman interest is prac~ically lack-
ing. In order to tell the story with a proper background it would be 
necessary to obtain personal experience narratives from hundreds of en-
listed men and officer~ to cover the actual combat description of each 
small unit on each battlefield. In order to more vividly describe the 
true picture existing during the various actions, certain citations for 
awards and decorations are inserted. The citations inserted are in a 
smaller ty'pe and written on separate pages so as not to interrupt the 
continuity of the basic narrative. The citations inserted are but a 
small percentage of those awarded for each phase of a battle. Unfor-
tuilately they are tb.e only ones available to the writer. They will, 
however, serve to describe the intensity of the combat and to insert 
human intere&t into the reading. 
(From "The Story of a Regiment 11 by Judson llacivor Smith) 
EXPLANATORY NOTE 
Until comparatively recent years no effort has been made systematically 
to continue in unbroken service the regul.8.r regiments of the army. Thus 
at the close of most of our wars reg~ents have been disbanded and th~ir 
existence brought to an untimely end, and a unit which fought in the War 
of 1812 and the Civil War, for example, under the same regimental desig-
nation, need not necessarily be in any sense whatever the same organization. 
Thus, the story of the present 21st Infantry properly begins with G.O. 
#33, WD, dated June 18, 1861, which provides for the creation of the 12th 
Regiment of U. S. Infantry. Through the accident of common practice dur-
ing the war, wherein battalions frequently served as separate and distinct 
units, our lineage is properly traced through the actions of the 2d Bat-
talion, 12th Infantry, until the promulgation of G.O. 1150 WD, dated August 
1, 1866 ani G.O. 1192 dated November 23, 1866, which changed the name of the 
2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, to the 21st Regiment of Infantry. 
The 3d Battalion, 14th Infantry, which had not been organized during the 
Civil War, was organized and recruited to strength in the fall of' 1865 and 
t~ansferred to the Pacific Coast for service in Arizona. Pursuant to the 
same orders which changed the 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry, to the 21st In-
fantry, this 3d Battalior., 14th Infantry, became the 32d Regiment, am, 
finally in 1869, pursuant to WD G.O. #16 and #17, the 32d was consolidated 
with the 21st, the consoli_dated regiment retaining the designation of the 
21st U. s. Infantry. 
G.O. #33 WD, dated June 28, 1921, transferred all personnel of the 21st 
Infantry to other regiments and transferred the regiment, by means of its 
colors and records, to the Hawaiian Department. 
G.O. #35, HD, dated August 19, 1921, directed that: "Upon arrival in 
the Department the Colors and Records will be sent to Schofield Barracks, 
T. H., and there turned over to the Commanding General of that post. Effec~ 
tive upon receipt, the entire personnel of the 44th Infantry is transferred 
to the 21st Infantry. The 44th Infantry is placed on the inactive list, 
with the 21st Infantry as its active associate. 
3 

~-- - -~ 
· General Orders) 
No. 1 ) 
REGIMENTAL COAT OF ARMS 
HEADQUARTERS, 21st INFANTRY 
Office Of The Regimental Commander, 
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii 
Subject: REGIMENTAL INSIGNIA. 
Extract 
February 15, 1924. 
1.- General Orders No. 7, these head~uarters, dated April 9, 1923, 
is revoked and the following regulations contaii~ed in a fetter· from 
the Adjutant General of the Ar~ will hereafter govern the wearing 
of the 21st Infantry Regiment Distinctive· Insignia by members of the 
command: 
• • • • • • 
1. The Secretary of War approves the following Coat-of-Arms for the 
21st Regiment of Infantry for wear as part of the uniform of the Regi~ 
ment. 
Arms: Party per fess azure ana argent, in chief a sun in splendor 
or charged with a five-bastioned fort of the first, in base a cedar 
tree eradicated proper. 
Crest: On a wreath of the colors four ·arrows sable, armed and 
feathered gules, tied with a rattlesnake skin proper. 
Motto: Duty. 
Description: This regiment was originally organized in 1861 as the 
2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, and as such was in the Army of the Potomac, 
taking part in numerous engagements, the baptism of fire being at Cedar 
Mountain, Augu~ 9, ·1862, where it performed its mission with such success 
as to bring forth special aention from General Prince, the Brigade Comman-
der. This incident is shown b,y the cedar tree. In 1866 it was enlarged 
and the name changed to 21st Infantry. It was in four Indian Campaigns, 
shown by the four arrows of the crest, the rattlesnake was the Indian 
emblem of War. At Santiago, the regiment was in the 5th Corps, the badge 
of which. was a five-bastioned fort, and its Philippine service is shown 
by the Katipunan sun. The colors of the shield, blue and white, have been 
the Infantry colors during the existence of the Regiment. 
By order of COLONEL PERRY: 
(Signed) 
4 
w .. c. · DeWare, 
Adjutant. 
GIMLETS HAVE FOUGHT IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE 
~ · 
. ..r 
Between 1815 and 1861 there was no Twenty-first Infantry 
Regiment. Our predecessors during the W&r of 1812, however, 
e,stablished a foundation for the elan which -we1 bear now and 
always. Here is an account of the gimlets of one hundred and 
thi~y-two years ago. 
THE 21st INF .ANTRY'S TROPHY OF NIAGARA 
THE Battle of Niagara, fought within sight of Niagara Falls, is perhaps better known to the 
student of history as the battle of Lundy's Lane. 
This latter name arises from the fact that the 
bitterest part of the struggle occurred in Lundy's 
Lane during the attack by the Amer-
tery. Resting their muskets on this fence, our 
men poured in a volley that killed or wounded 
every one of the gunners, then rushed the battery 
and took possession of their guns. A British line, 
lying in support, fired with deadly effect and then 
chargerl, with intent to retake the 
ican Infantry on the British battery 
which was in position there. The fol-
lowing account of the battle is taken 
from a history of the 21st Infantry, 
published by Capt. C. E. Hampton, 
21st Infantry, in 1909: 
~ ~ 
guns with the bayonet but were driv-
en back. Three times they made des-
perate efforts to recapture the bat-
tery, but the Twenty-first doggedly 
held its ground. The combatants 
were so close that the fire from their 
muskets crossed and it is said that 
the buttons on the enemies' uniforms 
could be plainly distbguished by its 
light. The Twenty-first suffered 
fearful losses and must inevitably 
have been expelled from its hard won 
position had not Ripley, with the First 
At sunset, on the evening of July 
25th, 1814, General Winfield Scott's 
brigade, advancing down the Niagara 
River, on the Canadian side, found 
itself confronted by the British Ar-
my drawn up on rising ground a sport 
distance below the Falls. Although 
greatly outnumbered and over-
matched in artillery, Sc.ott unhe~itatingly engaged 
the enemy and sent word to General Brown, at 
Chippewa, of the perilous situation. The latter 
ordered General Ripley forward and hastened to 
the battlefield. At nine o'clock, p. m., Ripley's 
brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first and Twen-
ty-third Infantry regiments, with a detachrr.~nt of 
the First, arrived upon the scene. Scott's troops 
were exhausted and scattered by the continuous 
fighting, and Ripley's were at once pushed for-
ward to form a new line. 
A British battery of seven guns posted 8fl a 
hill in the center of their line, near a road called 
Lundy's Lane, was seen to be the key to their po-
sition. Turning to Colonel James Miller, who 
commanded the Twenty-first Infantry, General 
Brown said: "Colonel, take your regiment, storm 
that work, and take it." Colonel Miller's prompt 
reply, "I'll try, sir," is one of the few sentient 
speeches of the battlefield that our history has 
delighted to transmit from gene:.:ation to genera-
tion. 
In the dim moonlight the Twenty-first climbed 
the hill until it reached a rail fence near the bat-
and Twenty-htird, come to its aid. 
The enemy, having also been heavily re-enforced, 
made three more unsuccessful assaults, and then 
retired from the field. 
General Brown co111plimented the regiment 
and its commander in the highest terms and pre-
sented to it one of the captured guns, a beautiful 
bronze six-pounder, "in testimony of -its distin-
guished gallantry." In addressing Colonel Miller 
he said, "You have immortalized yourself"; and 
passing years have proved his prophecy correct. 
In this desperate struggle the Twenty-first 
lost one hundred and twenty-six killed and wound-
ed, or forty-five per cent. of its entirP- stren~ :h, 
the regiment having entered with less than three 
hundred men. 
The battle was won against odds of almost 
two to one, and from a foe that numbered in his 
ranks many of Wellington's veterans, trained on 
the battlefields of the Spanish Peninsula. As ex-
ample of calculating courage, of tenacious persist-
ence, and of headlong bravery, our history con-
tains none more brilliant, nor is it likely to show, 
in the future, one more glorious. · Time cannot 
dim .the luster of such deeds. · 
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21st INFANTRY ANTHEM 
In 1916-1917, while the Regiment was engaged on ,Kexican Border 
duty, with headquarters in San Diego, ' California, it acquired an · 
~admiring friend in. C.arrie Jacobs Bond, famous American composer. 
The Blue Flag, a musical selectio~ f'or band, was oOpyrighted by 
her in 1917. She published. this selection and dedicat'd it to the 
21st Illf8J}try.. T-he End of' a P~r!ect Day, the author's best known 
composition, const-itutes .a part of' The Blue Flag, and was dedicated 
as the Regimental, Anthem at ·a meeting of the entire Regiment on 
September 16, 19:37. The words of' the anthem are by lla.rgaret B. 
Woodward, wife. of Second Lieutenant. La.ma.r F. Woodward, 21st In-
fantry. 
To the glor.y of' men w~o haTe. gone before, 
~d the glory of .sons yet unborn; 
The Twenty•first ever we · consecrate, 
118¥ her crest long with honor be .worn; 
United we'll sta'nd whene 1er duty calls, 
To a man, till the viet 'ry is won, 
And the . f'ame and the st~ength of the Twenty-first 
Shall be pride in the task wel~ done. 
Peninsula 
Virginia 1862 
Manassas 
Antietam 
Fredericksburg 
Chancellorsville 
Arizona 1866 
Arizona 1867 
Arizona 1868 
Arizona 1869 
Santiago 
Zapote River 
Luzon 1899 
BAmE HONORS 
21st Infantry 
CIVIL WAR 
Gettysburg 
Virginia 1863 
WUderness 
Spottsrlvania 
Cold Harbor 
Petersburg 
INDIAN WARS 
Arizona 1870 
Modoc 
Nez Percea · 
'Bannocks 
SPANISH AMERICAN W1R 
PHILIPPINES INSUaRECTION 
6 
Luzon 1901 
Luzon 1902 
-. 
~RLD 7/AR II. 
Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941 
Tanahmerah Bay, New Guinea, 22 April 1944 
Hollandia, New Guinea, 23-28 April 1944 
Philippine Islands 
Panaon Island, 20 October 1944 
Breakneck Ridge, Leyte, 5-18 November 1944 
Hill 1525, 8-9 November 1944 (1st Bn.) 
Daro - Mt. Lao - Yt. Mamban, 20 November - 10 December 1944 
Carigara Defensive, 10-27 December 1944 
~san Jose, Mindoro, 22-29 December 1944 (3rd Bn.) 
San Jose, 29 December -~January 1945 (Remainder of Rgt.) 
.Boa}(, Maranduque, January 1945 (KCo.) 
?inamalay&n, Mindoro, 7-11 January 1945 (I Co.) 
Bongabong, 6-14 January 1945 (3rd -Bn.) 
Gusay, 20 January 1945 
Calipan - Najuan, 20-24 January 1945 
Nasugbu - Wawa - Lian - Tagaytay - Imus - Paranaque - Zapote -
Las Pinas - Nichols Field ~ Ft. Wm. McKinley - Alabang - Los Banos 
31 January - 3 March 1945 (Cannon Company) 
Lubang Island, 28 February - 7 March 1945 (1st Bn.) 
Dipolog, Mindanao, March 1945 (2nd Bn.) 
Malabang- Parang, . Mindanao, 17 April 1945 
Cotobato, 18 April 1945 (2nd Bn.) 
Tamontako - Lamopog, 18-19 April 1945 (2nd Bn.) 
Toril - Bago, 2 May 1945 
Mintal, 2-9 May 1945 _ 
Libby Drome, 3-13 May 1945 
Talamo Heights, 10-13 May 1945 (1st Bn.) 
Tugbok, 9-19 May 1945 (2nd Bn.) 
Mintal - Ula Roads, 9-25 May 1945 
Bayabas, 30-31 M&y 1945 (1st Bn.) 
Mulig, 2 June 1945 
Alhambre, 3 June 1945 
Sh&nkee,· 3 June 1945 
Monterey -Naming - Tag&kp&n - Talomo Valley, 3-13 June 1945 
Wangan, 15 June 1945 
Calinan, 18 June 1945 
B&guio, 17-18 June 1945 
Tamg&n Trail, 6-19 June 1945 
Tamogan Trail, 10 July - 1 August 1945 
Sarangani Bay, 16. July- 7 August 1945 (lst Bn.) 
\ 
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CCJOlENDATION BY THE COWANDI!l} GENERAL 
24th DIVISION 
The 21st Infantry Regiment is cited for extraordinary heroism 
and outstanding performance of duty in action against the enem_y far 
6 to 16 November 1944, and from 1 Kay to 19 June 1945, on Leyte and 
llindanao Islands • 
On 6 November i944, the Regiment launched the first of a relent-
less series of attacks against Breakneck Rid~e, key to the ene~ de-
fense system at the -head of the Ormoc Corridor. Despite almost 
constant rain; the en~'s through exploitation of nearly perfect de- · 
fensive terrain; meagre and uncertail'l supply, and dwindling reserves 
of manpower as compared with the enemy's constant reinforcement, the 
21st Infantry took the offensive and held it against a veteran eneJV 
force. ·By frontal attack and envelopment, the 21st maintained such 
pressure against a numerically superior enemy, that in twelve days 
it advanced 2000 yards and seized complete contrel or the dominating 
high ground. The Regiment counted a total of 1,779 enemy dead, an 
irreparable blow to one of the Japanese Eopire's finest divisions~ 
Undoubtedly many others lay undiscovered in the tangled terrain. 
This bitter and sustained struggle broke the enemy hold on the nor-
thern end of the Ormoc Valley and paved the way for the subsequent 
capture of Limon and the ultimate neutralization of the ~ntire island. 
So severe had been the fighting that every third line soldier was either 
killed or wounded. Seven rifle company commanders fell~ The· Regiment 
then aided, after a short rest, in the annihilatiQn of the enemy on 
Mindoro, Marinduque, Lubang, and Luzon. It struck lfindanR.o on 17 April 
as an assault unit of the 24th Division, seized the Malabang Airstrip 
and the key river port of Cotabato, and took part in the Division's 
lightning drive across the island. On 1 May, commencing at Bago, 140 
miles from its starting point, the Regiment attacked 6,500 Japanese 
troops concentrated in the Talomo ·River Valley. These elements were 
. I 
strongly supported by artillery, armed with an inordinately high pro-
portion of automatic weapons and manning expertly placed positions, 
built over a period of years, and naturally camouflaged by lush trop-
ical growbh. For fifty-one heat-ridden days, with thick abaca fields 
channelizing its attacks, but permitting strong infiltration against 
its flanks and rear, the 21st continued the indomitable assault. After 
fourteen days it was able to commit only 54% of its original strength, 
but it never relaxed pressure. Without losing momentum, it absorbed 
1000 replacements. By 18 June the Regiment had advanced twelve miles, 
taken the finest airfield on Davao Gulf, killed by actual count 2,133 
enemy troops, disorganized and scattered the remainder and destroyed 
or captured all of their organic equipment. In addition to its heavy 
battle casualties, the attrition of severe heat, difficult terrain and 
continued strain had forced hospitalization of 1,411 other officers and 
men. · During the gruelling period every assigned objective was taken on 
schedule. The fierce fighting spirit of the Regiment comnrunicated it-
self to every man, old and new alike, and morale remained grimly high. 
These actions of the 21st Infantry Regiment reflect the finest tradi-
tions of the United States Ar~ and will stand as a bright page in the 
nation's military history. 
8 
ROSCOE B. WOODRUFF 
l.lajor General 
Commanding. 
TiiE TWENTY FIRST REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM 
(On Leyte) 
21st Infantry Regiment 
52nd Field Artillery Battalion 
1st Platoon, Company A, 3rd Engineers 
Collecting Company A, 24th Medical Rgt. 
Company A, 44th Tank Battalion 
Company C, 632nd Tank Destroyer Battalion 
Company C, 85th Chemical Battalion (4.2" mortars) 
7th Portable Surgical Hospital 
I After the battle of Breakneck Ridge the RCT was changed from 
time to time to include other Engineer Units, new Portable Surgical 
Ho~itals, and tank ~nd TD units, but the 52nd Field Artillery - a 
magnificient battalion of 105mm howitzers - remained with the 21st 
Infantry throughout al'~ the fighting in the Philippines except for 
a few weeks at Caragara when the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion was 
substituted. 
It is desired here to pay tribute to the 52nd Field Artillery 
Battalion. No one knows more than the infantryman in battle how much 
we rely on our own artillery. The 52nd was always there with its g_uns 
to support us with its accurate and heavy fire for every step of our 
advance. Their forward observers were always with the most advanced 
infantrymen arxi performed acts of gallantry daily. Their guns were 
always our closest friends. Many a dea~ ·Jap claimed on the scoresheet 
of the 21st Infantry was really killed by our brothers of the 52nd. 
llaey a soldier owes his life to them. Every honor which we claim for 
the 21st Infantry: Regiment we gladly share with the 52nd Field Artil-
lery Battalion. 
9 
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PEARL HARBOR AND THE EARLY DAYS 
When the Japanese ·struck Pearl Harbor, the 24th Division was one of 
the two divisions garrisoned in the Hawiian Islands. This was December 
7, 1941. The division suffered light casualties only., The division was 
composed basically of three regimental combat teams built around its three 
infantry regiments. Threse regiments were the 19th Infantry (Rock of 
Chikamauga), the 21st Infantry (Gimlets) and the 34th Infantry. The 24th 
Division was a Regular Army Division. The division immediately began to 
strengthen the defenses of Oahu and train for jungle warfare and amphi-
bious landings. 
When the threat to the islands had passed, the division sailed for the 
South Pacific, arriving at Rockhampton, Australia in August 1943. Then 
began another long period of training which was soon to bear its first 
fruit. 
HOLLANDIA, NEW GUINEA 
On 22 .April 1944, D-Day for the Tanahmerah Bay-Hollandia Campaign, the 
Regiment launched its first campaign against the Japs. This invasion 
climaxed a long period of training and defensive action in Oahu, Australia, 
and Goodenough Island.' The Gimlets smashed thru thirty-five miles of rough 
jungle terrain in four and a half days and fought one battle enroute. This 
campaign has since been rated as the fastest and best coordinated campaign 
in jungle warfare. 
After a practice landing on the coast of New Guinea, the Gimlets loaded 
on transports and became part of a 850 ship convoy. Seven days later, on 
the morning of 22 April 1944, the Regiment landed at Tanahmerah and Depapre, 
New r~inea. 
ACTION CF THS 21ST INFANTRY, 22 APRIL 1944 
The 21st Inf~ntry, commanded by Col. Charles Lyman, less the lst Bat-
talion, to land at Tanahmerah Bay, secure a beachhead, and move overland 
to Depapre. The 3rd Engineers to construct a road from Tanahmerah to 
Depapre. The 52nd Field Artillery to go into position at Tanahmerah Bay 
and be prepared to fire in support of the Regiment. 
ACTION OF THE lst BATTALION, 21ST INFANTRY 
The lst Battalion, 2ist Infantry, was ordered to land at Depapre Bay, 
secure a beachhead, leave Company 11 A11 to hold the beachhead until relieved 
by the 2nd Battalion, 21st Infantry. The lst Battalion, less Company "A" 
to move out immediately and seize the Regimental objective, the high ground 
overlooking Depapre. 
At 0830 the morning of 22 April 1944 the lst Battalion, commanded by 
Lieut. Colonel Thomas (Jock) Clifford, had successfully established a beach-
. head at Depapre Bay. Company 11 A11 quickly organized the defense of the beach-
heaq/ and the remainder of the Battalion moved out toward Mariobe, the Regi-
mental objective. 
At 1600, 22 April, the 1st Battalion had seized Mariobe, and dug in for 
the night. · The first day of the campaign had been uneventful with exception 
of a few Japs killed by naval fire, and two prisoners captured by a patrol 
from Company 11C11 lead by Lieut. Charles Counts. These were the first Jap 
prisoners to be captured by the Gimlets. 
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The landing of the Regiment at Tanahmerar w~s not so successful. The 
terrain that looked so good in aerial photos t urned out to be impassable 
swamp. This beachhead had to be abandoned and the Regimental combat team 
moved by landing craft to the Depapre beachhead. A small detachment of 
the 2nd Battalion was sent overland from Tanahmerah to Depapre to recon-
noiter the shore. The Depapre beachhead, although inadequate, became the 
beachhead of the entire 24th Division. 
On the morning of 23 April the Gimlets bagged their first Jap. Pvt. 
Martin of Company "C", looking up from a breakfast of "K" ration, saw a Jap 
peering thru the bushes. A well aimed shot earned Martin the honor of being 
the first Gimlet to kill a Jap. This was number one on a list of many thou-
sand doomed to stop Gimlet lead. 
Eager to contact the ene~, the 1st Battalion pushed on. All morning of 
the 23rd of April Jap reconnaissance patrols moved parallel to our column 
but no contact was made. At 1500, 23 April 1944, the 2nd Platoon, Company 
110 11 , commanded by Lieut. Jack Wright, contacted and drove in a Jap outpost 
on Distassi Creek. Distassi Creek was named in. homr Qf Sgt. Distassi, the 
first Gimlet killed in action against the Japs. The 2nd Platoon of Company 
"C" had engaged a strong ene~ force estimated as two rifle companies rein-
forced. 
The 1st Platoon, Company "0", commanded by Lieut • . Robert (Ace) Malone, 
was ordered to envelop the ene~'s left flank. Moving quickly the 1st 
Platoon overran a Jap outpost of twenty men, crossed the creek and drove 
to center of the enemy strong point where they met stubborn resistance. 
The weapons platoon of Company 11C11 , commanded by Lieut. William Langford, 
went into action, made a direct hit on a Jap armored car and neutralized 
three machine gun nests. Company ncn was commanded by Captain Roy Marcy. 
Lieut. Phillip Irons lead a platoon of Company 11B11 up and moved into posi-
tion on the right flank of Company 11C11 • The small area '16s a hell of sound, 
gun flashes, and the hoarse shouts of men in battle. 
At 1630 Colonel Clifford ordered the 1st Battalion into perimeter for 
the night. Just before dusk the Battalion was greeted by Father Brady, 
the Regimental Chaplain. He was making the rounds giving away cigarettes 
and words ,of encouragement. Chaplain Brady had gone ashore with the bulk 
of the regiment, but upon l'l!aring that the 1st Battalion was in a fight, 
had made the hazardous trip up over the mountain to join the 1st Battalion. 
That night the enemy pulled out of their defense on the creek, broke in-
to small groups, and continued to harass our perimeter until dawn of the 
24th. 
The morning of 24 April patrols were sent out and reported that the 
enemy had withdrawn. At 0900 Company "A", having been relieved from the 
beachhead, rejoined the 1st Battalion and was sent across the creek to 
occupy the Jap position. Orders were received to hold our position until 
the Regiment could be consolidated and rations and ammunition brought for-
ward. At 1100 the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infan~ry, joined the 1st Battalion. 
At 0730, April 25th, the 1st Battalion continued the advance on Hollandia. 
The terrain opened up as we followed an ~roved road toward the drome. En-
emy equipment and supplies had been abandoned beside the road as the terri-
fied enemy hastily withdrew. In some houses tables were found set for meals 
that were never eaten. Occasionally a sniper would harass our column but 
never again did the enemy attempt to block our advance to Hollandia. 
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At 1155, 26 April 1944, Company 11C11 , the Advance Guard of the Regiment, 
pulled upon a high hill overlooking the Hollandia Drome. As far as the 
eye could see lay blasted planes. The Regimental Commanaer ordered the 
Jrd Battalion to pass thru the 1st Battalion and seize the Drome. The Jrd 
Battalion, commanded by Lieut.Colonel Chester A. Dahlen, moved across the 
Hollandia Drome and secured the field. Later in the day the Jrd Battalion 
sent a patrol on to the Cyclops Drome where contact was made between the 
24th and 41st Divisions thus ending the campaign~ 
So far, I have dea·cribed only the action of the lead battalion of the 
Regiment. To the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lieut.Colonel Seymour E. Madi-
son, fell the task of supplying the lead battalions. The track over the 
mountain proved impassable for vehicles, even for the G~I.'s friend, the 
jeep. Instead, Gimlets wanting to fight, found themselves lugging boxes of 
K rations and ammunition in a long file up the rugged trail to supply the· 
battalions forming the spearhead. It was ignominious work for highly 
trained combat men, but to their credit. 
The campaign was officially over but much fighting remained to be done. 
The Hollandia Invasion had isolated 60~000 Japa to the south. They of course 
would attempt to join the forces north of Hollandia. The avenue of escape 
to the north was canalized through the Hollandia area. Trail blocks were 
established on all trails and trail functions leading north. It was in this 
kind of action that Pvt. Monroe McGee of Company nCn distinguished himself. 
McGee contributed a total of 45 Japs, killed, to the Regimental list. He 
was often referred to as, "One Man Patrol McGee". 
When the mop-up was completed, the enemy had lost 1771 killed, and a 
then unprecedented number of priaoners - 502. This number was shared equally 
by all battalions of the Regiment. The Regiment had suffered only 32 casu-
alties during the entire campaign. The main part of the division remained 
at Hollandia until the time was ripe for the invasion of the Philippines. 
SIXTH U. S. ARMY -- PACIFIC VETERAN 
By General Walter Krueger, USA 
Commanding General, Sixth Armr 
By mid-october 1944, Sixth Army had cleared Western New Britain of enemy 
forces, had reconquered the Admiralties, had completed its operations on 
the north coast of New Guinea, had seized and secured southeastern Morotai 
in the Halmaheras, and was enroute to Leyte Island to begin the liberation 
of the Philippines. In order to appreciate the operations which followed, 
it is necessary to understand General MacArthur's over-all plan for the Phil-
ippine Campaign. First, the Leyte Operation was to be undertaken to obtain 
naval, air and supply bases from which to provide support for future Phil-
ippine Campaigns; next, the plan called for a hop from Leyte across the 
Visayas to seize southwestern Mindoro so as to establish airfields within 
125 miles of Manila Bay; and third, a landing was to be made in the Lingayen 
Gulf. area of Luzon,~ followed by a rapid drive southward to seize the Central 
Plain-Manila area, to open Manila Bay to our shipping, and subsequently, to 
destroy hostile forces remaining on Luzon. All of these operations were 
assigned to Sixth Ar~ and plans for t heir accomplishment were well under · 
way by the time Sixth Army.was enroute to Leyte . 
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The Leyte Operation was divided into three tactical phases. Phase 
One consisted of an amphibious operation to secure the entrances to 
Leyte Gulf. Phase Two comprised major amphibious assaults: to seize 
the coastal strip of eastern Leyte from Tacloban to Dulag, including 
the airdromes and base sites in the area; to open San Juanico Strait 
and Panaon Strait; and to secure the central valley of Leyte including 
the Carigara Bay area on the north central coast. ·Phase Three called 
for the destruction of hostile forces remaining on Leyte and the clear-
ing of hostile forces from southern Samar. Phase One of this operation 
lasted from 17-19 October 1944, during which time the 6th Ranger Infantry 
Battalion occupied Dinagat, Homonhon and Suluan Islands, thus securing 
the entrance to Ley~e Gulf. Phase Two was initiated on 20 October 1944 
when X Corps and XXIV Corps landed on the east coast of Leyte in a power-
ful amphibious assault. These landings followed by one hour the landing 
of the 21st Infantry Regiment .of the 24th Infantry Division on Panaon 
Island,. where this regiment rapidly established control over Panaon Strait. 
Sixth Army quickly exploited its initial successes. In the X Corps zone 
. of action the 1st Cavalry Division on 20 October seized Tacloban Airfield 
and on the following day captured Tacloban. Five days later elements of 
this division were moving northwestward along San Juanico Strait toward 
Carigara. The 24th Infantry Division secured Palo on 21 October, then 
advanced rapidly into the Leyte Valley, and on 29 October succeeded in 
gaining contact with elements of the 1st Cavalry Division south of Cari-
gara. In a coordinated attack by unit.s of these two divisions Carigara 
was captured 2 November. 
Meanwhile, in the XXIV Corps .zone of action, the 7th Infantry Division 
captured Dulag airstrip on 21 October, advanced rapidly westward to seize 
the three airfields in the Burauen area by 25 October, and captured Dagami 
on 29 October against heavy enemy resistance. Other elements of this di-
vision pushed southward, secured Abuyog and then advanced westward across 
the mountains to occupy Baybay on the Camotes Sea. The 96th Infantry Di-
vision, which had landed on the right of the 7th Infantry Division, init-
ia}ly by-passed enemy positions on Catmon Hill and seized the southern 
portion of the Leyte Valley within its zone of action. This division 
attacked Catmon Hill on 28 October and qy 31 October had completely el~ 
ina ted all enemy resistance there. · Following this action, the 96th Infan-
try Division began the relief of the 7th Infantry Division in the Dulag-
Burauen-Dagami-Tanauan area. 
By 2 November 1944, Sixth Army had gained control of the broad Leyte 
Valley and its airfields, had opened Panaon and San Juanico Straits, and 
had secured Carigara on the north central coast and B~bay on the west 
coast, thus successfully ·completing the second phase of the operation. 
It soon developed, however, that General Yamashita, the Japanese commander 
in the Philippines, intended to hold Leyte at all costs. The Japanese High 
Command had already committed its navy in a bold and desperate attempt to 
defeat our naval forces in Philippine waters and destroy our shipping in 
Leyte Gulf. In the historic Battle of Leyte Gulf which occurred during the 
period 24-26 October, this threat was turned back by our Third and Seventh 
Fleets. A large part of the enemy naval forces were sunk and the remainder 
withdrew in a badly damaged condition. 
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In spite of this disastrous -~ ~vai defeat, General Yamashita rushe1 
reinforcements to Leyte on all aVailable craft, openly stating that the 
battle of the Philippines would be won or lost on Leyte Island. From 
Cebu, Panay, and Uindanao, enemy reinforcements came in barges, landing 
craft and other minor shipping; and from Luzon reinforcements poured south-
ward in cruisers, destroyers, destroyer escorts and transports. In spite 
of terrific losses inflicted by our air attacks on his convoys, the enemy 
succeeded in landing a corps headquarters, and the bulk of · five divisions, 
besides a ·considerable number of corps, combat and service troops. By 
. early NOvember, it was clearly apparent that Phase Three of the operation 
· would be difficult and protracted, due not only to the heavy reinforcements 
which the ene~ was rushing to Leyte, but also to the advent of the rainy 
season and · to a lack of adequate air support ·caused by our inability t .o 
build airfields in the- m:>rass that Leyte had become. 
,J>hase Three began on 3 November ·when X Corps advanced the 24th Infantry 
Division westwa~d from its positions at Carigara. This division captured 
Pinamopoan 'on 4 November and then turned southward on Highway 2 in the di-r~ction of Ormoc. Shortly thereafter, it encountered strong and stubborn 
resistance 6h Breakneck Ridge which was not ' eliminated until· 16 November. 
End of Excerpt from General Kruger's Report. 
X CORPS - LEITE 
By Major General F. C. Sibert, USA 
Commandin~ General,. X Corps 
I Corp~, wxier Sixth Army, in its first, operation landed on Leyte on 
20 October 1944 in the first and decisive battle of the Philippines. 
Its initial objectives, the seizure of Tacloban, Tacloban Airstrip, 
.·Palo, juncture with the xnv Corps, and the opening of the San Juanico 
Strait, were accomplished in five bloody days in the midst of thousands 
of~riendly filipinos and one typhoon. 
. By the twelfth day, the final Corps objective was taken when the 24th 
Infantry, Division, -driving up Leyte Va~ley, coordinated with the 1st Cav-
alry- Division in a combined attack on Carigara. Elements of the 16th 
Japanese Division had been badly mauled and remnants driven into the hills 
between Ormoc Val~ey and Leyte Valley. The first of the Japanese reinforee-
'ments were met in the center of the valley at Jaro where elements of the 
Japanese 30th Division from Mindanao and elements of the 102d Japanese Di-
Yision from Cebu were kicked aside h1 the 24th Infantry Division. 
Japanese reinforcements were now pouring into Ormoe and the Corps was 
· given the mission of advancing to secure that Port. The 24th Infantry 
Division advanced west along Carigara Bay and turned south on the highway 
. towards LiJOOn and Ormoc. The. _1st Cavalry Division moved into the hills be-
tween the two valleys to prevent aey hostile attempt to cross into Leyte 
Valley. 
On turning south towards Lim:>n, the 24th Infantry Division had a meeting 
. engagement with the crack Japanese 1st Division and a gruelling fight en-
sued before the 24th Infantry D~vision finally overran the Japanese .main 
position (Breakneck Ridge). . 
End of Excerpt from General Sibert's Report. 
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ROSTER OF OFFICERS ASSIGNED 
TO 21ST INFANTRY AS CF 20 OCTOBER 1944 
' ' 
Able, Sothoron K. 
Aitken, llalco.m D. 
Allen, Shelton P. 
Anderson, Ernie o. 
Anglim, Edward ll. 
Babich, Peter C. 
Barker, Silas R. 
Battin, Donald H·. 
Becker, Philip A. 
Bemis, Russell B. 
Berkowitz, Julius 
Blair, Oa ther 
Bland, Irvin G. 
Blaney~ Kermit B. 
Bowman, Wheeler G. 
Boyd, Wilbur B. 
~rown, Robert A. 
Brown, Roy c. 
Browning, Newton F. 
Bunkley, Thomas H. 
'Bussell, Frank T. 
Buttice, Angelo P. 
Byrd, William M. 
Clifford, Thomas E. Jr. 
Coers, Burt N. 
Cooper, Clee s. 
Corrigan, Michael J. 
Counts, Charles R. 
Courtney, Burl 
Crosson, Hugh s. Jr. 
Crouch, Theodore 
Curles, Cecil ll. 
Dantzler, LeRoy A. Jr. 
Dice, Francis R. 
Didak, Eugene J, 
Eastman, Walter R. 
Eddy, Lowell P. 
Edleson, Harold 
Ender, Robert R. 
·Evans, Roy A. 
Farmer, Edward s. 
Farrell, John B. 
·Fisher, Francis R. 
Ford, Clarence R. 
Foster, Lute A. Jr. 
li'ourqurean, Wade D. 
Gilbert, John T. 
Girardeau, John H. Jr. 
Goldpaugh, John J. 
Goean, Robert L. 
Gullie, Frank J . 
Haas, Arthur c. 
1st Lt. 
Capt. 
Capt • . · 
1st Lt. 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
1st ·Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
1st Lt. 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
Capt. 
2nd ;Lt. 
llajor 
2nd Lt. 
1st Lt. 
Lt.Col. 
lla.jor 
.2nd Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
llajor 
2nd Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
Capt. 
let Lt. 
w.o. 
lst Lt. 
1st Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
1st Lt. 
. 1st Lt. 
Capt. · 
1st Lt. 
Capt. 
W.O. 
1st Lt. 
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Co. I. Plat. Ldr. 
Hq. 3d Bn., Bn. S-3 
Regtl. Ammo Off • 
Co. A •. C.O. 
Co. L. C.O. 
Co. A. 
Co. K. 
Co. E. 
Pers. Off. 
Asst. Rgt. S-4 
Rgt. Dent. Sur g. 
D~S. Sixth -Army 
-D.s. 24th Div. 
Co. L. 
Co. A. 
Co. I. 
Hq. 1st Bn., Bn. s-f 
Co. G. 
Rgt. S-1 
Co. K. 
.Regt. S-4 
Co. B. 
Rgt. Com. Off. 
Leave in U.S. 
Rgt. Surg. 
Co. F. 
Co. A. 
Co. C. 
Co. L. 
2nd Bn. Ex. Off. 
Co. B. 
Cannon Co. 
D.S. 24th Div. 
2nd Bn. Bn. Comdr. 
Co. E. 
3rd Bn. Com. Off. 
D .S. SiX.th Army 
Cannon Co. c.o. 
Co. H. C.O. 
As at • A.mnlo •. Off. 
Co. D. 
Hq. Co. lst Bn. 
Co. E. 
Co. F. 
Hq. Co. 1st Bn. 
Co. A. 
Co. K. 
Leave in U.S. 
Leave in U.S. 
Hq. Co. 3rd Bn. C.O. 
Asst. S-4 
Co. H. 
(' 
Halderson, Llewellyn D. 
Hall, Claude H. 
Haller) RObert F. 
Hammer, Richard P. 
Handel, David 
Hansen, David W. 
Hartley, Russell w. 
Hartman, Wm. H. 
Hawkins, William S. 
Haywood, Major G. 
Hudson, Roger W~ 
Hughes, William C. Jr. 
Irons, Philip S., III 
Ivey, Paul B. 
Jameson, Charles R. Jr. 
Johnson, Dale E. 
Jones, Erner 
Kelley, Jack H. 
Kester, Alfred J. 
Kilgo, Robert L. 
tancaster, James L. 
Langford, William N~ 
Lannin, Thomas R. · 
Leahy, Johri P. 
Leatherman, Leland F. 
Lenm, Stanley C. 
Leaky, Albert W • . 
Little, Lamar w. 
Lockhart, Gerald L. 
Langridge, Kermit c. 
Luria, Sidney B. 
McFarland, James 
McMaster~ Rudolph J. 
Maclean, Ardell G. 
Madison, Seymour E. 
Malone, Robert H. 
Marcy, Roy W. · 
Marks, Arthur 
Marquez, Thomas 
Mayer, John D. 
Miller, George J. 
Moore, Dan. c. 
Morean, Gilbert W. 
Mote, Jack A. 
Murphy, James F. 
Nacheff, Steve P. 
Oler, William L. 
Olson, Erwin L. 
Parent, James M. 
Patrick, Wm. J. 
Pierce, James F. 
Postma, James L. 
Prall, William A. 
Ramee, Eric P. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
Capt. 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
w.o •. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
Major 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
Major 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st_ Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
Lt.Col. 
1st Lt. 
Major 
Capt. 
2nd Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
1st Lt. 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
1st Lt. 
Lt.Col. 
Co. E. 
Co. F. 
Co. K. 
Co. H. 
D.S. Hq. 24th Div. 
Co. D. 
Co. B. 
Co. B. 
3rd Bn. Surg. 
Sv. Co. MTO 
Hq. Co. 
Co. A. C.O. 
3rd Bn. S-3 
2nd Bn. S-2 
Co. F. C.O. 
Co. I. C.O. 
2nd Bn. Surg. 
Co. C. C.O. 
Hq. Co. 3rd Bn. 
.Co. E. C.O. 
Asst. Rgt. S-1 
Co. D. 
Hq. Co. 2nd Bn. 
1st Bn. Bn. C .o. 
Rgt. S-2 
2nd Bn. S-4 
2nd Bn. Asst. S-2 
3rd Bn. Bn. Exec. 
Co. B. C.O. 
A. T. Co. 
3rd Bn. Surg. 
1st Bn. Com. Off. 
Cannon Co. 
Co. C. 
Rgt. Exec. 
Co. ·c. 
Leave in u.s·. 
1st Bn. Surg. 
Co. G. 
2nd Bn. S-3 
T .D. 19th Inf. 
Co. H. 
A. T. Co. 
Hq. Co. 3rd Bn. 
A.T. Co. 
Rgt. Asst. S-4 
Leave in U.S. 
Serv. Co. c.o. 
Co. F. 
3rd Bn. S-4 
Co. K. 
3rd Bn. S-3 
Co. I. 
Hq. 3rd Bn. Bn. c.o. 
Reid, Neil E. 
Rannaker, Evert D. 
Rhein, William L. 
Rogers, Edward J. 
Rogers, Woodrow 'N . 
Rosenblatt, Benjamin 
Sabatine, Matthew 
Sellmer, George 
Seyle, Frank Vl. 
Sloan, Nicholas E. 
Smigrod: Seymour 
Smith, Henry M. 
Smith, Vinson s. 
Stanford,, Don D. 
Steward, Alvin E. 
Suber, Tom i'i. 
Swast, John J. 
Thompson, James H. 
Trembley, Arthur H. Jr. 
Ufer, Karl A. 
Upton, Sherwood A. 
Vinneau, Ernest L. 
Walters, Murray M. 
Weber, Frederick R. 
Nheeler, Leroy C. 
White, William C. 
Whitney, Charles R. 
Wr'.i. tney, Howard H. 
Wicker, Glenes E. 
Wilson, Milton E. 
Wright, Albert J. 
Young, Emitte L. 
Capt. 
2nd Lt. 
lst Lt. 
Capt. 
lst Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
lst Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
lst Lt. 
Capt. 
lst Lt. 
lst Lt. 
2nd Lt. 
Capt. 
lst Lt. 
Capt. 
Capt. 
Capt. 
lst Lt. 
Capt. 
Capt. 
lst Lt. 
Capt. 
Lt.Col. 
2nd Lt. 
lst Lt. 
lst Lt. 
lst Lt. 
lst Lt. 
lst Lt. 
lst Lt. 
lst Lt. 
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Co. M. C.O. 
Co. I. 
Asst. Dent. 
Co. A. C .0. 
SUr g. 
Co. C. 
Co. G. 
. 
Hq. Co. lst Bn. 
Co. M. 
Hq. Co. 
Rgt. S-3 
Co. G. 
Rgt. Hq. Co. (I & R Plat) 
1St Bn. S-4 
Jrd Bn. S-1 
Co. F. 
Co. K. C.O. 
Co. D. C.O. 
2nd Bn. S-1 
Co. D. 
Regimental Chaplain ' 
Leave in U.S. 
Co. K. 
Asst. Rgt. Chap. 
Rgt. Commander 
Co. M. 
Sv. Co. A&P Off-. 
Co. L. 
Co. K. 
A. T. Co • C • 0. 
Co. K. 
Co. C. 
Hq. co. 3rd Bn. 
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At the northern end of the Ormoc Valley on Leyte Island, the 
21st Infantry fought and won one of the most bitterly contested 
battles of the war. Fighting centered around Breakneck Ridge, a 
deeply accented terrain feature. Breakneck Ridge is not a ridge-
line, but is formed by a series of knobs. The low ground thick 
with shoulder high cogon grass, the pockets between the hills thick-
ly wooded. The valleys are deep and precipitous. Even a small force 
ingeniously emplaced could have exacted enormous casualties. The 
seriousness of the task became apparent when the presence of the 
First Japanese Division was determined. The First Division, fresh 
from Manchuria, superbly trained and equipped, organized a system of 
trenches and interlocking pillboxes, varied to cover both surrounding 
trenches and prepared fields of fire. Heavily supported by 75mm, 105nun, 
and l50mm artillery, this crack combat unit had developed what they con-
sidered an invulnerable line. 
·During the 12 days from 5 November 1944 to 16 November 1944 (in-
clusive), a technique for clearing connecting trenches in terrain im-
passiblJ for tanks, was per!ected. Assault fire carried into a trench 
from which teams with · grenades and tol1IIIIY' guns cleared the file from bend 
to bend. It was impossible to ~pot these fortifications because of the 
grass and excellent camouflage, Spider holes dug flush to the ground 
remained undiscovered even after troops had searched the area. Hundreds · 
of these holes were scattered indiscriminate~. Coordinated attack was 
difficult; move~nt limited by sniper fire and barely discernible auto-
matic fields of fire. 
Against this determined opposition an average of 200 yards a day 
was ,gained until the entire Breakneck Ridge was occupied. In the 2000 ( 
yard advance from the enemy's original front lines, 1,779 Japanese bodies 
had been counted. It is reasonable to assume many more lay dead in thick 
tropical vegetation. The action had been bitter for the 21st. Losses 
comprised heavy battle casualties and many from causes other then battle. 
Officer. casualties were inordinately heavy. At the conclusion of the 
action, line companies averaged 1 officer and 85 enlisted men. 
Difficulties arising from extremely broken terrain, sporadic communi- -
catiop, and inaccurate mapping were complicated by an intricate supply 
problem. Incessant rain transformed Leyte into one big mud hole. Carry-
ing parties exhausted themselves carrying anununition, water and rations. 
Rear echelon personnel were sent in and finally whole fighting units 
labored to supply the front lines. The men of the regiment were contin-
ual~ on the move, some fighting by day ~nd hauling supplies by night. 
Aside from the discomfort and serious drop in efficiency under this rain, 
it provided a protective curtain during the day and covered the ene~'s 
movements in night attacks. With Breakneck Ridge secured, the backbone 
of the island's resistance was broken. The successful termination of the 
action immeasurably hastened the end of Japanese occupation of Leyte. 
By the time the 21st Infantry was committed, the enemy had completed 
its organized withdrawal from Pinamopoan and Carigara to the Breakneck 
Ridge area. Since the Ormoc Road runs through the ridge, this high ground 
takes on a .definite importance. 
16 
The Jap First Division was a cocky outfit. 
On November 4th the Regiment landed at .Tanuan to meet the threat of 
newly landed Jap reinforcements. On the 5th the 21st Infantry Regimen-
tal combat team was trucked and mrched rapidly across t .he Island to the 
vicinity of Pinamspoan on the North shore. In the days to follow the 
bloodiest battling of this war was to take place between Pina.mapoan and 
Limon. The 21st Infantry met the enemy First Division, a. force three 
times its size, head on. After a week of this fight while the 21st was 
still slugging forward, two arms reached out around our flanks and struck 
the Japanese rear Limon. These daring flanking movements, although not a 
part of the Battle of Breakneck Ridge, described hereatter, deserve mention 
here. One Battalion of the Thirty-fourth Infantry under command of Lieut. 
Colonel Thomas Clifford (formerly of the 21st Infantry) took the right and 
one Battalion of the Nineteenth Infantry under . command of Lieut. Colonel 
R. B. Spragins enveloped from the left. These ~wo battalions made wide en-
circlements and were completely cut off from other troops and almost with-
out lines of communications. This daring plan of Major General Fred Irving, 
Division Commander, was entirely unsuspected by the enemy. Both battalions 
fought desperately and gallantly. There is no doubt that the Japanese First 
Division was caught off balance and crippled by these two battalions. 
· This is a story of the 21st Infantry and the details of the fights of 
Clifford and Spragins will not be recounted here. However, the story of 
our successful action on Breakneck Ridge, fh all probability, would never 
have been written had it not been for those two gallant battalions. 
In the following account the actions of the Regiment are described in 
some detail. In .reading it, one must remember that every move, every de-
fense, every attack was closely supported by artillery. The division 
artillery of the 24th Division included three battalions of 105W howitzers, 
the l)th, 52nd and 63rd Field Artillery Battalions and ,the 11th Field Ar-
tillery Battalion, 155MM howitzers. In addition to the constant and heavy t 
supporting fire of this artillery, the X Corps artillery of one battalion 
each of l55MM howitzers, 155MM guns, and 8 inch howitzers fired day and 
night in· our support. 
BREAKNECK RIDGE OFFENSIVE 
On the morning of 5 November 1944, the 21st Infantry was ordered to 
move to the PINAMOPOAN area and relieve . the 34th Infantry. Dispositions 
of Battalions at 0600, 5 November 1944 were as follows: 3rd Battalion and 
Headquarters Company were in the vicinity of COLASION: 1st Battalion at 
vicinity of CAPOOCAN, 2nd Battalion and Separate Units had just arrived at 
TANUAN and were preparing to move to vicinity of TUNGA. At approximately 
0930, 5 November 1944, a meeting was held at the 34th Infantry CP at 
PINAMOPOAN. Officers attending from the 21st Infantry were the Regimental 
Commander, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion Commander, S-2, S-3, and 3rd 
Battalion S-3. General plan of relief which was agreed upon was as follows: 
3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry to have road priority and move directly up High-
way #2 and relieve 3rd Battalion 34th Infantry as soon as possible. Upon 
arrival in that area by 3rd .Battalion 21st Infantry the 3rd Battalion 34th 
Infantry was to i.Jmlediat ely move to the .rear with priority on road. Approxi-
mate location of the 3rd Battalion 34th Infantry at the time of relief was 
( 07 .1-68.0). 1st Battalion 21st Infantry was to nvve up after the 3rd 
Battalion, 34th Infantry had cleared, and occupy the area held by 2nd Bat-
talion, 34th Infantry in the vicinity of (07.5-68.2) 
17 
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From approximate~ 1000-1115, the Regimental Commander, Lieut. Col. 
Frederick Weber, 3rd Battalion Commander, Lt.Col. Eric ~e, and Regi-
mental S-3, Capt. Nicholas Sloan, made reconnaissance of the area to place 
the two Battalions. At the Jrd Battalion, 34th Infantry CP, the Executive 
Officer, 34th Infantry joined the Reconnaissance party. The Regimental 
Commander decided to make a reconnaissance for the lst Battalion, and the 
Jrd Battalion Commander, Regimental S-3 with the Executive Officer, 34th 
Infantry as a guide were to look over the forward area. It was soon dis-
covered that the highest and most commanding ground in the area hadn't been 
occupied so the Jrd Battalion Commander decided to occupy it upon arrival 
of his Battalion. The party picked up a squad from Company 11E11 , 34th Infan-
try at Point, "A" and proceeded towards the bridge. Men from this squad were 
dropped off at lntervals to the east of the road to occupy the high ground 
(Point 11C11 ), thus providing local security for the Reconnaissance Party •. At 
the bridge two jeeps from the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion were parked and 
drivers said that the officers and a forward observer party were on the high 
ground conducting fire at a school house that had 25 Japs in it. The Execu-
tive Officer, 34th Infantry confirmed this. The Reconnaissance party pro-
ceeded from the bridge forward to Point 11 B'1 , without security as the squad 
was all disposed. At the furthermost point that the Reconnaissance party had 
advanced they could see the target that the Artillery was firing on. The tar-
get was about 300 yards on up the road. At this point the Reconnaissance 
party came back to the bridge and worked their way up to the high ground on 
the east side of the road at Point 11C". From this high ground, the Artillery 
firing on OP hill was observed. No contact was ever made with men from Com-
pany "K" who were sent up from the road to occupy this ground while the party 
made its reconnaissance up the road. At approximately 1115, the 3rd Battali~n 
Commander left to meet his Battalion. The Regimental S-3 met the Regimental 
Commander and returned. While enroute back to the CP a reconnaissance was 
made for the Regimental CP. A site at Point 11 A11 was selected. At '1230, upon 
return of the Regimental Commander and the S-3 to the Regimental CP, the Regi-
mental Executive Officer had a message from the artillery that their forward 
OP was being attacked. A message was sent to the 3rd Battalion Commander at 
1240 to investigate and take necessary action. At 1330, the 3rd Battalion 
Commander requested the artillery to cease firing. This fire soon ceased. 
Later on in the afternoon of 5 November 1944, it was learned that Com-
pany "K" had occupied OP Hill with slight opposition and had freed the 52nd 
Field Artillery party. Company 11 Itt had occupied the high ground later named 
"Hot Spot Knob". Both companies dug in. The 3rd Battalion attempted to run 
ammunition, food and .shovels to "I" & ttK" Companies but enemy fire prevented 
this. Small amounts of ammunition reached "K" Company. Meanwhile the 1st 
Battalion roved to the vicinity of PINAVOPOAN. 11 A11 and nan Companies then 
moved to areas occupied by 2nd Battalion, 34th Infantry. Company "C" re-
mained in the vicinity of COLASION to guard bridges. By dark, troop dispo-
sitions were as follows: Company "l" and Heavy Machine Gun Section, "Hot 
Spot Knob"; Company "K" and Heavy Machine Gun Section, O.P. Hillr Company 
"L" as follows: 1 platoon as litter bearers and carrying parties; 1 platoon 
for Battalion CP defense, 1 platoon with Company 11 K11 • During the night both 
Company "!" and 11 K" were counterattacked. The 3rd Battalion, 19th Infantry 
18 
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BRONZE STAR 
Captain TOM W. SUBER, Infantry. U. S. Army. For heroic 
achievement in connection with military operations against the 
enemy near PASSANGRAHN, DUTCH NEW GUINEA, from 29 April to 3 
May 1944. When two patrols of an infantry regiment were am-
bushed and pinned down by intense enemy machine gun fire, 
Captain Suber immediately organized and personally led another 
platoon to the scene. Due to his excellent leadership, initia-
tive and ~ood judgment, the enemy was taken by surprise and 
quickly fled, thus relieving the beleagured patrols. Through-
out this entire period Captain Suber displayed a high degree 
of initiative and leadership. quickly establishing control of 
his men after landing. and maintaining excellent control and 
orP,er during the advance to HOLLANDIA DROME, in spite of tre-
mendous supply and evacuation difficulties. Captain Suber's 
unselfish devotion to duty during this entire period reflects 
great cre~it upon himself and the military service. 
SILVER STAR (POSTHUMOUS) 
Staff Sergeant AHTOHIO PEPE, Infantry, United States Army. 
For gallantry in action nee,r Pinamopoan, Leyte, Philippine 
Islands, on 6 Hovember 1944. Sergeant Pepe volunteered to go 
to the rear to bring up vitally needed machine gun and mortar 
ammunition. With utter disregard for his own safety he crossed 
ground in a truck under intense enemy fire. Upon returning with 
ammunition the truck vas hit. putting it out of action. Sergeant 
Pepe jumped out of the truck and assisted in the defense of this 
ammunitio~ securing it until elements of his unit were able to 
reach i't. He gave his 1 ife for this cause. Sergeant Pepe 1 s cour-
age and determination are a credit to himself and are in accord 
with the highest traditions of the service. 
SILVER STAR 
Staff Sergeant (then Sergeant) DOMINIC R. CASTRO. Infantry. 
United St·ates Army·. lor gallantry in action at Breakneck Ridge. 
Leyte. Philippine Islands. on 6 Hovember 1944~ Sergeant Castro 
was a squad leader in an infantry rifle company. The enemy made 
a bayonet charge on his position. Sergeant Castro was hit by a 
grenade and also bayoneted. He stayed in his position without 
medical attention until he was properly relieved. By his remain-
ing in position, enemy infiltration was not possible. Sergeant 
Castro displayed true devotion to duty and was an inspiration to 
allrwho witnessed his actions. 
SILVER STAR 
Private CHARLES E. CLEMMER, Infantry, United States Army. 
lor gallantry in action at Breakneck Ridge, Leyte, Philippine 
Islands, on 5 November 1944. Private Clemmer was an automatic 
rifleman in an infantry company. During a heavy attack against 
the enemy he was on the left flank of his platoon. In this 
actio~ the squad leader and several of the men were killed 
One enemy sol4ier threw a grenade at Private Clemmer's BAR 
and he caught the grenade in one hand and threw it back thus 
saving the lives of the BAR team. Private Clemmer's quick 
thinking and complete disregard for his own personal safety 
was a source of ~nspiration to all vho witnessed his actions 
and reflects great credit upon himself and the military service. 
SILVER STAR 
Staff Sergeant (then Private First Class) ANTHONY J. 
JASIUIEWIEZ, Infantry, United States Army. For gallantry 
in action at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 5 November 1944. 
Sergeant Jasiukiewiez was a scout ~or an infa~try rifle pla-
toon. He pushed forward in front of his platoon under heavy 
enemy fire and coverea a trail to prevent an enemy flanking 
movement while his platoon moved into position. Later in the 
same action, he volunteered and went on three patrols into en-
emy territory and brought back valuable information concerning 
enemy strength and dispositions. Throughout the whole action, 
he demonstrated a high degree of personal couiage and disregard 
for his safety and was an inspiration to all the men of his 
platoon. His action reflects great credit upon himself and 
the military service. 
SILVER STAB 
Private MELVIN L. TAYLOR, Infantry, United States Army. 
For gallantry in action at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 6 
November 1944. Private Taylor volunteered to go to the rear 
to bring up vitally needed machine gun and mo!tar ammunition. 
With utter disregard for his own safety he crossed ground in 
a truck under intense enemy fire. Upon returning with ammuni-
tion the truck was hit putting it out of action. Private 
Taylor jumped from the truck and assisted in the defense of 
this ammunition securing it unt e ements of his unit were 
able to reach it. Private Ta or's coura~ and determination 
are a credit to himself and are in accord with the highest 
tradi-tions of the military service. 
SILVER STAR 
Major (then Captain) TOM W. SUBER, Infantry, United States 
Army. For gallantry in action in the Philippine Islands, on 5 
and 6 November 1944. About noon, on 5 November, a group ·of 
artillery observers were beseiged by the enemy at an observation 
post situated on a ridge. As commanding officer of the advance 
guard company of an infantry battalion, Captain Suber led the 
attack against the enemy, personally participating with the as-
sault ele:neuts. His prompt and energetic action and his fearless 
leadership uudoubtedly saved the lives of the artillery observers. 
Captain Suber's company occupied and organized the defense of the 
ridge. The enemy attacked the company's perimeter once during 
( 
the day, and three times during the night. Due to his organiza-
tional ability and his timely use of counter-attack, his company 
succeeded in repelling the enemy attacks. Th~ perimeter was sub-
jected to almost continual fire by enemy automatic weapons, knee 
mortars, and artillery. Despite the enemy fire, Captain Suber 
exposed himself time · after time observing the situation and visit-
ing and enco~raging his men. Captain Suber's cou1age was a source 
of inspiration to all me mbers of his command and reflects great 
credit upon himself and the military service. 
BRONZE STAR 
Private First Class GEORGE L. JESTER, Infantry, United States 
Army. For heroic achievement in connection with military operations· 
against the enemy at Pinamopoan Pass, Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 
6 November 1944. Private Jester was an acting squad leader of a 
mortar squad i.n an infantry rifle ·company. His great vigor and lead-
ership in controlling his men when they were subject to heavy mortar 
and machine gun fire from the enemy, saved not only the men under 
his control, but also valuable equipment. His coolness and courage 
were an inspiration to his unit and reflect credit upon himself and 
the military service. 
BRONZE STAR 
Private First Class ROBERT B. MILLER, Infantry, United States 
) Army. For heroic achievement in connection with military opera-
tions against the enemy at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 5 November 
1944 . Private Miller was a rifleman in an infantry rifle company. 
During a heavy attack and under continuous enemy fire he evacuated 
several wounded men who otherwise would have died. He brought up 
much needed ammunition and acted as a runner for the platoon. He 
later directed fire on a trail on which the enemy was bringing up 
reinforcements, and caused heavy casualties among the enemy. Private 
Miller's to t al disregard for his own personal safety was a source of 
inspiration to all who witnessed his actions and reflects great cred-
it upon himself and t he military service. 

SILVER STAR 
Secon~ Lieutenant (then Technical Sergeant)ANDREW E. P.RISTAS, Infantry, 
Upited States Army. For gallantry in action near Pinamopoan, Leyte, Philip-
pine Islanda, on 5-6 November 1944. On 5 November 1 944 Sergeant Prist&$ was 
commanding a 'platoon of heavy .. J O caliber machine guns, when two compani~s of 
the battalion were cut off by the enemy . In the face of enemy fire and with 
complete disregard for his own personal safety, Sergeant Pristas went from 
machine gun to machine gun of his platoon checking ammunition and targets, and 
instilling confidence in his men. When the withdrawal was ordered after three 
enemy attacks on the night of 5-6 November 1944, he remained behind with one 
section of his machine guns to cover the withdrawal of his company, firing up-
on the advancing enemy for fully one half hour and successfully carrying 6ht 
his aission. His outstanding courage and devotion to duty in the face of 'he!y 
fire is worty of the highest traditions of the military service . 
BRONZE STAR (Posthumous) 
First Lieutenant LLEWELLYN D. BALDERSON, Infantry, Unit~d States Army. 
For heroic achievement in connect ion with military ope rat ions against t _he 
enemy near •••••,••••• , on 6 November 1944. Lieutenant Halderson was a rifle 
platoon leader when the perimeter of his company was attacked by an estimated 
com~any of the enemy. In the face of enemy rifl~. machine gun and mortar fire, 
Lieutenant Ha.lderson c':Q:ecked his part of the perimeter and found a. gap created 
by several casual ties. Under enemy fire he cros•ed the area, secured reinforce-
ments and a box of grenades, returned and successfully filled the gap and pre-
J' vented a break-through by the enemy He found one of his men lying woundea 
n,,rby and assisted him back to the center of the perimeter where he received 
mt4ical attention. _ Lieutenant Balderson's undaunted courage and devotion to 
4~~1 ~eflect great credit upon himself and the military service. 
took over beach defense in PINAMOPOAN sector and established strong 
outposts to the South of Highway #2 before dark. 
Plan of attack for the following d83". Companies "I" and "K" to 
clear ridge assisted by Company "A" attacking up the road. Company 
"G" to follow and be prepared to make reconnaissance of area South of 
LIMON and MOUNT CATABARAN. At 2100, the S-3 met advance party from 2nd 
Battalion at CAPOOCAN and made reconnaissance of Bivouac area in the vi-
cinity of COLASION. 2nd Battalion closed in Bivouac area at 2345. The 
Third Battalion was attacked all night by strong enemy forces and were 
under heavy artillery concentrations. 
There was no map whatsoever of the terrain except a radically inac-
curate map of Leyte Island which was 1/250:,000 SCjille. This condition 
was true for the next twelve days. ' · 
6 November 1944: 3rd Battalion units were completely cut off and under 
violent attack. Company 11 A11 jumped off at 0800, from vicinity of 3rd 
Battalion CP (Point "D") to advance to vicinity of bridge. At 1155 stiff 
opposition drove Company "A" to the rear. Casualtieswere high especially 
among off:i:.cers. At 0920, the first message came from Company 11I 11 on ''Hot 
Spot Knob" stating they saw 20 Japanese retreating towards LIMON. At 0925 
Company nC" reinforced with Filipino scouts left to occupy Hill 1525 which 
overlooks 3rd Battalion defensive area. At 1140, report that snipers were 
working in towards Company "B" who sent a patrol out to intercept. At 
approximately 1300, the Third Battalion withdrew to the vicinity of the 
beach. Meanwhile 2nd Battalion and elements of the 3rd Battalion were re-
organizing and defending line along former 3rd Battalion CP. (Poi.nts "A" 
) and "0".). Jrd Battalion assembled and reorganized in the vicinity of 
PINAMOPOAN. During the night of 6 to 7 November 1944, 2nd Battalion CP 
was counterattacked. Company 11C" returned at approximately 1710, and re-
ported no contacts but that the guides and scouts had become lost and 
brought them ?ack. 
7 November 1944: 2nd Battalion jumped off at 0800. Company "E" was on 
right of road and reached intermediate objective with small opposition. 
Company 11G11 on left of road ran into trouble in bottom of gulch prior to 
reaching intermediate objective. Tank destroyers were used to fire direct 
fire into pocket. Tanks were sent down road and before reaching the bridge, 
one tank was knocked out by a Japanese who placed a land mine on it. Com-
pany "L" was ordered to take intermediate objective on left of road by wide 
encircling mvement to the left. Company "L" failed to reach objective by 
dark and withdrew, and set up perimeter with Company nFn, on left flank of 
intermediate objective. 
The following sullllll&ry for the period above is taken from Headquart ers 
X Corps weekly report No. 3, for the week ending ll November 1944. 
"No outstanding activity utltil evening of 5 November 1944. By evening 
the 3rd Battalion, 21st Infantry, occupied the high ground 1000- 1500 yards 
south of PINAMOPOAN and were in contact with an estimated 300 Japanese." 
'16 November 1944, the Japanese succeeded in driving the 21st Infantry 
from the ridge and by night had dug in on the Northwest slopes of the 
19 
ridge and harassed our forward elements with mortar, and 75mm Artillery 
Fire in addition to several piecemeal attacks during the night, one of 
which resulted in_the death of 18 Japanese, including a Captain, two 
Lieutenants. By evening a patrol from the 21st Infantry, had reached 
Hill 1525 and had made no contacts .n 
n7 November 1944, the leading Battalion 21st Infantry made contact 
with the forward elements of an estimated enemy battalion on a general 
line from (06.6-67.0) to (07.5-66.5). The enemy well dug in and -delayed 
their _advance with small arms, automatic weapons, mortars: and a battery 
·of artillery. Several pockets of resistance were cleaned out during the 
day but the enemy resisted stubbornly, from well dug in positions on com-
manding terrain. Company 11 G" 19th Infantry upon occupation of Hill 1525 
at 1700 discovered a Japanese perimeter of unknown strength on the South 
Slope". (It was later known that Company "G", 19th Infantry was not on 
Hill 1525 but was one or two miles to the east thereof.) 
Casualties for 21st Infantry, 5, 6, and 7 November 1944. 
40 Killed in Action, 117 Wounded, and 3 Missing. 
Extract from Headquarters X Corps Weekly Report No. 3, for week endigg 
11 November 1944. 
"The enemy's operations plan as of 6 November 1944 ~nvisiaged the 57th 
49th and 41st Regiments disposed from left to right on the semi-circular 
and ridged high ground running generally Southeast from a point Southwest 
of PINAMOPOAN - - - that dog tags, pay Qooks, and other identifications 
taken from enemy dead indicate that enemy units are in and disposed in 
accordance with proposed plan of operations disclosed in captured map of 
6 November 1944.'1 t 
At dawn 7 November 1944, Regimental Field Order #19, was distributed to 
units concerned. Extracts there from as follows: 
1. a. Enemy, strength undetermined, holds high ground on ridge 400 
yards South of 2nd Battalion. Elements of the 1st Japanese Division, 
remanents of the 16th Division in foothills and mountains South of line 
CARIGARA - PINAMOPOAN. 
b. Division artillery supports attack with 15 ~nutes preparation 
from 0750 to 0805 on intermediate objective. Further fire on call. 
2. 21st Infantry resumes attack South astride PINAMOPOAN - ORMOC ROAD. 
Time of attack 0800, 7 November 1944. Formation: Column of Battalions, 
2nd, 1st, 3rd. Line of Departure: Present front lines. 
3. a. 2nd Battalion 21st Infantry: 
(1) Initial objective: Ridge 400 yards South of Present Front 
Lines. 
(2) First objective: Seize and secure high ground (see opns 
· sketch). 
(3) Will patrol from first objective. 
-b. 1st Battalion initially Regimental Reserve - present positions 
will be prepared to move on or~er. 
20 
) 
c. 3rd Battalion initially Regimental Reserve - present positions 
will be prepared to move on order. 
d. 52~~ Field Artillery will mass its fires on intermediate objec-
tive from .0750-0805, then lift to first objective. Thereafter fires on 
call. 
e. 1st Platoon, Company "A.", 44th Tank Battalion will be prepared 
to support 2nd·Battalion. 
f. Co.aq::>any "C" 85th <lhemical Battalion will reconrtoiter for posi-
tions .to support attack on first objective. 
g. 3rd Battalion; 19th Infantry (attached), secures PINAMOPOAN 
area. 
h • . 1st Platoon, Company ''A", 3rd Engineers continues with present 
mission. 
i. Company "C" 632nd Tank Destroyer Battalion upon arrival will 
reconnoiter for positions to support attack of 2nd Battalion. 
j. 7th Portable Surgical Hospital continues with present mission. 
In this attack as stated . above, Company 11E11 alone aqvanced 250 yards 
and took the hill to their immediate front (North of the road and right 
flank of the assigned "intermediate objective".) There they held the 
ground for the remainder of the day and that night, although there was 
a strongly held pocket of resistance on their left (South) which was not· 
taken. Company "G" and the tanks were held by this pocket and failed to 
gain its intermediate objective. Company "L" was then ordered to make an 
encirclement to the left and take the portion of the intermediate objec-
tive on the left of the road. This attack failed~, It withdrew to the 
southwest and joined Company 11F11 which had advanced about 400 yards and 
then withdrew due .to a misunderstanding of orders. Company 11F11 when 
joined by Company "L'' was on the near slope of the hill assigned as the 
intermediate objective for the day. 
A~ noon 7 November 1944, Colonel W. J. Verbeck assumed command of the 
regiment. 
Service and supply echelons which were far in rear (TUNGA) at the be-
ginning of the operation were just now appearing. Rations and ammunition 
supply presented the greatest difficulties and supply functioning (only 
moved by carrying parties) were very inadequate. 
At 15:45, 7 November 1944, Lieutenant Colonel Madison, formerly Regi-
mental Executive Officer assumed command of the .2nd Battalion. The former 
Regimental C:ommander was appointed Regimmtal Executive Officer. All po-
sitions consolidated and units reorganized. 
At 2000, 7 November 1944 - Field Order ·120 was issued, Extracts there-
from as f~llows: . 
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1. a. Enemy resis~nce of unknown strength is located in the ravine 
along the road at ( 07 .5:1..67 .0) and is dug into the hillside on both sides 
of the road. Occupied defensive installations are also located on high 
ground _at (07.0-66.1) and (09.2-63.8) 
b. Division and corps artillery is sited for close support of 
operation. 
2. This Regiment will attack South, 0700, 8 November 1944 with two 
bcl.ttalions in assault. 2nd Battalion with Company 11 1 11 attached on the 
right; lst Battalion on the left; by an initial-frontal attack and wide 
envelopment of enemy's right to destroy enemy forces delaying along high-
way 2. 
3. a. 2nd Battalion Company ''L" attached will attack to capture high 
ground to the South at 0700. From there this Battalion will attack south-
ward to secure the ridges ( 06 .5-66.2)-( 07 .2-66.0)-( 08.3-66 .o). 
b. lst Battalion with -Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon 
attached will, from its present position envelop the enemy right flank, 
occupy Hill 1525 (3000 yards to Southeast) and will be prepared to con-
tinue attack on Highway 2 when ordered. 
:The 3rd Battalion was held in Regimental reserve and all attached units 
~ere assigned supporting missions. A 10 minute artillery preparation was 
to proceed the attack of the 2nd Battalion. 
At 0700 the 2nd Battalion jumped off and attacked objectives and the 
pocket of resistance along the road. Flame throwers were employed to 
good advantage. Enemy artillery was active, shelling the road, the bridge 
at the bottom of the gulch and ranging in near Regimental C.P. at 0840 Co~ 
pany itF" reported from internediate objective that it was moving forward to 
secure the high ground on the final objective. 
At 1700,-7 November the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Pla-
toon was attached to the lst Battalion far the purpose of reconnoitering a 
route to Hill 1525 the next day. The 1st Battalion started on its wide en-
circling move at 0700, 8 November 1944 and moved towards Hi'll 1525. Infor-
.mation was received from Division that the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry had 
been order~d to move and to hold 1525, so the 1st Battalion had b~en ordered 
to move from that hill on an azmuth of 280 degrees to cut ORMOC read about 
1800 yards south of LIMON to prevent the escape of the ene~ from PINAMOPOAN 
Ridge Line • · -
' 
At 0832, 8 November 1944 message received from 2nd Battalion, 19th Infan-
try that they were on high ground near Hill 1525 but had not secured good 
observation • . (it later proved that this Battalion had taken the wrong ridge 
to the South from the beach and were from two to three miles to the North-
west of Hill 1525.) 
At 1600, the 1st Bat~alion reported being on the South Slopes of Hill 
1525, and was in contact with a force of ene~ armed with automatic weapons, 
and rort~rs on the North and Northwest slopes of the same hill. 
Nothing further was heard .from 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry. 
22 
SILVER STAR (Posthumous) 
Sergeant FRANCIS E. HOGG, Field Artillery, United States 
Army. For gallantry in action against the enemy near Limon, 
Leyte, Philippine Islands, 8 November 1944. Sergeant Hogg, a 
radio operator with an artillery forw.ard observer party attached 
to a cowpany of ·infantry which had been assigned the miss ion of 
guarding our extremely -important left flank against repeated strong 
enemy attacks, displayed extraordinary beroisw in attewpting to 
attend a radio frow another field artillery battalion which he 
realized would .have wade possible the furnishing of additional 
artillery support to our infantry. Despite the heavy enemy fire 
which had wounded the forward observer in his party and all mem-
bers of the only other field artillery party present, and with 
utter disregard for his own safety, he rushed from his foxhole 
to retrieve ' a temporarily abandoned radio from the other artil-
lery battalion upon being told the infantry needed addition!'l 
artillery support. He had barely cleared his foxhole when be 
was killed by enemy fire. Up to the time he was fatally wound-
ed he performed his duties in an outstanding manner and con-
tributed greatly toward breaking .up repeated enemy attacks and 
in saving our troops many casualties. Sergeant Hogg 1 s unselfish · 
and outstanding act of heroism and his exemplary devot i ·on to dut,-
were an inspiration to all those with whom he worked and reflect 
great credit upon himself and the military service. 
SILVER STAR 
First Lieutenant LESTER B. KING, Field Artillery, United 
States Arwy . For gallantry in action near Pinamopoan, Leyte, ( 
Philippine Islands, during the period 8 and 9 November 1944. 
Lieutenant King was assigned as artillery forward observer with 
a cowpany of infantry which had been assigned the mission of 
guarding the extremely important left flank of our lines, Short-
ly before noon on 8 November the enemy began ~aunching a series of 
deterwined attacks in an attempt to dislodge the company from its 
commanding position. During one of these attacks around 1200 op 
8 November, Lieutenant King becawe badly wounded in the arm and 
hand by wachine gun fire. Kno~ing that the bard-pressed cowpany 
greatly depended on hiw for artillery support and realizing the 
extrewely urgent need for such support, he refused to leave ·his 
post of duty although in great pain from his wounds. For twenty-
four hours under heavy fire and with no . ~edical attention except 
first aid, he brough effective artillery fire on one enemy attack 
after another until the enewy advance had been stopped and rein-
forcewents could be sent up to help the company out of its difficult 
situation. By his great skill and heroic conduct, he was to an out-
standing degree responsible for breaking up the repeated enewy attacks 
and for thus permitting the company to hold our left flank intact un-
til a counterattack could be organized to drive the enemy back, 
SILVER STAR 
Technical . Sergeant WILLIAM SCRAPPER, JR., Infantry, United 
States Army. For gallantry in action at Leyte, Philippine Islands, 
on 9 November 1944. On this day, an infantry battalion attacked 
and seized a hill. After the hill vas seized, the enemy counter 
attacked fiercely.. Dur i ng t his enemy counter attack, Sergeant 
Scrapper was the platoon sergeant of a heavy weapons platoon. 
While inspe c ti ng his heavy machi ne gun positions, he discovered 
that the crew of one of his heavy guns had been put out of action 
by enemy fire. Sergeant Scrapper realizing that the fire of the 
machine gun was necessary in aidi ng to repulse the enemy counter 
attack , alone set up the machine gun again and made it ready for 
firing. Be then to;k the position of gunner, · and resu111ed fire upon 
the enemy. He performed all the functions of the members of the gun 
crew, and succeeded in maintaining f ire upon the enemy until the 
counter attack was repulsed. The fire from Sergeant Scrapper's ma-
chine gun contributed materially t o repulsing the counter attack of 
a determined enemy. Sergeant Scrapper's daring and fearless display 
of courage was a source of inspi r ati on to all who witnessed his ac-
tions, and reflects gre~t credit upo n himself and the military 
service. 
SILVER S TAR 
Captain CHARLES R. JAMESON, Infantry, United States Army. 7or 
gallantry in action at Pinamopoan , Leyte, Phillipine Islands, from 
8 November to 15 November 1944. During this period, Captain Jameson 
displayed leadership and personal courage of the highest order. On 
I 
8 November, he led the successful attack on "Hot Spot Knob", a part 
of Breakneck Ridge, consolidating the position and coordinating its 
defense for the next six days . Countl ess times during this period, 
) Captain Jameson exposed himself to the fire from enemy position s, 
some only fifty yards distant, to visi t outlying parts of the p eri-
meter and to act as observer for art illery and mortar fire. On 10 
November, he extricated a platoon from a position in which they were 
receiving flanking fire on both sides . He was the last man to with-
draw. On 11 November, he stood up in t he face of a vicious enemy 
attack where the enemy automatic fi r e was inflicting heavy damage, 
and shouted! "Get up and return the fi re! They are not shooting 
at you, they're shooting at me!" On 1 5 November, his personal dar -
ing and leadership were largely respons ible for the knocking out 
and capturing of five Japanese light machine guns. Captain Jameson's 
courageous actions reflect great credit upon himself and the mili-
tary service. 
SILVER STAR 
Staff Sergeant (then Sergeant) LOUIS G. KEPLER, Infantry, 
United States .Army. For gallantry in action at Breakneclc Ridge, 
Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 10 Novemb er 1944. Sergeant Kepler 
was a squad leader of a light mach ine gun section of an infantry 
rifle company. During the withdrawal of the company, which his 
squad was covering, he succeeded i n c r awling to his gun and de-
stroying it when further action agai nst the enemy could not b e 
taken. The men in Sergeant Kepler's ~ quad had all been killed or 
wounded by extremely heavy enemy machi ne gun and mortar fire, which 
continued throughout the time he was destroying his machine gun. 
Once the gun was put out of ac t ion, he assisted in removing the 
----~~nded to safety. His outstandi n g bravery in this instance is 
nota and reflect 's high credit u pon himself and the military 
service. 
At dark 8 November 1944 the units of the 2~st Infantry were disposed 
as follows: 
1st Battalion on South Slopes of Hill 1525·. 
Company 11F11 at Point "F" on BREAKNECK RIDGE its final objective for 
the day and was in contact with strong hostile forces to its South and 
East. 
Company 11E11 at at Point 11E11 on its intermediate objective. 
The Bridge on the ORMOC ROAD between Points "B" and 11 C11 had been de-
stroyed by the enemy. This cut the only route of approach to OP lUll to 
Tanks and Tank Destroyers. 
Enemy emplacements flanking this bridge with rifle, automatic weapons, 
moz:tar and artillery fire were holding Company 11E11 in place. 
Company 11 L11 at "Point 11 C11 had not advanced but had been subjected to 
infiltrating attacks .by enemy infantry throughout the afternoon. At 1530 
the last enemy attack against Company 11 L11 had failed. 
Artillery fire of 15 centimeter caliber was now being received in the 
area of "the intermediate objective" and the Regiments rear elements. Overs 
from this fire were hitting in the bay to the North. 
· Throughout the day the enemy had continued to stubbornly resist. the 
advance of all elements, sniper fire was continuous in front, flanks and 
rear of all positions. 43 Japanese bodies were counted within our position. 
The enemy capabilities at the close of 8 November 1944 as enumerated by 
G-2, 24th Division were as follows: 
a. Offensive action towards PINAMOPOAN by enemy forces moving North frdm 
OR!v!OC. 
b. Offensive action North toward PINAMOPOAN combined with flanking effort 
in direction of JARO over TAMBUCO - JARO trail (6 miles to Southeast). 
c. Infiltration to our rear areas to disrupt our lines of communications 
and harass our Perimeters." 
The 21st Infantry was ordered by ·Commanding r~neral, 24th Division at . 
1000, 8 November to maintain the initiative at all costs. 
The 24th Division Field Order 9 November 1944 is quoted in part as 
follows: 
"3a. 21st Infantry will: 
(1) Attack and capture Division objective (Ridge Line 4000 
yards South of LIMON). 
(2) Upon capture of Division objective, patrol vigorously to 
the South and prepare to continue attack towards ORMOC. 
(3) Will protect 'Nest flank of Corps: The zone of action of 
the 21st Infantry was approximately 4,000 yards~ 
ACTION OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 21ST INFANTRY, 9 November 1944. 
There was heavy rain all day reaching Typhoon proportions by 1430. The 
1st Battalion at dawn, leaving Company 11A11 to hold Hill 1525 until the 
23 
early expected arrival of the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry moved on an 
azmuth of 280 degrees towards the ORMOC road South of LIMON carrying out 
"' their order to make the. wide envelopment of the enemy's right. 
At 0950 the 1st Battalion less Company 11A11 had proceeded generally 
West for approximately one and one half miles and reported they were held 
upon the slopes of a hill within sight of the .ORMOC Road by heavy enemy 
fire and were being attacked from front and both flanks. 
At 1140, 1st Battalion had moved to the Northwest slowly and was less 
than a mile East of LIMON. 
No word had been received from 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry but it was 
assumed that the Battalion was moving towards Hill 1525. 
At 1150, Company 11A11 on Hill 1525 was being hard pressed to hold the 
position against heayy ene~ frontal and flank attacks. The First Battal-
ion commander was ordered to withdraw to Hill 1525 with the remainder of 
the Battalion ahd ho]d that hill. 
At 1250 withdrawal was complete and Battalion Commander reported he was 
· being attacked by strong enemy forces on three sides. He reported his . 
losses were ·heavy. 
The Regimental Commander reported to division that no sign of the 2nd 
Battalion 19th Infantry had been noted, and 1st Battalion was hard pressed 
on Hill 1525; at 1400, 1st Battalion Commander reported that he had re-
. treated from Hill 1525, and was using Company 11A11 as a covering force for 
the withdrawal. At 1830, 1st Battalion had withdrawn 3500 yards to the 
North and had formed a perimeter for the night South of the Beach, East of 
PINAjfOPOAN. . 
The 2rid Battalion, 19th Infantry had confused directions and guides from 
another organization had misled them. They were in fact 3000-4000 yards to 
the Northeast of 1525 in very rough wooded and hilly country. · 
ACTION OF 21ST INFANTRY, LESS 1ST BATTALION, 9 November 1944. 
The Regiment was ordered to attack astride the ORMOC Road with the 2nd 
Battalion (Less Coinpany "F") -on the right of the road and the 3rd Battalion· 
on the left (South). Limited objective was assigned (From "Point 11 F" to 
11Point 11B" and to the Northwest.) Machine gun preparation was fired by "H" 
and "M" Companies for half hour preceeding attack. 
At 0930 Company 11 I 11 arrived at "Point C11 • 
At ·1025 Company ·11E11 advanced towarJ "Point B11 from its location at 11 Point 
Ell. 
At the same time Company 111" jumped off from "Point C11 and advanced to-
ward their objective along the ridge running South. At the same time 
Company 11 G" commenced a northern encirclement from "Point E11 to attack OP 
Hill from the North. 
All companies had forward observers from artillery and fire of opportun-
ity was brought down on all enemy resistance. Attacks were supported by 
heavy 60mm and 81mm Mortar Fire, and the 2nd Battalion had 4.2 Mortar forward 
24 
y,
 a
nd
 N
as
ty
 
B
at
tle
 o
f t
he
 L
ey
te
 S
pi
de
r H
ol
es
 
O
ne
 o
f W
ar
's 
H
ar
de
st
, B
lo
od
ie
st 
Th
e 
in
cr
ed
ib
ly
 te
di
ow
t a
n
d 
bl
oo
dy
 tt
uk
 
o
f r
o
o
tin
g 
o
u
t 
th
e 
Le
yt
e 
la
ps
 is
 d
es
cr
ib
ed
 
gr
a
ph
ica
lly
 i
n 
th
is
 d
isp
at
ch
 fr
om
 R
ob
er
t 
,
Sl
la
pl
en
,
 
N
E
W
SW
E
E
K
 w
a
r 
co
rr
es
po
nd
en
t: 
Th
e 
co
m
m
an
d 
po
st
 w
as
 
kn
ee
-d
ee
p 
in
 
m
u
d 
ob
 t
he
 s
id
e 
o
f t
he
 h
ill
, a
n
d 
w
he
n 
w
e 
cli
m
be
d 
u
p 
fr o
m
 t
he
 r
oa
d 
it 
w
as
 n
ip
 a
n
d 
tu
ck
 w
he
th
er
 w
e 
w
o
u
ld
 m
ak
e 
it 
o
r 
sli
de
 
ba
ck
 i
nt
o 
th
e 
qu
ag
m
ire
 b
el
ow
. 
It
 w
as
 
po
ur
in
g 
an
d 
al
th
ou
gh
 i
t 
w
as
 
10
 o
'c
lo
ck
 
in 
th
e 
m
o
rn
in
g 
th
e 
sk
y 
w
as
 d
ar
k.
 B
eh
in
d 
us
 
w
as
 
th
e 
Ph
ili
pp
in
e 
Se
a 
of
f 
th
e 
e
a
st
 
co
as
t o
f L
ey
te
.
 
an
d 
in
 fr
on
t w
er
e 
th
e 
ro
ll-
in
g 
rid
ge
s 
w
hi
ch
 1
or
 e
!e
ve
n 
m
u
dd
y 
da
ys
 
ha
d 
al
rt'
ad
y 
pr
o
v
id
ed
 t
he
 s
tif
fe
st 
ba
ttl
e-
gr
ou
n
d 
in
 th
e 
hi
st
o
ry
 o
f t
he
 S
ou
th
w
es
t P
a-
cif
ic.
 T
hi
s 
w
as
 
w
he
re
 
fre
sh
, 
cr
ac
iC
' 
Ja
p 
tro
op
s,
 l
an
de
d 
at
 O
rm
oc
 1
5 
m
ile
s 
to
 t
he
 
so
u
th
,
 
w
er
e 
be
in
g 
de
pl
oy
ed
 b
y 
G
en
er
al
 
Ya
m
as
hi
ta
 a
lo
n
g 
a 
jag
ge
d 
m
o
u
n
ta
in
 a
n
d 
v
n
lle
y 
lin
e
.
 
Th
is 
w
as
 t
he
 s
ec
o
n
d 
ph
as
e 
o
f 
th
e 
Le
yt
e 
ba
ttl
e
-
a
 fi
~t-
rat
e J
ap
 d
e
la
yi
ng
 
ac
tio
n
 
an
d 
m
ay
be
 s
o
m
et
hi
ng
 m
o
re
. 
"
Si
t-
he
re
 a
nd
 ·l
ist
en
 t
o 
th
e 
o
o
n
ct
'!l
't,
" 
.
 
the
 C
Gl
on
el 
in
vi
te
d.
 
It
 b
eg
an
 f
rig
ht
en
in
gl
y 
an
d 
~a
tu
re
-'
 
ly
 w
ith
 a
 t
en
-m
in
ut
e 
bU
rst
 fr
om
 J
ap
 7
5-
m
ill
irn
et
er
 a
tti
lle
ry
, 
cr
as
hi
ng
 2
00
 y
ar
ds
 
to
 
o
u
r 
le
ft.
 
Th
en
 o
u
r 
m
o
rt
ar
s 
be
ga
n 
w
ho
om
ph
in
g 
o
v
er
he
ad
. 
B
et
w
ee
n 
.
 
ro
ar
s,
 
th
e 
fia
t, 
sn
ap
pi
ng
 n
o
te
 o
f 
a 
Ja
p 
sn
ip
er
's 
rif
te 
so
u
n
de
d 
jus
t a
bo
ve
 u
s.
 
"
Th
at
's 
Ch
ar
lie
," 
sa
id
 C
ol
on
el
 V
er
be
ck
. 
"
H
e 
al
w
ay
s 
ge
ts 
ex
ci
te
d 
w
he
n 
th
e 
sh
ow
 
'
st
ar
ts
.
"
 
Ex
ci
te
d 
o
r 
n
o
t, 
Ch
ar
lie
 h
ad
 b
ee
n 
u
p 
th
er
e 
in
 th
e 
co
go
n
 g
ra
ss
, w
hi
ch
 is
 a
s 
hi
gh
 
as
 N
ew
 G
ui
ne
a's
 k
un
ai
, 
fo
r 
se
v
er
al
 d
ay
s 
an
d 
ha
d 
al
re
ad
y 
ki
lle
d 
ab
ou
t 
fif
te
en
 
N
ew
sw
ee
k 
NO
VB
MB
EII
 ~
. 
19
4<
 
'
19
44
 
15
! 
A
m
er
ic
an
s, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
Fr
an
k 
Pr
ist
, _
Ac
me
\ 
'th
e 
n
ex
t 
rid
ge
, 
st
ill
 u
n
n
am
ed
, 
50
 y
ar
ds
 
w
ith
 r
ill
es
 a
n
d 
fis
tfu
ls 
o
f 
gr
en
ad
es
. 
In
 
ro
ad
s 
a
n
d 
bu
lld
oz
t!r
s 
ha
d 
to
 p
ul
l 
do
ze
ns
 
ph
ot
og
ra
ph
er
 (s
ee
 pa
ge
 3
6)
 · Ch
ar~
e w
as
 
ta
w
ay
. 
Th
e 
m
o
rt
ar
 . 
fire
 w
as
 
la
nd
in
g 
in
 
ad
di
tio
n 
to
 
th
e 
sp
id
er
 h
ol
es
, 
th
e 
N
ip
s 
o
f t
ru
ck
s 
thr
ou~
. T
he
 st
ra
te
gy
 e
m
pl
oy
ed
 
g~
 an
d 
he
 h
ad
 o
n
e 
o
f 
th
e 
w
o
rld
s 
be
 
m
ea
n
, 
bl
ac
k 
bu
rs
ts 
o
n
 t
he
 f
or
w
ar
d 
slo
pe
, 
ha
d 
th
e 
u
su
al
 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f 
co
co
n
u
t-
lo
g 
by
 
th
e 
24
th
, 
m
 
w
ht
ch
 
o
n
e 
rcg
.m~
t 
hi
di
ng
 p
la
ce
s. 
>-
~and
 beh
in
d 
it 
w
as
 th
e 
in
ce
ss
an
t c
ha
tte
r o
f 
bu
nk
er
s 
a
n
d 
pi
llb
ox
es
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 
th
e 
•
w
o
rk
ed
 d
ow
n 
th
e 
ro
ad
 a
n
d 
tw
o 
re
gt
-
W
e 
he
ar
d 
th
e 
co
n
ce
rt
 ~m
t a
n~i
~-:
-
'm
ac
hi
ne
-g
un
 fi
re
, o
u
rs
 a
n
d 
th
e 
Ja
ps
'. 
Tw
o 
n
at
ur
al
 a
lly
 o
f 
th
e 
co
go
n 
gr
as
s. 
Th
ey
 
m
en
ts
 f
la
nk
ed
 i
t 
o
n
 ~t
h si
d,e
s, 
lea
p&
Og
-
mo·
~ed
 up
 a
lo
ng
 th~
 roa
d 
m
 t
he
 J
ee
p 
f 
'o
f 
o
u
r 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 w
er
e 
se
ek
in
g 
to
 H
an
k 
m
a
de
 a
 
po
in
t 
o
f 
bu
rro
w
in
g 
in
to
 b
ot
h 
gl
ng
 fr
om
 r
id
ge
 t
o 
n
dg
e,
 c
re
at
ed
 a
 n
ee
d 
M
aJ
.
 
G
en
. 
F.
 
C.
 St
~rt
, co
m
m
an
de
r 
'th
e 
hi
ll 
fro
m
 t
he
 s
id
es
, 
bu
t i
t 
w
as
 s
lo
w
 
sid
es
 o
f 
ev
er
y 
slo
pe
, 
a
n
d 
do
w
nh
ill
 t
he
 
fo
r 
fo
od
 d
ro
ps
 f
ro
m
 
pl
an
es
.
 
B
ut
 w
he
n 
th
e 
Te
nt
h 
_
Co
rp
s. 
B
ng
.
 
G
en
. 
K
er
u
ae
 
ig
oi
ng
.
 
.
 
re
v
er
se
 s
id
es
 o
f 
th
e 
rid
ge
s 
w
e.
re
 a
s 
di
ffi
-
th
e.
 pl
an
es
 ~ar
ne b
ac
k 
sh
ot
 f
ul
l 
o
f 
ho
le
s, 
Cra
m~r
, ass
iSta
n~ c
o
m
m
an
de
r <
?f 
th
e 
24~
. 
•
 
A
 p
riv
at
e 
sh
ou
te
d 
u
p 
to
 u
s 
fro
m
 a
 p
it.
 
•
 c
u
lt 
to
 c
ap
tu
re
 a
s 
th
e 
as
ce
n
dm
g 
slo
pe
s. 
n
at
iv
e 
ea
rn
er
s 
a
n
d 
ca
ra
ba
os
 h
ad
 t
o 
be
 
ro
de
 m
 
ba
ck
 w
tt
h 
G
en
er
al
 S
tb
er
t 
w
hi
le
 
"
B
et
te
r 
du
ck
," 
he
 s
ai
d.
 "
'T
he
y'
v
e 
be
en
 
T
he
 2
4t
h 
D
iv
isi
on
 h
ad
 t
o 
ad
va
nc
e 
by
 
u
se
d 
excl
usiv
e~y.
 . 
.
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
,
 
yo
ur
 c
o
rr
es
po
nd
en
t 
cr
o.
u
ch
ed
 m
 
fro
nt
,
 
fsn
ip
in
g 
o
v
er
 h
er
e 
a
n
d 
w
e 
ha
d 
so
m
e 
Ja
p 
in
ch
es
,
 
u
sin
g 
gr
en
ad
es
, 
fla
m
e 
th
ro
w
er
s, 
T
he
 c
as
u
al
tie
s 
m
 
th
e 
dt
vi
St
on
, 
w
ht
ch
 
fla
nk
ed
 b
y 
tw
o 
M
P'
s 
w
tth
 g
un
_s
 c
o
ck
ed
.
 
~arti
ller
y a 
fe
w
 m
in
ut
es
 a
go
." 
an
d 
rif
les
. 
Ta
nk
s 
w
er
e 
em
pl
oy
ed
 a
lo
ng
 
ha
s 
be
en
 in
 li
ne
 2
7 
co~s
ecut
ive 
da
ys
 a
n
d 
Sl
ow
ly
 w
e 
o
o
ze
d 
al
on
g 
th
e 
st
de
 o
f t
he
 
~
 
th
e 
ro
u
te
 w
he
re
 f
ea
sib
le
 b
ut
 t
he
 r
ai
ny
 
w
as
 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 f
or
 k
ill
in
g 
so
m
e 
5,
50
0 
hi
ll 
an
d 
th
en
 in~
hed
 up
 th
e 
Jid
ge
, w
hi
ch
 
B
ur
ni
ng
 O
ut
 S
pi
de
rs
: 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 
se
as
o
n
 
in 
th
e 
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
 i
s 
po
or
 t
an
k 
Ja
ps
, 
ra
n
 a
s 
hi
gh
 a
s 
50
 pe
~ c
e
n
t 
am
o
n
g 
•
 
.
 
.
 
.
 
an
 
unk
no~
 pn
va
!e
 h
ad
 a
pt
ly
 d
ub
be
d 
.
 
o
th
in
g 
se
n
sa
tio
na
l a
bo
ut
 th
is 
fig
ht
 in
 t
he
 
w
ea
th
er
.
 
M
os
t 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
w
er
e 
lig
ht
 a
n
d 
co~
bat
 tro
op
s. 
M
uc
h 
o
f 
th
ts 
w
as
 d
ue
 to
 
C
ha
rl
ie
 T
he
 ,Sm
p~m
 Co
l. 
W
1l
lia
m
 V
er
-
B
re
ak
ne
ck
 m
 ~e
 tru
dd
le.
 o
f t
he
 w
ee
k-
lo
ng
 
oc
 c
o
rr
id
or
. I
t w
as
 ju
st 
slo
w
, m
u
dd
y,
 
m
ed
iu
m
 A
m
er
ic
an
 a
rt
ill
er
y 
a
n
d 
th
e 
co
n
-
sm
pe
rs
. 
.
 
.
 
be
ck
,
 c
o
m
m
an
dm
g o
ffi
ce
r o
f t
he
 2
1s
t R
eg
-
fig
ht
 t
o 
ta
ke
 1
t. 
Th
e 
n
dg
e 
w
as
 
sa
u
ce
r-
:a
n
d 
n
as
ty
. 
Pr
ob
ab
ly
 n
o
w
he
re
 e
lse
 h
av
e 
st
an
t 
bl
an
ke
t o
f m
o
rt
ar
 fi
re
 o
v
er
 t
he
 h
ill
s. 
A
dv
an
ce
s 
w
er
e 
hm
tte
d 
to
 4
00
 o
r 
50
0 
1m
en
t 
o
f 
th
e 
24
th
 D
iv
isi
on
, 
sa
t 
a
t 
th
e 
sh
ap
ed
 a
n
d 
th
er
e 
w
er
e 
fe
w
 t
re
es
 o
n
 
it.
 
~Jap
s b
ee
n 
du
g 
in
 5
0 
w
el
l. 
Th
ei
r 
fa
vo
rit
e 
Ph
os
ph
or
us
 f
ire
. 
sp
ew
ed
 b
y 
m
o
rt
ar
 o
v
er
 
ya
rd
s 
a 
da
y 
al
on
g 
th
e 
ro
ad
. 
T
he
 N
ip
s 
ph
on
es
 t
al
ki
ng
 t
o 
hi
s 
fo
rw
ar
d 
o
bs
er
ve
rs
. 
It
 w
as
 p
oc
ke
d 
by
 r
av
in
es
 a
n
d 
ro
u
n
d 
the
~ 
~'pos
itio
n w
as
 
in
 a
 
sp
id
er
 h
ol
e. 
Sp
id
er
 
w
id
e 
ar
ea
s 
w
ith
 t
he
 a
id
 o
f 
th
e 
w
in
d,
 
al
m
os
t a
lw
ay
s 
co
u
n
te
ra
tt
ac
ke
d 
la
te
 in
 th
e 
"
W
e1
l a
tta
ck
 a
t 
10
:3
0,
" 
th
e 
co
lo
ne
l s
ai
d.
-
gu
lli
es
 t
he
 g
ra
ss
 w
as
 
6 
(ee
t h
ig
h.
 :t'
he~ 
ho
le
s 
ar
e 
o
n
e-
m
an
 
fo
xh
ol
es
. 
Th
el
' 
ar
e.
 
bu
rn
ed
 o
u
t 
la
rg
e 
ar
ea
s 
o
f J
ap
 r
es
ist
an
ce
. 
a
fte
rn
oo
n,
 
an
d 
if 
th
e 
A
m
er
ic
an
s. 
o
v
er
-
"
U
se
 y
ou
r 
Ha
rn
e 
th
ro
w
er
s 
a
n
d 
w
e1
1 
gi
ve
 
sm
el
l o
f J
ap
 d
ea
d 
flo
at
ed
 s
ic
kl
y 
o
v
er
 1
t. 
·; 
u
su
al
ly
 2
 f
ee
t w
id
e 
a
t 
th
e 
to
p 
an
d 
w
id
er
 
ex
te
nd
e
d 
th
ei
r 
lin
es
 t
he
y 
lo
st 
th
e 
gr
ou
nd
·
 
yo
u 
fif
te
en
 m
in
ut
es
 o
f 
81
 m
o
rt
ar
 b
ef
or
e 
1 
a
t 
th
e 
bo
tto
m
 a
n
d 
ru
n
 fr
om
 4
 t
o 
6 
fe
et
 
•
 
Fo
od
 a
n
d 
B
lo
od
: 
T
he
 
su
pp
ly
 p
ro
b-
th
ey
 h
ad
 g
ai
ne
d.
 S
o 
th
ey
 m
ad
e 
a 
po
in
t 
o
f 
th
em
. H
ow
's 
th
at
?"
·
 
T
w
o
 R
id
ge
s:
 N
ea
r t
he
 su
m
m
it,
 w
e 
go
t'
 
!in
 d
ep
th
. 
T
he
 J
ap
s 
lik
e 
to
 
pl
ac
e 
m
a-
!e
m
 w
as
 c
rit
ic
al
 th
ro
ug
ho
u
t. 
Am
m
u
n
iti
on
 
at
ta
ck
in
g 
in
 t
he
 m
o
rn
in
g,
 c
o
n
so
lid
at
in
g 
I 
Th
e 
o
th
er
 e
n
d 
o
f 
th
e 
w
ifl
} 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
o
u
t 
a
n
d 
st
ar
te
d.
cr
aw
lin
g.
 F
ro
m
 t
he
 t
op
 
!c
hi
ne
 g
un
s 
in
 t
he
m
 o
r 
jus
t l
ie
 a
n
d 
w
ai
t 
an
d 
fo
od
 b
og
ge
d 
do
w
n 
o
n
 
w
as
he
d-
o
u
t 
a
n
d 
w
ai
tin
g 
fo
r 
th
e 
Ja
ps
 to
 r
ec
o
il.
 
ap
pr
ov
al
 a
n
d 
th
e 
co
lo
ne
l r
an
g 
of
f. 
w
e
 w
at
ch
ed
 th
e 
pr
og
re
ss
 o
f t
he
 b
at
tle
 fo
r 
~
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
.
 
--
--
--
--
--
-~
~-
--
--
--
-~
-L
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
~-
--
--
--
--
"
 
observers and used this fire to great advantage. 
In a grenade, rif~e and flame thrower action the remaining pocket in 
the gulch just East of "Points C and E" was eliminated. 
At 1150 Company "L" reported· heavy rifle and mort,'ar fire slowing its 
advance. 
At 1305 Company "L" was still progressing on the top of the ridge in 
the center of its zone of action. 
·At 1335 Company "G" reported having taken its objective but due to 
heavy enemy fire of all ~eapons was organizing the Eastern slopes of 
the ridge 300 yards . North o.f "Point B11 • 
At 1815 Company "G" received counter-attacks which were repul&ed. At 
dark the forward line was as follows; Company "F" at "Point F", Company 
11111 at 11Point Gu, Company "I" at "Point C", Company "E" in the v:icinity · 
of high ground just Northwest of "Point B11 , and Company "G" on East slope 
of ridge 300 yards·North of "Point B11 • A platoon of heavy machine guns 
was attached to each rifle company to tie in their perimeters for _. the 
night. Company "K" was in reserve near "Point A". 400 Japanese bodies 
were counted during this day's action. 
An agressive mission was assigned to the .Regiment for the next day. 
The front of the Regiment was reduced qy the assignment of Hill 1525 to 
the 19th Infantry. 
) 
·10 November 1944: The night and morning of 10 November 1944, the weath-
er was heavy rain, and the ground was intensely muddy. During the night 
the enemy cut wire lines to the .forward battalions. Message from X Corps, 
10 November 1944 relayed through Headquarters 24th Division st~ted: 11Early 
arrival of reinforce.rrents expected." 
Casualties of the Regiment at this time had reached, 72 Killed in Action, 
232 Wounded, 7 Missing. Officer casualti_es ~ere especially high. 
Division Field Order No. 8, dated, 2310, 9 November is quoted in part: 
112. 24th Division will attack with four (4) battalions in assault en-
veloping hostile left (West) flank, secure objective and protect the 
Corps West Flank. 
Time of attack: 0700. 
"3· a. 21st Infantry reinforqed: 
Will attack with two (2) battalions in assault, seize and hold 
its portion of the Division objective prepared to continue the attack. 
b. 19th Infantry (-2 Battalions): 
Hill attack _with one battalion from present positions in the 
vicinity· of Hill 1525 seize -and hold its portion of the Division 
ob j ective. (Note: This Battalion was not actually on Hill 1525.) 
c. 34th Infantry reinforced (-1 Battalion): 
(1) Will have 1st Battalion under Division control assemble 
CAPOOCAN BEACH not later than 0500, 10 November 1944. Move 
over water by LVT, land (2 miles West of PINAMOPOAN) attack, 
capture and hold its portion of Division objective. 
X. Success of the LEYTE campaign depends upon quickly and 
completely destroying hostile forces now to our front." 
The following is extracted from Headquarters X Corps, Weekly Report 
No .• 3, dated 11 November 1944: 
1110 November 1944, the 24th Infantry Division failed to move forward, 
and e1.emy resistance continued strong. However a pocket of resistance on 
North Slope of BREAKNECK RIDGE was eliminated." 
The following is extracted from Headquarters 24th Division Periodic 
Report No. 22, 1800, 10 November 1944: 
"All efforts to Jrove down or around the reverse slopes of high ground 
just East of the road (06.6-66.6) were met by heavy small arms and auto-
matic .weapons fire. Irttermittant artillery fire received by forward ele-
ments of the 21st Infantry at close of period. Forward artillery observers 
believe that they have located the enemy artillery positions and counter 
battery fire is being effected. Enemy bodies counted in day's action by 
ilst Infantry - 78". 
11 It is estimated that the 21st Infantry, was now opposed to at least 2 
Battalions of the Japanese 57th Infantry Regiment, and at least 1 Battal-
ion of the 49th Infantry Regiment. IdentificatioBs also were found con-
firming presence of the 1st Infantry Regiment to our front. These are 
three Infantry Regiments of the First Division, recently arrived from 
Manchuria. Enemy troops are well trained, well equipped and fed and appear 
to be first class fighting soldiers." 
At 0930, the 1st Battalion moved forward in column of companiea, Company 
"A" leading, and passed through Company 11 K11 and rwved south. Company 11 K11 
was at this time at "Point EH • 
. At 0955 Company "G" took OP Hill. At the same time Company 11 I 11 moved to 
bridge and guarded it. t 
1st Platoon, Company 11A", 3rd Engineers began reconstruction of the bridge 
to permit the passage of tanks. This bridge building job, carried out under 
fire, was an accomplishment of the 1st Platoon, Company ttA", 3rd Engineers. 
The enemy had destroyed the bridge and Captain Latane, 11A11 Company commander, 
had measurec the distance to be spanned. He took the figures back and tim-
bers were cut to the exact size. The structure virtually prefabricated was 
trucked as near the gulch as possible and the bridge was assembled under 
fire. 
At 1120, Company 111 11 seized the high ground 300 yards South of its pre-
vious day's position and held commanding ground ("Point H11 ). At 1010 the 
enemy pocket of resistance between 11G11 and 11 1 11 Companies was cleared out 
and the entire ridge was thus secured. 
The 1st Battalion was directed to attack the ridge 200 yards to its 
front (West) by maneuvering in the draws on either side of the enemy held 
spur. This attack failed to materialize. At the close of the day found 
the 1st Battalion on its morning positions. The 1st Battaion Commander 
was r elieved and Major Little, Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion was placed 
in command. 
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Cbmpany 11 G11 was relieved by Company "A" and Company 11 G:t withdrew to 
the perimeter held by Company 11 K'1 • 
• At 1535 Company "Lrr received strong artillery fire. 
The Battalion of the 34th Infantry on the right and the 19th Infantry 
6n the left were in rear of the extension of the flanks of the 2l'st In-
fantry and were believed to be moving south to come abreast of the 21st 
Infantry. Supplying rations and ammunition to the scattered units still 
presented the greatest threat to the success of the operation. At no time 
was more than a unit of fire present in the Regiment. 
11 November 1944: During the night 10-11 November 1944 the enemy cut 
telephone lines from Regiment to all Battalions. Headquarters X Corps 
\'ieekly Report No. 3, is quoted in part as follows: 
"11 Noyember 1944, the 21st Infantry penetrated the enemy strongpoint 
on the South slope of BREAKNECK RIDGE. This was the second of two pockets 
which ~d offered resistance for three days. Breakthrough was accomplished 
with the assistance of eleven tanks. Fifteen out of twenty known heavy ma-
chine gun positions were eliminated. The pocket of resistance has not been 
cleared but has been considerably weakened." 
For the per~od 115 enemy bodies were counted. 
At 0805 a message received that the lst Battalion, 34th Infantry on our 
right was moving towards their objective south and west of LIMON. Heavy 
intermittent rains throughout the day with very slippery mud underfoot. Ar-
tillery preparation was to be fired for one hour prior to 0900 on enemy ridges 
and pockets along BREAKNECK RIDGE. Company "C" 85th Chemical Battalion main-
taiood harrassing fire on reverse slopes South of 11Points, F, H, G" and OP 
Hill at the rate of approximately two rounds every five minutes all night. 
From 0645 to 0745 concentration of 750 rounds were to be fired and from 0830-
0900 a concentration of White Phosphorous was to be fired. Forward observers 
with each rifle company for Artillery, 4.2 Mortars and 8lmm Mortars were to 
bring down fire of opportunity on all enemy points of resistance. At 0900 
the 1st and 2nd Battalions jumped off abreast 1st Battalion on the right 
(North of OP Hill). The 2nd Battalion in column of companies attacked to 
the South and West. Company "E'' moved through Company "F" and attacked 
South. Company "G" attacked Northwest along the ridge in the direction of 
OP Hill to connect with the 1st Battalion. 
Company "I" was held at "Point C" with one platoon guarding the bridge. 
The attack of~e 2nd Battalion towards the South met strong enemy resistance 
almost imme<;Y.tately from the South and from wooded ridges to the East of CORK-
SCftElN. At 0955, Company "G" in 2nd Battalion reserve was moved up to CORK-
SCREW. Company _"L" still attached to the 2nd Battalion attacked the resistance 
to the East and met heavy resistance ·from woods 150 yards to the East. Company 
11F11 along Hot Spot Knob, in the meanwhile had passed through Company "E", ob-
served 150 Japanese digging in on th~ ridge to their east. They brought down 
heavy mortar and machine ,gun fire on ·this position, and then attacked and 
occupied the ridge with one platoon. At first this· position was believed to 
constitute. the heavy enemy resistance from the east, but 11 E11 , "G" and "111 
Companies still found their southward operations were flanked by heavy fire 
from the East. The terrain was such that a 200 yard advance represented a 
500 yard movement on the terrain. 
The 1st Battalion·' s advance met little resistance initially. At 1320 
the Engineers reported the bridge completed. The tanks would be unable 
to advance to the top of the BREAKNEcK without support of riflemen to the 
front, rear and with the column due to suicide attacks by enemy soldiers 
with magnetic mines and grenades. The approach to the bridge to the OP 
Hill was known to be heavily mined. A squad of Engineer Mine Detector 
personnel, twelve enlisted men from the Regimental Intelligence and Re-
connaissance Platoon, and a plato on from Company 11 1" were employed as 
rifle cover for the tanks in their advance up and over to the South slop-es 
of BREAKNECK. 
Captain Van Winkle, Commanding Officer of Company 11 A11 , 44th Tank Bat-
talion led his tanks on foot and personally directed their operations 
under heavy fire. He was ttdce wounded but returned only after the op-
eration was completed. On the section of the road running South for 300 
yards from the OP Hill, the tanks, although road bound due to the nature 
of the terrain, engaged and destroyed numbers of pillboxes, and automatic 
weapons, and cleared the way for the advance of the 1st Battalion. The 
tanks withdrew before nightfall with the loss of one tank. The 1st Bat-
talion gained its objective (ridge at "Point J·n.) 
At 1815, a report was received that the 2nd Battalion, 19th Infantry was 
slowly moving So4th to a position Northeast of LIMON. 
All positions were consolidated and 350 rounds of White Phosphorous wer~ 
used with effect on enemy positions facing the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The 
wind was qlowing generally south and enemy positions in spider holes were 
cleaned out thereby . Fields of fire were also cleared in the high cogan 
grass bordering our perimeters by this fire. During the days action th6 
1st Battalion fired 1,500 rounds of 81mm Mortar. 
The following is extra.cted from H eadguarters X Corps Weekly Report No. 
4 dated 18 November 1944: 
11 The 12th of Novembe r 1944., the enemy resisted our advances South down 
the reverse slope of BREAKNECK RIDGE. However, progress was made by our 
forces until after 1300, whe n the enemy strength began to build up. By 
1600, the enemy firepowe r- had reached such a degree of intensity that our 
forward elements were forced to consoliJate the ridge. During the night 
our units were harassed by infiltration into our perimeters and some ar-
tillery fire. " 
The G-2 Periodic Report No. 24, Headquarters ?4th Infantry Division, 
the following is ~ed: 
nAt the end of this period (1800, 12 November 1944) the 21st Infantry 
forced to consolidate their positions on BREAKNECK RIDGE by heavy en~my 
fire from an estimated two battalions with all arms including artillery. 
During the d~ of 12 November 1944, the Regiment counted 97 Japanese 
bodies killed during the day. At 0715, 12 November, the Anti-tank Com-
pany was dispatched to the position of Company "G" to relieve them. The 
· strength of the companies at this time was low. The 1st Battalion com-
manded by Major Little averaged one officer and one hundred enlisted men 
per companj·. Some returned sick, wounded, and about 50 replacements were 
received at this time and were split among the rifle companies. All rear 
echelon personnel who could be spared from their duties were sent as re-
placements to the rifle companies. Native carriers, in limited numbers 
were obtained to carry ammunition and rations to the front line companies. 
One hot meal per day could now be fed to combat elements. Ammunition re-
serves were built up to about 1! units of fire. 
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SILVER STAR 
Colonel WILLIAM J. VERBECK, Infantry, United States Army. For gallant.ry 
in action near Pinamopoan, Leyte, Philippine Islands, on ll November 1944. The 
regiment of infantry which Colonel Verbeck was commandin~ had been held up for 
five days by a determined Japanese force of infantry and , artillery. The enemy 
was strongly entrenched in the gulches and on the rev&rs e slopes of a command-
ing ridge about two thousand yarda southwest of Pinamopoan. They were fresh 
first-line troops, equipped with a high percentage of automatic weapons. At 
this critical time Colonel Verbeck organized a striking force consisting of one 
platoon of medium tanks protected by the regimental intelligence and reconnais-
£ance platoon and one engineer mine - detector squad, and personally led it on 
foot to the crest of the ridge, _from which point the infantry and tanks were, 
for the first time, able to advance and hold ground. The turning point had been 
reached. From then on our troops were able to move steadily forward. Colonel 
Verbeck's example of bravery and energy had inspired his troops with the drive 
needed to overcome an aggressive well-trained enemy force and is in keeping with 
the highest of military traditions. 
SILVER STAR (Posthumous) 
First Lieutenant DALE E.JOHBSOi, Infantry, United States Army. For 
gallantry in action in the vicinity of Pinaaopoan, Leyte, Philippine Islands, 
on ll November 1944. Lieutenant Johnson accompanied a group of his men during 
a tank ·action, the miasion .of his party being to protect the tanks in their ad-
vance from suicidal attempts of the enemy to lay mines under the tracks of the 
vehicles. During th~ tank action, three wounded men, left behind from the 
previous day's fighting, were discovered on high ground that was swept by en-
eay fire. Li•utenant Johnson unhesitatingly crawled to the high ground under 
eneay fire and, with the help of three enlisted men, evacuated these casual-
ties to safety. He supervised the e~cuation of the wounded soldiers with a 
calm steadiness. Later in the same action, with a small party, he occupied 
a ridge under heavy enemy fire and protected both flanks of the tank column 
with fire from this commanding terrain feature. Li.eutenant Johnson was killed 
ia a later actio~ against the enemy. Lieutenant Johnson's courage and total 
disregard for his own personal safety were a source of inspiration to all who 
witnessed his actions, and reflect great credit upon himself and the military 
service. 
BRONZE STAR 
Captain (then First Lieutenant) SOTHORON K. ABLE, Infantr~, United States 
Army. For ~eroic achievement in connection with military operations against 
the enemy near Pinacopoan, Leyte, Philippine Islands, on November 11, 1944 . 
Captain Able with the remnants of his platoon of Infantry was directed to fur-
nish rifle protection to a platoon of medium tanks. Leading the column on foot 
under enemy fire Captain Able escor.ted the tanks to the crest of an enemy held 
ridge 2000 y~ds southwest of Pinamop.oan. From this point the tanks and Infan-
try were ab-le to advance and hold ground. Captain Able then assisted in the 
removal, under fire, of our wounded who had been lying near the crest for two · 
d.ays. His energy and courage are a credit to himself and the military service.~ 
,I 
View of Pinamopoan- Breakneck Ridge 
Looking North to South Towards 
Limon From Carigara Bay, Leyte. 
II November 19ijij 

•AWJV ·s·n &4l ~o 
>f::>&qJ&A '•r we! II !II\ 1 auo fOl Ol sJepJo Jo~ lJOdaJ puv q 
ellfJJan6 S!4 ~o sJaqwaw pue eJa!::>oeg "A o1qed "l1 
-
-
.
.
.
.
 
-
-
(!!~.-.{J~i 
This 
lssu• 
•
 
Pric• 
·
 
2 0 C en~ a
v
o
s 
Pay N
a M
ore 
nu~ 
4 Pages 
~~;;;;;;;;;;;;;;:~==~ 
Y
 c
sr fCX 
M
a
nila, Phiiippin
es;Sunday
,
 N
ovem
ber 12, 1944 -
-
~
=
~
 
N
um
ber
.192 
apanese Surround M
 ainstoy 
\. 
-
~ 
.
 S. ,~4th D
ivisi;bn :in Leyfe 
-~· 
-
.
 
.
 
-
-
.
 !E
ne;,y l)islodged 
1Flom-~Positiitns 
In C
ariga
·ra
 Sector 
n
.ippan forces A
dvancing T
ow
ards Site 
O
f D
ivisional H
eadquarter-S
upply, 
C
om
m
unication Lines ol D
oom
ed U
nlt C
ut 
Pow
erful 
J
apa
n
ese 
u
nits 
operating in the C
arigara ~reCtor 
have 
su
cceeded 
In 
su
rro
u
nding 
the 
m
ainstay o
t the U. S. 24tll 
pivislon o
ri T
u
es<:lay, N
o
v
e
m
ber 7, &C<!Ordlng to the lat"'\t reporta 
re
a
ching M
aniln
.
 
Su
t.j 
ctjng 
tho 
<
n
.:;m
y 
tro
op
s 
to 
M
earuvh11e 
o
tber reports brougl\t 
a
 he:~. vy 
c&n-cfntre.ttcn 6! 
a
.rtH
W
y 
.fn 
t1te 
n
e
.,a
 ot ~~evere dogtlg'htins 
'lire 
a
nd 
se
v
e
re
 
attoeks 
by 
l&
nd 
o
v
e
r the ()rm.()C 
•re
a
 o
n
 the s!\m
a 
ttO
O
;?,:I, tne Jllp.:tne.s.e !orces '<li.J!G~};'~ 
d"-Y 
w
hen 
a 
total ot
,l8 
en
eo
:1y 
a.lr--
&J 
tbi!a
e
n>eomy 
ftom
 
his J>OSitio
n
' 
c
ra
tt w
e
re
 either 
•hot dow
n o
r d~ 
Q!>d 
a
re
 
st
"
>di.ty U
g:tt<
nlnrr 
~'lr 
m
qed o
ut o
t a ftjlhter-W
mber fo"' 
o
n
ci,.,:e
.,..u
,t 
riJ>g
.
 
~tkm 
w
l\loh ~peal'8<1 
o
v
e
r 11'• 
.AI.lvo ne;~g 
.N
lp[l<)n 
"
"
'
'
•
 a
re
 n,.'ll. 
r<
ilon. 
.Tap&llue 
airm
en 
dellnitely 
'"* 
o
• 
to 
tbe 
•H
e 
o
r 
"tho
·
 
"
'"
'"
''Y
 
W
t
·
 <Jowo U
 
P.38's 1n<l probably 
;at~h D
lvblona1 h""dquulfj)r<l 
w
l\il.l>: t;roupt 
4Dwtt 
·tw
o Ill"~ l>oooi<l~• 
o
ther 
m
it• 
"
'
"
•
 
ccim
p; .
.
 t.)J 
o
ev
er• 
<lam
aciD
IJ ~wo 
o
then," lbe ~
·
 
ed the tr""' 
o
r t..ooJ» 
r.ud 
a
apptteo 
trt.m
 
the 
aecto'r lAid. 
u
 
wi~t 
•
•
.
 c~m-mun~tttnu 
to 
U
tf' y~
+ii,· ~
·
~
~
 ~
-'--.,--
e
n
e
m
y IY
-adq.aflr[
-er1'. 
·
 
·: '1!-~
· 
.
.
 
~, 
·
,
.
.
 
Q
nrcotnlng 41fllt!llt lcrn
l .
.
.
 lb~ flii· 
.
 rfJ 
N
ippo
n
 gtot>~:.J u
nt:a 
.
.
.
.
,
 
•o
"tln;;ln 
.
 
"
'; 
!M
i
' 
n
'
•v.v 
m
>
•la..Jitt
.
 
'bc-m.Jr..
·
.'ii·F
r .
.
 -
·LeJ.J.e 
e.bo11t 
tot~ 
~&!l'tlt!',t!an. ~o t·~ 
a
 
·~· 
I. 
.
 
d<>o'nul ·~~
·51utrtt, w,r~•..t·t~ #fof S
.,...)
_, 
"~·'jot! .
.
 .,....,..;..~
~
1't .~. ~R'~~\erd 
•ll~~el!t 
r
.ni,urln't."J
•P'•
-
•
 
g:..r.
·
 
TOaii 
.
.
 
r
~
o 
in 
th
t 
D.,,..~~~ 
"'e~
l)ot· 
IH
'Y
' 
,~
 
1ttn
 
w
·lh
tn.t'lln; th~·t: \P~h.il! 
n
·f
·
 
·
·:......,.to
·
 
w
a 
r
~
 
.in8' •1·1Jn~l 
thr en~:ory 
v
.·hi'IP 
th 
.
.
.
.
.
.
 ~bOok 
a ~fff';...l J:ura 
1e
o
n
•o
'ltla;tiJ\.I 
.
 o•r~rwlt~;~~ 
"t ~
-
III'Odl<'t:
.
.
.
.,. illa
t thPPb~ 
U
m
on 
h
"
'l 
n
o
rth 
o
t 
P
u
.a
o:: 
e-
-J*C
il 
m
ay be lo"C
' 
a
n4 Jtard, 
l.lotl<int{ 
e
v
e
ry 
•M
tnY
 1tttf'll"P~ 
to. 
ccw4t..,-
to
 riJport• tf"eclved ~
.
 
bre
alt 
thT
o
ug-b
.
 
.
 
~ 
,
 
•
 
.
·
 •
.
 
1'1><? grnnd4e>.1e O
'ffon
>lve 
n
.,. 
<
tryptcal 
-
tb
• 
~
 
10<11 
<;m 
·aJ'I 
aectoot'! 
w
ill 
"""'II 
toda,. by M
urll ~
r
,
 ~
.!At. 
tlhe U
.
 !!. ID
vnslbn fo
rco
s
,
 
oo1 
-
.
,
.port..r attadN
!l 
-41> <len-
,
.
.n
..t•d
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
,
.
 
M
aoA
ftllilr'll 
~
-
•
 
A
lrfleld R
al4ed 
•tu
.c 
illa
t 
G<-J"'::"i 
.~
b
~
 
u
nlnleJTilplod 
alr 
"
'
'lion 
o
"
'r
 
.
.
.
.
,
.
.
.
.
.
,
.
.
 
that 
•
 
S.Srge 
rro
up 04 
lnyasloo front the Japa
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
,
 J
-
troopo hacl 
.
.
.
 
W
ild Eagles 
at day
·
 
~
 
tile 
-tl<
o
t of haru!d'nc 
stru
ck at the 
'l'a
. 
IIIIo 
L
rom
 
A
m
erican 
p~aa.,. 
a
nd 
•m
oke w
a
•
 
"
'IQOtor &
orpt"do boot
.,:! a
nd Aa<l Jolo
.
 
tta
m
l•t 
e4 ta 
U
te 
e
a
nplrut;ry 
baltle 
for 
tructA
ve 
The attack plan was for the 3rd Battalion under Lt.Colonel Ramee with 
the Tank Company attached to continue the attack East astr~de the road 
on the top of BREAKNECK RIDGE. All Regimental flame throwers were supplied 
to the 3rd Battalion. After the tanks had crossed the crest the 1st ·Bat-
talion was to attack on the right, and envelop the enemy's left (West) flank. 
2nd Battalion in reserved between "Points F and H". 
At 1045, the 3rd Battalion jumped off. At the same time the Anti-Tank 
Company reported securing the ridge in front of .Company "G" last night posi-
tion. 
At 1115, tl;Le tanks were beyond the cut on the ridge and reported receiving 
very little hostile fire. 
At 1125 Company 11 C11 took its objective (Hill at "Point K11 ). 
At 113 5, Companies 11L11 & 11F11 took their objccti ves C~.t "Points M and N", 
respectively and were concentrating their fire on the draw between their 
positions. 
At 1220, Companies "F" and "K" had made contact at Point 110 11 , and the 
whole of BREAKNECK RIDGE had been taken. 3rd Battalion reported reac~ing 
its days objective. 
At 1415, the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Plat0~n of Regimental ·Head-
quarters was sent out to mop up snipers overlooking the bridge. Reported 
successful mission. Sniper fire in our rear elements ceased for the first 
time after this action. 
At 1545, all front line units reported that enemy fire to their front and 
flanks was increasing and that the enemy was being reinforced. No further 
advances were made. Consolidated perimeters were set up for the night. There 
was little enenw activity and no counter-attacks were made during the night. 
2,200 rounds of 81mm Mortar Here expended during the day. 
13 November 1944: As will be discerned by glancing at the map BREAKNECK 
RIDGE is not one ridgeline . but in reality is a series of six ridges none of 
which are continuous but are formed by a series of knobs. The low ground is 
thick with coeon grass to a height of four feet. The pockets between the 
hills are rugged and thickly wooded. The valleys are deep, precipitout. Al-
though all commanders constantly endeavored to· prevent the ~ttack from break-
ing up into a series of uncoordinated combats, the terrain did not permit 
exact timing or coordination. Jump off times were often postponed due to the 
difficulties of supply of ammunition. 
Headquarters X Corps i'veekly Report No. 4, had the following · report con-
cerning the action of the 21st Infantry, for 13 November 1944: 
"During the day the 21st Infantry advanced South from BREAKNECK RIDGE, 
and at 1500 were 400-600 yards South of the crest' of the ridge. At that 
time the right flank (West) of the ·road was not in contact, while the left 
flank (East) of the road was encountering some Tesistance. At this time an 
enemy attack developed from the crest with approximate strength of one com-
pany but the attack was repulsed and the Japanese withdrew.n 
G-2 Periodic Report No. 25, Headquarters 24th Infantry Division, is quoted 
as follows: 
"Enemy identif ications at BREAK1TECK RIDGE - 57th 'Infantry, Headquarters 
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SILVER STAR 
First Lieutenant PliiLIP S. IRONS, III, Infantr;r,. United 
States Army. For gallantr;r in action at Pinamopoan Ridge, Le;rte, 
Philippine Isl~nds, on 13 lovember 1944. An infantry company was 
given the mission of attacking and occupying two hills, two hun-
dred yards to the left of a mountain road. This ground controlled 
the road for four hundred yards. The company succeeded in occupy-
ing the extreme left hill which s ·e~ured the left flank, but the 
platoon on the right flank ~as forced to withdraw. During this 
operation the company commander was seriously wounded. At approx-
imately 1400, Lieutenant Irons, belonging to another organization, 
was sent forward to assume command of the company with the mission 
of seizing the second hill and holding it all at costs. The enemy 
;,as well entrenched and w.as in possession of commanding ground with 
good observation. Lieutenant Irons reorganized a greatl;r depleted 
unit of very tired men and seized the second hill after much hard 
fighting. Later in the evening, after the second hill was seized, 
he organized the defense of the hill with hardly sufficient person-
nel for adequate security. During the night his company was fierce-
ly attacked by the enemy with grenades and bayonet&. This enemy 
attack was repulsed. · The number of dead during this operation was 
two hundred. Lieutenant Iron's leadership and courage were a source 
of inspiration to all members of his company, and reflects great 
credit upon himself and the military service. 
BRONZE STAR 
Technician fifth Grade FLOYD K. GULBRANSON, Medical Depart-
ment, United States Army. For heroic achievement in connection 
with military operations against the enemy at Breakneck Ridge, 
Leyte, Philippine Islands, from 12 November to 18 November 1944. 
As medical aid man for an engineer working party, Technician Gul-
branson was the onl;r medical man in the vicinity. He rendered 
quick and efficient aid to wounded infantrymen as well as his own 
unit. He was constantly under fire from enemy snipers, but carried 
out his work calmly and effectivel;r. Tech~ician Gulbranson's con-
duct under•fire reflects greatest credit upon himself and the mili-
tary service. 
SILVER STAR 
Private First Class HARVEY B. PERRY, Medical Department, United 
States Army . For gallantry in action at Breakneck Ridge, Leyte, 
Philippine Islands, on 16 November 1944. On this day Private Perry, 
a medical aid man for an engineering working party found it necessary 
to render first aid to men from other organizations who were without 
medical assistance. Be rendered the required aid quickly and effici-
ently without regard for his personal safety. Later a man from his 
own unit was hit and the entire party pinned down by enemy machine 
gun fire. Private Perry went fearlessly to his aid. In doing so 
his first aid pouches were ripped from his back by machine gun fire. 
he continued his errand of mercy, however, and evseuated the wounded 
man safel;r. On this as well as on numerous other occasions, 
Private Perr;r's conduct was a heroic example for the other men 
of his organization and the armed forces of his countr;r. 
SILVER STJ.R 
Staff Sergeant (then Private . First Class) JOHN W. McCLELLAND, 
Infantr;r, United States Ara;r. Jor gallantr;r in action at Le;rte, 
Philippine Islands, on 12 November 1944. Sergeant McClelland was 
acting assistant squad leader of an infantr;r rifle compan;r. After 
his platoon had attacked a strongly defended Japanese perimeter and 
_succeeded in penetrat1ng it, he was ordered to guard the rear of his 
platoon. In this capacity, he person·ally accounted for six Japan-
ese trying to infiltrate the position and isolate the platoon. Ser-
geant McClelland's fire, in the face of superior enemy numbers, was 
entirely .responsible for keeping his platoon from being surrounded 
and cut off. ·Sergeant McClelland's courageous action reflects great 
credit upon himself and the military service. 
BRONZE STAR 
Private First Class .GEORGE H. DIEHL, Infantry, United Stat~s 
Army. For heroic achievement in connection with militar;r op•ra-
tions against the enem;r at Hill 1525, Le;rte, Philippine Islands, 
on 10 November 1944. Private Diehl was an acting squad leader in 
an infantry rifle company which was engaged in combat with the enemy . 
. Exposing himself to enem;r fire he worked his wa;r to three wounded men 
and successively assisted each of them in reaching safety. Private 
Diehl's courage and devotion to his fellow soldiers reflect great 
credit upon himself and the military service. 
BRONZE STAR 
Staff Sergeant WILLIAM F. FRANCHER, tnfantry, United States 
Arm;r. For heroic achievement in connection with militar;r opera-
tions against the enemy at ~e;rte, Philippine Islands, on 12 Novem-
ber 1944. Sergeant Francher was an acting platoon sergeant of an 
infantry rifle compan;r. Sergeant Francher was wounded b;r enemy 
artillery ~hrapnel but remained at his post directing mortar fire 
until the company was relieved. He later had his wounds dressed 
but refused to be evacuated to a hospital. Sergeant Francher's 
actions were an inspiration to his fellow soldiers and reflect 
credit upon himself and the military service. 
BRONZE STAR 
Staff Sergeant J. D. HAMRICK, Infantr;r, United States irmy. 
For heroic achievement in connection with military operations 
against the enemy at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on 12 November. 
1944. Sergeant Hamrick, a squad leader in an infantr;r rifle com-
pany, during the heaviest barrage of artillery and mortar fire, 
left the comparative safety of his foxhole to rescue one of his 
wounded men at t~e risk of his own life. Sergeant Hamrick's coura-
geous action set an excellent example for his men and reflects great 
credit upon himself and the military service. 
SILVER ST.A.R 
Private First Class JACK FURMAN, Infantry, United States 
Army. For gallantry in action at Breakneck Ridge, Leyte, Philip-
pine Islands, on 13 November 1944. Private Furman was twice wound-
ed in action against the enemy but insisted on staying with his unit. 
Later the same day, while the company was .halted at the battalion 
command post on its way .back to a rest area, the battalion command 
post received a surprise attack by a strong Japanese force. Private 
Furman rushed at once to the outer perimeter where his fire was in-
strumental in silencing a Japanese machine gun. His resourceful 
act ions were an inspirat-ion to his unit throughout the campaign. 
SILVER S1'.A.R 
First Lieutenant CLAUDE H. HALL, Infantry, United States Army. 
For gallantry in action at Leyte, Philippine Islands, on lZ Novem-
ber 1944 . On this day, Lieutenant Hall, platoon leader, while 
severely wounded, and at further risk of his life, exposed himself 
to en~my fire to direct artillery fire upon advancing Japanese · 
troops and an active enemy field piece. Lieutenant Hall's aggres-
siveness and leadership under fire served as a continuous example 
and inspiration to the whole compan7 and reflects great credit upon 
himself and ' the mil~tary service. 
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3rd Battalion, 57th Infantry Regiment, lOth Company, 57th Infantry, lst 
Battalion, lst Field Artillery Regiment; lst Platoon, lst Company, lst 
Engineers; 57th Regiment plus lst Battalion. Quick firing guns, 57th 
Regiment Gun Company, lst Field -Hospital. Enemy killed and counted dur-
ing the day by the 21st Infantry - 135. 11 o 
At 1130 the lst Battalion jumped off on the right of the Regimental 
Front. Company "A" passed through Company 11B11 at 1100 and advanced. The 
attack was supported by Machine Gun fire from the vicinity of OP Hill fir-
ing into the draw. The tanks were held up by heavy Anti-Tank fire at the 
southern exit from the draw along the road. Company "B" attacked on the 
right flank down into the valley between "Point K and P. 11 It made a wide 
envelopment of hill 11P" moving onto it from the West. At 1300 Company 11 G11 
(less one platoon) replaced Company 11F11 • Company 11G11 was on the left flank 
of the ridge. l platoon Company 11E11 was East thereof as further flank pro-
tection. At 1305, Company 11A11 had taken objective 11Point Q11 • Company 11B11 
was moving with little oppo~ion. 
At 1410, Company 11 G11 reported being counter-attacked from the left (East). 
At 1510, Companies '1E'.' and 11C11 were being counter-attacked. Company 11B11 
was called back to help .hold the position of Company "C" which was threatened. 
All counte~-attacks were repulsed. At 1525 the tanks withdrew due to poor 
visibility. Rain storms prevented their proper use, and ammunition was al-
most exhausted. 
At 1550, Company 11 F11 and the 2nd Battalion Command Post received strong 
counter-attacks from the East at their position at 11Point R". These attacks 
were repulsed. 
At 1710, all units of the 2nd Battalion were receiving and repulsing counter-
attacks. 
At 1620 Company 111 11 was ordered to relieve Company 11F11 • 1800 all positions 
held and consolidated. The 2nd Battalion estimated it killed 342 Japanese. 
The heavy r~ins commenced again at 1800. 
14 ·November 1944: Extracts from the Periodic Report No. 26, Headquarters 
24th Infantry Division, dated 1800, 14 November 1944. 
"Japanese resistance in the area of BREAKNECK RIDGE is believed to be 
broken •. With complete occupation of the ridge area to include minor high 
ground to the ~outh, superior observation and fields of fire allowed the 
21st Infantry to obtain the maxi.!Illm results with Machine Gun, Mortar, and 
Artillery during the day. Particularly good results were gained from im-
proved fields of fire for the automatic weapons. A combined Infantry team 
of the 19th Infantry observed from Hill 1525, locating targets for the 21st 
Infantry, 8lmm Mortar Crews. Enemy forces in this area suffered heavy cas-
ualties for the period. At 1700 enemy resistance consisted primarily of 
pockets astride the PINAMOPOAN - ORMOC Road approximately 1,200 yards North 
of LIMON. 
The 21st Infantry counted 310 Japanese dead during the dey • 11 
At 0930, units of the 19th Infantry reported from Hill 1525. At 1030 
the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was dispatched to 
Company 11B11 from there to conduct. a patrol to the Nest of LIMON • 
• 30 
At 1110, Company 11F11 was relieved and moved back to 11Point A" in 
Regimerttal Reserve. 
At llZO .3rd Battalion was ordered to relieve the lst Battalion on the . 
right of BREAKNECK RIDGE. 
· At 12.30, lst Battalion had attained its objective along the line 11Point 
Q - Point P". Company "B" took "Point P11 by an encirclermnt to the West. 
The advance of the lst Battalion was supported by tanks one of which was 
knocked out. 
15 November 1944: During the night the 2nd Battalion commanded by Lt. 
Colonel Seymour Madison receiyed three desperate counter-attacks. In the 
last some enemy penetrated and were eliminated in a bayonet fight. Although 
enemy fire prohibited a count of enemy dead, the following morning large num-
bers of enemy were killed. Between 0900 and 1400 all Battalions employing 
all companies attacked and encircled remaining enemy reistances. 2nd Bat-
talion also attacked East and eliminated enemy prockets from which its 
counter-attacks bad been received. However, the 19th Infantry on our left 
had not closed the wide gap between Hill 1525 and BREAKNECK so enemy rein-
forcements constantly filtered in and became strong before nightfall. On 
the 16th o! November 1944 the Regiment again attacked supported by all 
· attached weapons and units. On the evening 16 November 1944, -~he 21st In-
fantry occupied the last remaining high ground and potential defensive po~ 
sitions North of LIMON. 
Headquarters X Corps Weekly Report, No. 4, dated 18 November 1944 states 
as follows: 1 
. . "15 November 1944, in the 21st Infantry sector resistance throughout the 
day consisted of small arms, automatic weapons, mortar and some artillery 
fire. Sniper fire was received throughout the day in rear of the front line 
element~. Many small pockets of 25-50 Japanese in rear areas were wiped out 
by machine gun and mrtar fire. During the night the 2nd an d. 3rd Battalions, 
· 21st Infantry, were attacked by 25-50 Japanese supported by 81mm Mortar Fire. 
Attacks were repulsed with 12 Japs killed in action in each case. 
16 November 1944: · The i2Sth · Infantry passed through the 21st Infantry a·t 
1200. During the morning the 21st Infantry had no enemy contacts but suc-
ceeded in mopping up rear areas. 11 · 
On ·l5 November 1944, the 21st Infantry killed and ~unded 245 Japanese, 
and on 16 November 1944 the 21st Infantry killed 47. 
Battle casualties for the 21st Infantry from 5th to i6th of November-6.30. 
Sick, injured from other casuses or battle fatigue-1.3.3. Total 765. 
Enemy bodies counted during the same period were 1, 779. 
It can be assumed that there was at least one enemy wounded for every 
counted dead, and also a number of dead uncounted. 
At the time of the relief of the 21st Infantry by the 32nd Division, the 
front line :was located along the line "Po~t "F", "L", "X", nyn • 
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HEADQUARTERS 21ST INFANTRY 
Offic~ of -trhe Regimental Commander 
APO 24 
15 December 1944 
Subject; Enemy Tactics •. 
To Asst 1t Chief of Staff, G-2, Sixth Army, APO #442. 
(Thru: G-2 Channels) 
1. In compliance with v~rbal request for material for inclusion 
in a weekly G-2 Report, the following is submitted: 
11 The 21st Infantry was committed to action against strong hostile 
forces at PINAMOPOAN, LEITE ISLAND, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, on 5 November 1944. 
Elements in contact were 57th Infantry Regiment, 49th Infantry Regiment, and 
small units of the 1st Infantry Regiment all of the First Division, and a 
:&ttalion or .roore of the 1st Division Artillery including some 15 m guns. 
During the period 5 November to 16 November 1944 the Regiment was directed to 
"maintain the initiative at all costs". During the period the 21st Infantry 
suffered 630 battle casualties, and killed and counted 1,779 enemy. The 
twelve day period resulted in an advance of 2,000 yards of difficult terrain 
over a series of six ridges South of PINAMOPOAN, now called BREAKNECK RIDGE. 
All who contacted the enemy were impressed with his excellence in bat-
tle. Little was noted of reckless charges, needless sacrifices, or failure 
to observe known tactical principles. The most outstanding enemy character-
.istic was his excellence in fire discipline and control of all arms. Without 
exception enemy fire was withheld until the moment when its delivery in great 
volume would give greatest effect. On 5 November 1944, the enemy on forward 
slopes of the first ridge allowed his positions to be by-passed by two rein-
forced companies of the 3rd Battalion. The enemy in approximate strength of 
one Battalion remained quietly in such concealment that the tYA:> companies ad-
vanced apparently without opposition on a routine relief movement and to secure 
the high ground. Then the enemy opened with such great effect that·the two 
forward companies found themselves completely isolated and unable to move, re-
ceive supplies or evacuate wounded. Only by super-human efforts bn the part of 
the remainder of the Regiment were these two companies extricated. 
/ During the daily attacks in the following ten days there were numerous 
instances where enemy defensive areas often consisting of bunkers, eight to· 
twelve machine guns, mortars and one company of riflemen would permit cau-
tiously moving advance elements to pass their excellently concealed positions, 
and fire on reserve troops moving in more compact formations. 
Throughout the entire period, generally speaking, enemy resistance was 
light in the morning a~d early afternoon hours. 
After 1530, enemy resistance began to build up. It was extremely heavy 
at about 1600, and then counter-attacks from front and flanks, and between 
units commenced and increased in intensity until dark. Night attacks on our 
perimeters although frequent were not as S.O.P. as is usual with Japanese 
F9rces. During six nights there were no enemy counter-attacks at all. 
By building up resist~ce late in. the afternoon, and counter attacking 
in force before dark, the enemy was able to bring greatest fire, with 
consequent demoralizing and disorganizing effect upon our assault troops 
at a time when their energy and ammunition were as nearly exhausted as· 
they would be at any time during the day. It ·also prevented proper con-
solidation of front positions before dark. 
Envelopments and encirclements never forced retirement or evacuation 
of any enemy position. Too great emphasis had been placed .on training that 
mere encirclement meant a successful action. The team play of the en-
circling force, large or small, had to be continued through the stages of 
occupation of the position, close combat within the position in conjunction 
with the frontal effort and complete mopping up. 
Enemy snipers were not found in trees although many_ trees offered good 
locations. Snipers seldom if ever fired at vehicles on roads, no matter ·how 
full of personnel they appeared to be. However, snipers were constantly fir-
ing at foot troops on roads, either as single individuals or in.formations. 
Snipers were often posted in nests of three or four. Consequently a volume 
of sniper fire could be delivered at once, even well behind the front l~nes. 
When firing at a single man, a group of four snipers would emit only one shot. 
This was apparently to conceal the location of the group. Many snipers used 
telescopic sights. Their fire was extremely accurate. 
Enemy artillery always fired into our positions when our supporting 
artillery was firing in close support of our own advances. Often this 
caused calls from rifle units to our artillery to cease firing. Enemy mor-
tars followed the same practice as well as enemy small arms which fired when 
our automatic weapons fired. 
The typical shrieking, hysterical, so called Banzai Charge was notice-
ably not employed. Enemy counter attacks were supported by mortar fire and 
automatic weapons. 
Our tank attacks or even movement in column to attack positions had to 
be guarded in front, flanks, and rear by riflemen. This was to prevent sui-
cide attacks by Japs specifically left for that one purpose, with magnetic 
mines, demolitions or grenades which were inserted in the tracks. 
Enemy attacks were often delivered by units of infantry crawling all 
the way t o close assault positions. These Japs had their helmets bristling 
with grass and weeds. Often the first indication of an approaching attack 
would be when outposts spotted grassy helmets moving in the deep cogon grass. 
Our own men had elastic bands around their helmets for the purpose of in-
serting grass and twigs and often our defenses hesitated to fire as identi-
fication was difficult. · 
In no case was an enemy attack upon one of the perimeters of the 21st 
Infantry units successful. Flame throwers, and white phosphorous were par-
ticularly effective and literally made the Japs squeal. 
Enemy infiltraters at night would cut telephone wire lines, and then 
wait in ambush for linemen to come to make repairs. Litter bearers and Aid 
Men drew particularly heavy fire. 
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Although the enemy used captured ordnance to supplement their own 
fire, his snipers used only Japanese rifles. This permitted our troops 
to detect their location because of the distinctive report. 
The enemy used reverse slope defense tactics effectively. Every 
reverse slope in the area was well defended. Every foot of the terrain 
attacked was utilized properly for defense. His utilization of the ter-
rain for defense was exceptionally good. All of his positions were 
mutually supporting. Most -enemy fox holes were constructed in the shape 
of an inverted boot. His fire step and firing position toward us was in 
the toe. The deep heel was used to retire into for cover during our ar-
tillery and ~rtar fire. Ene~ artillery pieces were located in covered 
emplacements well concealed with deep caves behind the gun for protection 
of gunners. 
One of our.bf,t'icers, Lieutenant Anderson, who regained our lines 
after spending two days wounded inside enemy lines had an opportunity to 
observe ene.!I\Y actions closely. All night was utilized for moving up 
ammunition and supplies by hand cart. He reported machine gun positions 
near draws and noses where the gun would be located on a forward slope. 
When artillery or mortar fire fell near the position the crews calmly 
went around the .reverse side on a trail going around a nearby corner or 
curve to a protected reverse slope position. As soon as our fire ceased 
the gunners immediately re-occupied their positions. 
In many cases our riflemen failed to dig t~eir fox holes de~p enough. 
During enemy mortar fire they were forced to crouch in their holes because 
the shallowness prevented them from standing upright. This lost them their 
observation completely and permitted the enemy to get up to bayonet range 
to where our riflemen was disadvantageously located to protect himself. Had 
he had a deep enough fox hole he·could have remained erect.and continued fir-
. ing from cover and better protected himself from closely advancing enemy in-
fantry men. 
W. J. VERBECK, 
Colonel, 21 Infantry, 
ColllllB nding. 
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Subject: 
To 
HEADQUARTERS 21ST INFANT!ff 
Office of the Regimental Commander 
A.P .0. # 24. 
6 December 1944. 
Commendation. 
Officers and Men of the 21st Inf antr:l• 
1. . The 21st Infantry was co·mmitted to action against strong 
hostile forces at PINAMOPOAN, LEYTE ISLAND, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, on 
5 November 1944. The Commanding General, 24th Division directed: 
"The initiative will be maintained at all costs. 11 From 5 November 
to 16 November at 1200, a period of twelve days, this order was 
carried out in continuous ~ombat against a superior and determined 
hostile force. Every effort by the enemy to hold PINAMOPOAN RIDGE 
was made. Under conditions of difficult terrain, unfavorable weather, 
uncertain supply conditions and with no reinforcements the 21st Infan-
try ejected the enemy from PINAMOPOAN RIDGE. During the twelve day 
period 1779 of the enemy were killed. 
2. It is with a feeling of deep pride that the undersigned 
commends the Officers and Men of the 21st Infantry for their achieve-
ment. 
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W. J. VERBECK, 
Colonel, 21st Infantry, . 
Commanding. 
Enemy infiltrators would cut the telephone wire lines and then 
a:mhush the linemen who came to repair the break 
v~u~nEJ m~N u~ 
t.:J • .4t:lj{ t.oy .IO{Vf{ 
The actual relief of the 21st Infantry from its positions on Breakneck 
Ridge occurred on 17 November 1944. The Regiment which thirteen days before 
had numbered 3050 now with a strength of less than 1600 officers and men 
returned to the vicinity of Jaro for rest and rehabilitation. However, the 
need for a deployed defense of the Western slopes of the Leyte Valley brought 
forth orders to occupy defensive positions. Long To.rr.s were now bombarding 
Ormoc from the vic.inity of Daro which was five miles west of Jaro. The 2nd 
and 3rd Battlions, therefore, moved out from Jaro on 18 November and occupied 
the hills around the guns. The 1st Battalion remained at Jaro. The rainy sea-
son on Leyte was now at its worst. Daro was cold and knee deep in mud. Our 
troops had neither blankets, dry clothes nor socks. Many were ill with dysen-
tery, and immersion foot. It rained constantly. Further to the '/lest in the 
high mountains were stationed one company from each of the two battalions. 
One company was on Mount Laao and one on Mount Mamban. Supplies and food 
bogged down on the muddy roads and trails. The veterans of Breakneck dug in 
and raised banana leaf roofs and waited. Mount Laao and Marnban were rough. 
We stayed here until 10 December. 
CARIGARA 
From 10 December to 26 December the Regiment moved to the North coast of 
Leyte to take up positions to defend the beach against enemw landing or raid-
ing attempts. The First Battalion was deployed in the vicinity of Barugo, a 
pleasant town which had been left comparatively untouched by the War. The 
1st Battalion was under the command of Major Lamar w. Little. The Second Bat-
talion under command of Major Francis R. Dice and the Third under Lt.Col. Eric 
Ramee stretched from Carigara to Capoocan. Rest and rehabilitation took place. 
New clothing and equipment arrived and some replacements were received. 
MINDORO 
Elements of the 21st Infantry participated in a number of campaigns dur-
ing the period 21 December 1944 to the 6th of March 1945. The 3rd Battalion 
under the command of Lt .• Colonel Eric Ramee sailed for Mindoro on 21 December 
where attacks on the convoy at sea caused casualties and heavy loss of equip-
ment. Landing at San Jose, Mindoro, this battalion was under cQnstant air 
attack and withstood a naval bombardment by enemw battleships, cruisers . and 
destroyers. The remainder of the regiment sailed from Leyte fo·r :Mindoro on 
27 December. On the 28th the convoy was under bombing and Kamikaze attack all 
day and two ships of the convoy carrying munitions and gasoline were blown up 
with a "loss of all aboard. No 21st Infantrymen however were lost. Other ships 
were also bombed and sunk and the regiment suffered some casualties. The Regi~ 
ment landed on December 30th having been attacked and bombed all the trip. In 
defensive po~ion the troops were subject to repeated air bombings. until 7 Janu-
ary 1945. · 
In the first ten days of January 1945 elements of the 3rd Battalion suc-
cessfully defeated enemy garrisons at Bongabong and Pinamalayan on Mindoro 
and at Boak on Marinduque Island. Company I under Captain Sothoron Able in 
two sharp fights brought Pinamalayan under our control while Lieutenant Milton 
E. Wilson with Company K surrounded the Jap· garrison of Boak in a schoolhouse 
and killed them all. 
MINOORO (cont.) 
The liberation of Northern Mindorowas carried out by the 21st 
Infantry. Lt. Colonel Henderson acted as military governor and re-
stored order and civil liberties among the peoples. In conjunction 
with a small guerrilla regiment under command of Major Ramon Ruffee, 
the 21st Infantry - less lst Battalion which was at San Jose - moved · 
overland from Pinamalayan toward Gusay, a Jap strong point, where it 
was reported that 400 enemy troops were concentrated. At the same 
time Company F under command of Captain Charles R. Jameson, Jr., moved 
by water in commandeered sail boats to Najuan. I Company guarcfed Pina-
malayan. K Company was still at Boak in Marinduque Island. The 2nd 
Battalion (less F. Company) surprised and dispersed the enemy at Gusay 
on January 19-20. On the evening of 19 January a Japanese patrol was 
ambushed by Regimental Headquarters personnel in the Regi~ntal Command 
Post where they had walked without knowing that the 2nd Battalion was 
surrounding their own base at Gusay. The 2nd Battalion had just complet'ed 
a four day march from Pinamalayan through the mountains with only caro-
metas and ponies and buffalo carts for transportation. . Regimental c.P. 
and Headcparters company had accompanied the 2nd Battalion. furing this 
march two rivers were crossed on parts of bridges destroyed by the enemy's 
delaying forces. Every item of equipment including about 3000 rounds of 
Slm.m. mortar ammunition was manhandled across the river. Only one Jap 
escaped alive from the ambush in the Rgt. C.P. 81m.m. mortars immediately 
fired on Gusay with good results. · · 
Company F, disembarked because of unfavorable winds and finally com-
pleted a gruelling mrch to Najuan on .foot in time to cut off the enemy's 
. withdrawal from Gusay towards Calipan, the capitol. 
Captain Kermit Blaney was in command of L. Company which spearheaded 
the 3rd Battalion's (-) thr.ust to take Calipan. There were sharp fights 
at Km. 8, Km. ?, and Km. 6. The guerrillas participated in this fighting 
of 23 January. On the 24th the 21st entered the capitol without opposition 
· and the enemy withdrew to the hills to the West. We rested in and around 
Calipan and first tasted the joys of being entertained qy a liberated people. 
Food was good for awhile. There also was Calipan gin. · 
In San Jose a regimental area add camp was established, badly needed 
replacements were received, equipment and clothes were replaced and a period 
of rehabilitation and training was started. 
DIPOLOO 
During the last days of March 1945 a force of one division was assemblea 
for the capture of Zamboanga in Southwest Mindanao. Just prior to the am-
phibious assault, the air attacks against the enemy in Zamboanga were stepped 
up. Marine air group 24 had landed at Dipolog on the Northwestern coast of 
the Zamboanga Penninsula. They were using the Point as a base of operations 
as it was in the h.mds of friendly Filipino guerrillas. Information was re-
ceived that an enemy force of atout 400 was advancing from the interior to 
capture Dipolog. Accordingly typ companies of the 2nd Battalion, 21st In-
fantry were flown to Dipolog from Mindoro in transport planes. This airborne 
force secured the air base and the town and the hostile force turned back. 
This was the first landing of ground forces on Mindanao. 
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GUERILLA REPORTS 
The Japanese force defending Northern Mindoro was driven from Calipan 
on 23 January 1G45 and scattered towards the mountains to the #est. For 
the next week the Regiment of Mindoro guerrillas under command of Major 
Rarr~n Ruffee carried out a campaign to finish off the defeated.Jap force. 
These Filipino troops had greatly assisted the 21st Infantry in its Min-
doro Campaign. Now, reinforced by mortar and machine gun uriits from the 
2nd and 3rd Battalions, 21st Infantry, they tackled the enemy in the hills. 
Two sample accounts of guerrilla actions follow: 
SUBJECT: 
TO 
· PHILLIPINE ARMY 
BOLO AREA 
Encounter ~ith the Japs, report on 
CO, Bolo Area 
29 January, 1945 
On Jan. 25, 1945, Lt. I. Minay with twenty four (24) armed men, Sgt. 
Aploinar with eleven (11) armed men and the Trench Mortar Section of eleven 
(11) men all under my direct command proceeded to Katuwiran to establish our 
line of attack. 
At 6:00AM the next day, Jan. 26, 1945 I sent patrol out to verify 
enemy positions. Within 25 minutes the patrol arrived reporting that the 
Japs were concentrated at Longos foot Bridge and among the houses within 
the vicinity. 
I ordered Lt. I. Minay and Sgt. Flores to deploy the men one hundred 
yards ahead of the Trench Mortar, before I ordered the Mortar Men to fire. 
Exactly at 8:00 AM the pounding of the Trench Mortar began at the place 
where the Japs were concentrated. On the first concentration of fire the 
Japs were at once demoralized and they were all scattered around. My men 
were able to advance as far as 25 yard from the enemy positions. We saw 
most of them already armless. In our first encounter the Japs retreated 
and I ordered all men to advance to gain the positions of the Japs. We 
were on failure because of the heavy machine-gun fire concentrated to the 
place where we deployed. The Japs have one (1) .50 cal. MG, and two (2) 
.30 cal. MG with several sub-machine guns in operation. I ~rdered the men 
to hold the line. For about three hours heavy exchange of fire 'Mas made. 
On this first encounter of ours the men on the front estimated that they 
were able to kill twenty (20) plus. · Ne could see those armless JaF'S taking 
rifles from the· dead ones. The firing of the Japs lasted for two hours. 
At 2:00 PM I ordered a concentr~tion of Mortar fire to the place where 
we spotted the machine gun emplacements. The Japs did not answer our fire. 
After 30 minutes, we heard the Japs firing at our right and left flanks, 
while the machine guns began to fire again at our front covering their ad-
vance to our line of resistance. Still the boys held the line. The boys 
were able to kill lots in their advance for they advance on an open field. 
Fearing that we might be encircled I ordered my men to withdraw to our first 
line of attack and hold the line again. The machine-gun fire lasted for two 
) . 
hours. 'Little by little we retreated to the other siJe of th8 river. 
In my supposition all in all we were able to kill .forty (40) Japs. 
We still saw blood scattered around on their fox-holes and alonr, their 
ways of retreat, when we attack them last 28 Jan. '45. .le have captured 
one (1) box of ammunitions .30 cal. Japs machine gun, one (1) rifle .25 
cal. and several magazines of .50 and .30 cals. machine guns. 
The Japs left plenty of ammunitions on the field. i'hey have wasted 
most of their ammunitions during our combat • 
. /s/ RAMON ANONUEVO 
1st Lieut., Inf. 
PHILIPPINE ARMY 
BOLO AREA 
CO 11 C" Co 
29 Jan. '45 
SUBJECT: Combat report (Longos Campaign) 
CO, Dolo Area T~-
1. · The following combat reports in Longos against the enemy are 
hereby submitted. 
2. a.STRENGTH OF OUR UNIT · - Five (5) Officers and one hundred 
fourteen (114) enlisted men. 
b .NUMBER Cf ARMS One hundred · seventeen (117) rifles 
and two ( 2) Trench r.fortars 81 },lM. 
c.OFFICER IN CHARGE ----- Lt. DOMINADOR B. ADEVA, Inf 
OFFICERS WHO PARTICIPATED - Lts. ANONUEVO, GIMENEZ, BACARRO & 
MINAY. 
d.CASUALTY SUSTAINED ----- NONE 
e.BOOTY TAKEN ------------ A~~UNITION, RIC~ and considerable 
Japanese Army Supply. 
f.SUPPLY ----------------- Furnished by Civilians 
3. ENE1IT STRENGTH ----------- Three hundred to four hundred (300 
400) including officers. 
b.Number of ~rms---------- Estimated to be two hundred (200) in-
cluding rifles and machine guns. 
c.SUPPLY --------------~-- The Japs had considerable number of 
rice and cattle taken forcibly from 
civilians. 
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d.ENE11Y DISPOSITION -- All Along the road from Longos to 
Calabugao. Entrenchment had. been 
established all along these points. 
e. NAME OF OFFICER ---- UNKNOWN 
!.CASUALTIES SUSTAINED- Estimated to be from forty (40) to 
fifty (50) .inen. 
4. NARRATIVE REPORT ----- The enemy composed mostly of those who 
retreated from.GUSAY and CALAPAN were entrenched all along the road from 
Longos River to Calabugao northward. They numbered approximqtely from 
three hundred (300) to 400 men including Officers. Machine gun emplace-
ments were established in their barracks covering the _road in the East side. 
They were e,vidently ready for any attack as Japs had been observed entrenched 
in their fox-hole day and night. In the morning of Jan. 28, 145 my men and 
four (4) officers an:i one hundred fourteen (114) enlisted men after receiving 
instructions from me disposed themselves along the East and South sides of 
the enemy positions. At -zero "hour" has been announced; the signal whic~, 
will be the pounding of. the Trench Mortar to the enemy positions, followed 
by two (2) smoke shells. The last two (2) smoke shells served as the 11 zero" 
hour and for the men to jump in the enemy. 
At nine (9:00 AM) of the 'same day the pounding commenced, and after 
one half hour, of pounding, the signal.for the whole unit was delivered. 
Our men at a double quick, but cautiously approached the enemy position. 
Enemy were seen dislodged from their entrenchment and were subjected to our 
rifle firing. The enemy was not able to effect any firing as they were all 
in panic, caused principally by the acute firing of the Trench Mortar and 
the traversing rapid firing of our men. However, their main force were able 
to "take offtt for the mountain located in the \!fest side of their position. 
Our men got hold of their positions taking as enemy booty, ammunitions, gas 
mask, rain coats, rice and meat. Scouts were immediately dispatched within 
the vidnity but discovered no enemy. However, foot-prints were discovered, 
presumably Japanese, leading to the mountain. 
We stayed in the place until late in the afternoon, when I received re- _ 
ports that the enemy was somewhere in the mountain, two and a half kilometers 
from our position, which was within a Trench Mortar range~ I~~ediately I 
ordered a twenty minutes pounding in the direction specif'ied, with all the 
ammunitions left. An hour later report was received that the enemy in that 
.area was again in turmoil. American lone plane was also observed encircling 
within the enemy area dropping several small explosions, which to my est~na­
tion were hand grenades. * 
The complete detail regarding enemy casualties is still in the process, 
as our S-2 Officer with his personnel are out in that area for more informa-
tion. More reports will follow. 
/ s/ DOMINADOR B. ADEV A 
1st Lieu t • , Inf 
In-charge of Operation. 
*Regimental Cqmmander, 21st Infantry, observing the·action in a L-5 
observation plane. 
General Orders) 
No. 68 ) 
0068 
WAR IEPARTMENT 
Washington 25, D.C., 14 August 1945. 
BATTLE HONORS.-As authorized by Executive Order 9396 (sec. I, WD Bul. 
22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. IIII, WD Bul. 11, 1942), 
citations of the following units in the general orders indicated are con..; 
firmed under the provisions of section IV, WD Circular 333, 1943, in the 
name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved 
honor and distinction: 
* * * 
19. CANNON COMPANY, 21ST INFANTRY REGIMENT, is cited for outstanding 
heroism and gallantry in supporting the drive of an airborne divi~ion 
from Nasugbu to Manila, Philippine Islands, 31 January to 5 February 1945. 
On 31 January the Cannon Company, 21st Infantry Regiment, landed at Nasug-
bu, Luzon. It was the only armored unit in support of the airborne di-
vision at that time. When heavy enemy resistance was encountered at 
Cayungan .on 1 February, this company moved forward under hostile artillery 
and autowatic weapons fire to cover the advance of leading units across a 
deep ravine. By direct fire, promptly and accurately placed, this company 
neutralized enemy automatic weapons permitting the seizure of the position 
with minimum losses to our forces. On 2 February at Aga the division ad-
vance was held up by another strongpoint. Despite the fact that its vehicles 
drew heavy hostile artillery, mortar, and automatic fiTe, this company ad-
vanced rapidly to forward positions and again by direct fire neutralized the 
enemy position. On 3 February, during the advance. on Tagaytay Ridge, from 
an area subject to enemy artillery, mortar, and small-arms fire, the Cannon 
Company, 21st Infantry Regiment, delivered direct fire on enemy emplacements, 
-greatly facilitating the seizure of the area. On 4 February, with assault 
units of the division, . this company surprised and destroyed hostile groups 
in four stone houses guarding approaches to the· Imus River Bridge. This 
action enabled the mined structure to be secured before it could be destroyed. 
By aggressive action at I.:a.s Pinas the same day, the self-propelled mounts 
reduced pillboxes near the Las Pinas Bridge, permitting this bridge, also 
mined, to be secured before the charges could be detonated. Capturing these 
tlro bridges intact was of greatest importance to the 31-mile advance made by 
the division that day. At Paranaque 5 February, encountering main defenses 
of the heavily fortified Genko Line guarding approaches to Manila and Nichols 
Field, the company pushed through streets covered by hostile artillery and 
antitank guns and mined with 250 KG aerial bombs, destroyed numerous pill-
boxes and large roadblocks, and materially aided the breaching of outer de-
fenses. Throughout this entire series of actions_, the Cannon Company, 21st 
Infantry Regiment, subordinated personal safety to aggressive action despite 
heavy casualties, and by its gallant action earned the admiration of all units 
it had supported. (General Orders 69, Headquarters, Eighth Army, 25 June 1945, 
as approved by the Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.) 
* * 
By order of the Secretary of War: 
Official: 
EDWARD F. WITSELL 
Major General 
Acting The Adjutant General 
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* -~· 
* 
G. C. MARSHALL, 
Chief of Staff 
. In the Luzon campaign from 31 January 1945 to 3 March 1945, the 
Cannon Company, ?1st Infantry, attached to the 11th Airborne Division~ 
participate~ in the following engagements: Nasugbu, Wawa; Lian, Tagay-
tay, Imus, Paranaque, Zapote, Las Pinas, Nichols Field, Fort '.Vil1iam 
McKinley, Alabang and ·Los B~ros. During this campaign four ou t of their 
eight self-propelled mounts were destroyed in act ion. The Company suffered 
heavy casualties among them the Company Commander, Captain Harold Edleson, 
killed. 
LUBANG 
The First Battalion now commanded by Major Nicholas Sloan conducted 
a rapid campaign on another island. Previous reconnaissances had been 
made by scouting parties under command of Lieut. Philip Irons and.Lieut. 
Thomas R. Campbell. Twenty-four hours prior to the main landing of the 
First Battal~on, a force under command of Lt. Campbell landed on Lubang 
and a road block was established to cut off enemy retreat into the jungle 
hinterland. Then Campbell with another small force attacked an ene~ 
garrison in the capitol city of Lubang and killed several on the night of 
28 February - 1 March. He was in radio communication with the landing 
force. Sloan's men made an amphibious landing after a naval bombardment 
at the town of Tilic on Lubang Island. At the same time Campbell's force 
approached Tilic to help the landing force. After securing Tilic, Sloan's 
battalion pushed the enemy into the hills where after receiving some losses 
~n a sharp encounter dispersed and destroyed the ,enemy force of 200 or more. 
The entire action lasted from 1 March until 6 March. The battalion then 
returned to San Jose. 
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BRONZE STAR 
Captain KERMIT B. BLANEY, Infantry, United States Army. 
For meritorious achievement in connection with military opera-
tions against the enemy in the Philippine Islands from 22 
January to 15 May 1945. Du. ring the Rorth~ast Mindoro Campaign 
at Km 8, Km 7 and Km 6 south of Calipan, qaptain Blaney was 
company commander of a rifle coml?&nY which was assault company 
of a battalion of infantry attacking toward Calipan. In a steady 
advance against continuous enemy automatic weapons defensive po-
sitions Captain Blaney showed great ability ap.d personal courage 
i~ maintaining aggressive advance and defeating the last enemy 
defenses south of Ca¥ipan. From 3 May to 15 May 1945 during the 
- Mindan~o Campaign, Captain Blaney a rifle company commander, led 
his companr continuously throughout the period in daily attacks. 
His ability and outstanding leadership were considered to be a 
great asset in main-tenance of the initiative during this period 
when casualties were very high. Captain Blaney was withdrawn 
from combat on 15 May upon division order for temporary duty in 
the United States. 
BRONZE STAR 
Captain (then First Lieutenant) PHILIPS. IRONS, III, Infan-
trY', United States -Army. For' meritorious achievement in connection 
with military operations against the enem7 at Lubang, Philippine 
Islands from 16 to 17 February 1945. Captain Irons was leader of 
. a reconnaissance patrol consisting of two officers and three en-
listed men which landed on enemy-held Lubang Island prior to the 
main operation. It was the mission of this patrol to determine 
the location, strength and general condition of the Japanese gar-
rison. Captain Irons and his men were brought to within a mile of 
the island by PT Boat at night. From this point they roved to shore 
in small rubber boats. Armed only with rifles, grenades and sub-
machine guns the meu stepped ashore, concealed their rubber boats, 
and moved cautiousl7 up the beach. Since. reconnaissance was im-
possible in the darkness they found~ sheltered spot and slept until 
daylight. The following morning Captain Irons . led his .men inland. 
Ia reconnoitering over exceedingly rough terrain through enemy 
territo~y he to~k his men to the crest of a twenty-six hundred fo~t 
hill commanding the island. From here he was able to observe enemy 
installations for an entire day carefully noting roads and bridges 
· and drawing sketches of the terrain features. Throughout the two-
day mission Capt~in Irons displayed ~uts~anding leadership. resource-
fulness and courage under the constant danger ox discovery by the 
enemy. The information he obtained was of great value in planning 
the subsequent operation ~hich was carried out successfully with a 
minimum loss of life and. time. Captain Iron's heroic devotion to 
duty and disregard for his personal safety reflect great credit upon 
himself and the military service. 
BRONZE STAR 
Private JOAQUIN R. TAPIA, Infantry, United States Arm7. For 
heroic achievement in connection with militar;r operations against 
the enemy at Lubang, Philippine Islands, on 2 March 1945. Private 
Tapia volunteered to join a patrol of four members to reconnoiter 
at night in advance of our own front lines to locate enemy machine 
gun postions and to rescue any living from four of our men who were 
missing from the afternoon's action. During this operation Private 
Tapia was killed. Private Tapia's total disregard :for his own per-
sonal safety was a source of inspiration to all members of the patrol 
and reflects great credit upon himself and the military service. 
ROSTER OF OFFICERS, 21ST INFANTRY 1 10 March 1945. 
COLONEL 
Verbeck, William J. 
LT COLONELS 
Henderson, Arthur H., 
Ramee, Eric P., 
MAJORS 
Dice, Francis R., 
Bussell, Frank T., 
Marcy, Roy W., 
Suber, Tom w., 
Sloan, Nicholas E., 
CAPTAINS 
Stanford, Don D., 
Girardeau, John R., Jr., 
Kelley, Jack H., 
Lockhart, Gerald L., 
' Thompson, James H~, 
Jameson, Charles R., Jr., 
Childs, John A. 
Aitken, Malcolm D., 
Williams,. Jay B., Jr., 
Becker, Philip A., 
Candler, Eugene N. 
AUen, Shelton P., 
Reid, Neil D. 
Olson, Erwin L., 
Brown, Robert A. 
Kilgo, Hobert L., 
Able, Sothoron K. 
Blaney, K~rmit B. 
Vienneau, Ernest L., 
Wicker, Glenes E., 
Ender, Robert R., 
Mayer, John D., 
Haywood, Major G. 
Curles, Cecil M., 
CAPTAINS, MC 1 DC, CH. 
Coers, Burt N., ..•..••. Major ••• 
Berkowitz, Julius 
Jones, Erner 
Mutzig~r, Dudley H., 
Cashman, Malachy, J.P., 
Luria, Sidney B., 
Walters, Murray M., 
Rhein, William L., 
Cathcart, John #., 
1st LIEUTENANT 
Parent, James M., 
Hash, Russell T., 
Farmer, Edwards., 
Mote, Jack A., 
Moore, Dan c., 
43 
Regt'l Commander 
Regt'l Ex 0., (SC) 
Comdg 3rd Bn., (SC) (Lv U.S.) 
Regt '1 S-2, (SC) 
Regt'l Supply O, (S-4) (Lv U.S.) 
Conrlg 2nd Bn. (SC) · 
· 3rd, Bn, Ex o., (sc) 
Comdg 1st Bn., (SC) 
Hq Co 3rd Bn, Hq Co Comdr, (Bn S-1) 
Ex 0, 1st Bn. 
Ex 0, 2nd Bn. 
Regt'l S-3, Regt'l Opns 0. 
Hq Co 2nd Bn, Hq Co Comdr, (Bn S-1) 
Comdg Co 11F'1 · 
Comdg Co 11C11 
Hq Co 1st Bn, Hq Co Comdr, (Bn S-1) 
Hq Co 3rd Bn, Bn S-3, Bn Opns 0. -"'-
Pers Adj, Ass't Adj, Bond & Ins 0. 
Corndg Hq Co. (Lv U.S.) 
Regt'l Munn 0., Actg Regt'l S-4 
Comdg ·co "M" 
Comdg Serv Co, Unit Load~ng 0. 
Regt 1 l S-1, Regt'l Claims 0. 
Comdg Co 11E11 
Comdg Co 111'1 
Comdg Co "L" 
Comdg Co "K" 
Comdg A-T Co 
Comdg Co "H" 
2nd Bn Hq., Bn S-3, Bn Opns 0. (Lv U.s.) 
Regt 1 l MTO, Serv Co 
Comdg Cannon Co 
Regt'l Surgeon, (MC) (Lv U.S.) 
Regt 1 l Dental Surgeon, (DC) 
2nd· Bn Surgeon (MC) (Actg Regt 11 Surg.) 
2nd Bn Surgeon (MC) · 
Regt'l Chaplain (CH) 
3rd Bn Surgeon (MC) 
Ass't Regt 1 1 Chaplain (CH) (Hosp) 
Ass 1t Regt'l Dental Surg., (DC) 
lst Bn Surgeon (MC) 
Com:ig Co 11G11 
Co 11C11 
1st Bn Hq, Bn S-3, Bn Opns 0. 
3rd Bn Hq Co; Bn MTO, (Lv U.S.) 
Co "H'' 
1ST LIEUTENANTS (cont.) 
Farrell, John B., 
Freeman, Coleman R., 
Goldpaugh, John J., 
Sullivan, John c., 
McNamara, 'iVarren M., 
,Malone, Robert H., 
Miller, George J., 
Dantzler, LeRoy A., Jr., 
Seyle, Frank 'N., 
Stewart, Alvin E., 
Stimson, Arthur E., 
Trembley, Arthur N., Jr., 
Oler, William L., 
Corbishley, Sidney F., 
Trammell, Alonzo K., 
Boyd; Nilbur B., 
Sicely, Maruice F., 
Smith, Hobert P., . 
Harrurar, Frank W. , 
tannin, Thomas R., 
Williams, Herbert Jr., 
Kirkpatrick, Earl R., 
Smith, John H., 
Margolis, Robert J., 
Nelson, Vernon R., 
Small, Jack 
StClair, Robert J., 
Sundquist, Raymound M., 
Niegand, Allen W., 
Fosse, Maurice J., 
Snyder, Henry A., 
'Nisor, Robert L., 
Doyel, James T., Jr., 
Wilsey, Clarence R., 
Camp, Paul B., 
Cassel, Robert F., 
Corri.gan, Michael J., 
Counts, Charles R., 
Crouch, Theodore 
Hall, Claude H., 
Irons, PhilipS., III, 
Langridge, Kermit c., 
Morgan, Norman 0., 
Wilson, Milton E., 
Bland, Irvin G., 
Froome, James N., Jr., 
Hammer, Richard P., 
Kester, Alfred . J., 
Langford, ~Nilliam M., 
Lemm, Stanley c., 
Lesky, Albert W., 
Murphy, James F., 
Patrick, ivilliam J., 
Sabatine, Matthew 
Young, Emmitte E., 
2nd Bn Hq Co. 
A-T Co, (Lv U.S.) 
Co 11M11 
Co "F" (Atch Unasgned) 
Comdg Co 11D11 
Comdg Co 11A11 
Co "E" 
A-T Co 
Regt 11 Gas & Cam 0. 
Co "F" . 
Regt'l Liaison 0, Custodian of 
Classified Documents. 
Co "D 11 
Co 11L 11 
Serv Co, Regt'l MMO 
Hq Co, 2nd Bn 
Co 11 I 11 
Co "E" 
Co 11 F 11 
Co "G" 
Co 11 E11 (DS 24th Div) 
3rd Bn Hq Co., Bn Comm 0. 
2nd Bn, Hq Co 
Co 11A11 
Co "C" 
Co 11 K11 
2nd Bn Hq Co, Bn Comm 0. 
Co 11 B11 
Hq Co 
1st Bn Hq Co, Bn Comm 0. 
Co 11D11 
Cannon Co. 
Co: 11D11 
1st Bn Hq Co Bn MTO 
Co 11H11 
A-T Co 
Cannon Co 
Regt'l Ass 1t S-3, I & EO. 
Co 11 C11 
Comdg Co "B" 
Co "F1' (D .s. 24th Div, G-4) 
1st Bn, Bn S-2 
A-T Co 
Cannon Co 
Co 11 K11 
Co 11 1'1 
Regt'l Hq Co, Regt 11 Comm 0 
Co 11H11 (Lv U.S.) 
,3rd Bn Hq Co, (Hosp) 
Co 11 D11 
2nd Bn, Bn S-4, Bn Fire Marshal, Serv Co 
Co 11 G11 
A-T· Co 
3rd Bn, ·Bn S-4, Bn Fire Marshal, Serv Co 
1st Bn, Bn S-4, Bn Fire Marshal, Serv Co 
3rd Bn Hq Co 
Van De Riet, Harry J., 
Bemis, Russell B., 
O'Hara, James M., 
McKeon, Robert G., 
Routen, Eugene v., 
Henebery, John J., Jr., 
Hudson, Roger w., 
Marquez, Thomas 
Campbell, Thomas R., 
Bunkley, Thomas H., 
Hartman, William H. , 
Buttice, Angelo P., 
1st LIEUTENANTS, MC, DC, CH. 
Klann, Herman R., 
Chukur, Vincent J., •.••• 2rid Lt ••• 
2nd LIEUTENANTS 
Didak, Eugene J., 
Eddy, Lowell P., 
Ford, Clarence R., 
Steinberger, Joseph G., 
Smith, Arthur c., 
Battin, Donald H., 
Morton, Stuart C., 
Carmody, Robert J., 
Mullis, Jack R., 
Reifsnyder, Henry G., Jr., 
Ryan, Donald H., 
. Lehrer, Joseph A., 
RUnciman, Alexander P., 
Levine, Solol!lOn 
Prickett, Loyd L., 
Nacheff, Steve P., 
Proctor, Harold I., 
Fittz, Samuel C., 
Grevie, Peter ¥i., 
Hamby, Paul W., 
Whalen, John c., 
Munson, Frank W., 
0 'Brian, Donald A., 
Lostroch, Elwood, L., 
Procento, Anthony 
McConnell, Paul E., 
Roberts, Harris K., 
Massar, George D., 
Martin, Clarence A., Jr., 
WARRANT OFFICERS J .G. 
Lancaster, James L., 
Evans, Roy A., 
45 
Co 11A11 ( Lv U.S.) 
Serv Co, Ass't S-4 (Hosp) 
3rd Bn Hq Co 
2nd Bn Hq, Bn S-2 
·co "E" 
Co "H" 
Regt'l Liaison 0. 
Co t1G 11 
Co 11 C11 
Co "ll" 
Co 11B11 (Hosp) 
Co 11B 11 
Ass't Regt'l Chaplain, (CH) 
Ass't Regt'l Surgeon, (VAC) 
Co "E" (Hosp) 
A-T Co 
Co 11F11 
Co 11 I 11 
SSO, Postal 0, Asst S-1, (Serv Co) 
Serv Co, Ass 1t Adj. 
Co 11 G" 
Co 11 A" 
1st Bn Hq Co 
Co 11 H11 
Co 11 L11 
Jrd Bn Hq, Bn S-2 
Co "I" 
Co "L" 
Co 11 K11 
Ass't S-4, Serv Co. (Lv U.S.) 
Co 11 L11 (Hosp) 
Co 11E11 
Co ''D" 
Co NKtt 
Co 11 K11 
. Co "Mn 
Co · 11 G11 
· Hq Co, (DS 24th Div) 
Co 11B11 (Hosp) 
1st Bn Hq Co 
Co "C'' 
Co 11H" 
Co 11 F11 
Ass 't Rgt '1 S-1 (Lv U.S.) 
Ass 't Munn o., (Lv U.S.) 
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Excerpt from 
"THEIR lAST STRONGHOLD'' 
A narrative account of 
THE 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION 
on 
MINDANAO 
by Major General R. B. Woodruff 
HEADQUARTERS EIGH'.m ARMY, APO 343, 24 May 1945. 
TO: Commanding General, 24th Infantry Division, APO 24. 
The lighting advance Mindanao and the courageous fighting in the 
Davao area have added new laurels to the already distinguished record 
of the 24th Division. · The courage and skill of officers and men de-
feated a determined enemy on ground of his own choosing and has opened 
the way to a rapid completion of the destruction of Japanese forces on 
Mindanao. My warmest congratulations to the 24th Infantry Division upon 
the attainment of this objective. 
I 
MORO GULF TO DAV AO 
R. L. EICHELBERGER, 
Lieutenant General, USA, 
Commanding. 
The distance and pace of the 24th Infantry Division's thrust from 
Moro Gulf to Davao stand as a unique achievement in tropical warfare. 
Despite sporadic resistanc.e, scores of destroyed bridges, roadblocks, 
ambushes and innumerable mines, the infantry spearheads traversed 140 
road · iniles in 17 days, ending this assault march with the capture of 
Davao. 
In less than three months of campaigning the division broke Nippon's . 
last bastion in the Philippines, killing 7,000 of the enemy. 
Davao was the oldest center of Japanese colonization in the Philip-
pines, subjected to. Nipponese penetration for almost thirty years. The 
city's 19,000 most influential citizens were Japs. During the planning, 
stage of the campaign, Intelligence estimated that 36,000 enemy troops 
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held Mindanao. Of these, 18,000 were reported in the Davao area --- the 
last strong concentration of Japanese forces in the Philippines. The 
enemy had had three years in which to prepare against the inevitable attack. 
He was well prepared. He expected the invasion to come from the sea, di-
rectly on Davao. Most of his guns faced Davao Gulf. Our overland backdoor 
attack caught him "with his pants down". 
The division's assault march and the bitter fighting which followed 
moved through every kind of tropical terrain; fertile valleys and ridge-
studded jungles, swamps and tortuous mountain passes, rich abaca and coco-
nut plains, saltwater expanses and swift flowing rivers, country populated 
by a conglomeration of Christian Filipinos, Mohammedan Moros, and heathen 
savages:, 
Large sections of Mindanao's" rain forests have never been explored by 
white men. Mountain chains, dominated by Mt. Apo (9,692 feet), follow a 
general north-south course through the island. The broad lower courses of 
the Mindanao River proved to be an asset to the division's assault, but the 
gorges of the upper Davao and Tolomo Rivers in the wild hinterland of Davao 
constituted the most difficult fighting terrain of the campaign. 
The invasion plan called for a landing in force on the shores of Mora 
Gulf and the seizure of Malabang Airstrip, one of the largest and best on 
the island; then for a bold drive across the island via Highway #1, the 
"National Highway", which runs cross-island to Digos on Davao Gulf, thence 
north along the coast to Davao City. 
Thirty six hours before the scheduled assault, information was received 
that Malabang Drome had been seized by guerrilla forces. Major General Frank-
lin Sibert, commanding the X Corps, therefore directed that the initial land-
ing be made at Parang. This required a change in Division plans while the 
convoy still sailed the high seas. 
At 0800, 17 April 1945, the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry landed at Baras 
and secured Malabang Strip and town. wVhile the 34th Infantry Regiment re-
mained a "floating reserve 11 , a naval bombardment pounded Parang. Fourteen 
hundred high explosive shells were hurled against the narrow landing area, 
followed by a rocket barrage. 
At 0900, the first wave of the 19th Infantry Regiment hit the beach at 
Paraqg. While one battalion secured the beachhead against light resistance, 
~nether pushed rapidly down Highway #1. 
A 240-foot bridge across the Ambul River had been burned. The spearhead 
forded the shoulder-deep river, carrying all weapons and equipment, and se-
cured high ground four miles south-east of Parang. By 1330, the 21st RCT had 
come ashore, followed by .the 13th Field Artillery Battalion, .and drove southo 
Overw~ter reconnaissance from Parang to the estuary of the Mindanao River fell 
to the 24th Cavalry Reco,nnaissance Troop. By the end of the first day a 35-
mile strip of the coast was in American hands. 

Though the Division Co.runander stepped into a spider hole and emerged 
with cracked ribs, Colonel William J. Verbeck, in command of the 21st In-
fantr,y, became the first casualty of the invasion. The Colonel was wash-
ing his face in a helmet and ducked for a final rinse when a sniper fired. 
The slug tore across · his back. A burst from the submachinegun of analert 
driver toppled the Ja~ out of a building twenty-five yards away. This was 
the third and last Jap killed during that day. 
Push to Pikit 
At .dawn, 18 April,. the 19th RCT commenced the drive tpward the impor-
tant road-and-river junction of Fort Pikit, an oli American installation. 
A vanguard detachment dug in around . the junction of Highway #1 and the road 
from Cotabato. Th~t night a for.ce of Japs supported by mortars and machine-
guns charged the perimeter. The assault was repulsed. Seven dead Japs were 
found at sunrise. 
, Meanwhile, the 21st RCT had embarked on an audacious amphibious thrust 
at Pikit by way of the Mindanao River. If successful, this movement around 
the right flank of the advancing 19th would cut off all Japs between Ft. 
Pikit and Parang. 
Aboard armed LCMs, one battalion passed through the gloom& estuary of 
the Mindanao Riv~r and occupied the provincial capital of Cotabato. It re-
. ported many ~rocodiles, but no Japs. On 19th April a vanguard company, 
patrolling upriver beyond Lomopog, encountered a clever enemy trap. 
A Moro reported that 75 Japs were encamped in a bamboo grove about 2,000 
yards distant. The company pressed upon the grove and was stopped by a mor-
tar barrage. Simultaneously, a banzai attack struck its flank. The company 
fell back t~ward the river, leaving one squad to cover the withdrawal. Crouch-
ed -in tall sword grass, the squad was surrounded by Japs. However, they held 
tneir own through the night 'and the dawn, and killed 14 Japs on their return 
trip to the company. 
It was then discovered that one man was missing, Pfc William Roepke, 38 
years old, a replacement in his first day of combat. Out on the left flank 
of the company he had held his position for three hours, picking off Japs, 
before he became aware that his company had withdrawn and that he was alone. 
_The sun was merciless. Heavy rains fell during the night • . Roepke held his 
post through twenty-hours, killing every Jap who looked his way. When he fi-
nally decided to shoot his way out he raised his score of dead Japs to thir-
teen. 
End of extract from General Woodruff's narrative. 
' 
DAVAO CAMPAIGN 
The combat efficiency of the 21st Regiment was good upon leaving Min-
doro for Mindanao. The recent acquisition of replacements had necessitated 
a brief but conc~ntrated training period. At the completion of this train-
ing period the regiment was considered ready for combat. 
On 17 Apr~l the 3rd Battalion landed near the town of Baras in southern 
Mindanao, secured a beach-head, the town of Malabang and its airfield. 
----
Agressive j:>atrolling was done along the Malabang-Lake Lanao Roa~ and 
along the Malabang-Parang Road. The lst and 2nd Battalions lancled at 
Parang . and took over the security of the beach-head there. ,:rhe Regi-
mental Commander was wounded at Parang and Lieut .Co).:onel Arthur Hender-
son, Regimental Executive, ably ~ommanded the 21st. -
. .... 
. , 
On 18 April the 2nd Battalion. ( -E Co) conun.anded by Lieut .Colonel Roy 
Marcy made an amphibious 100\Tement from Paral'lg up the north branch of the 
Mindanao River and seized Cotabato •. "F" Company urxier Captain Wicker then 
moved to the .junction of the_ north arid south branch of the river. Mean-
while "E" Company, Captain Kilgoe commanding, rooving up the south bt:anch 
. of the river,. landed at Tamontako~ One platoon then continued up tne river 
contacting ttFrt Compaey. "F" Company pushed on from the juncti~n of the two 
branches of the river, assaulted and .took the town ·of Lomopog. They patrol-
led up. the river from Lomopog to Ulandang and thence to Paidu Pulangi. tJpon 
being relieved by the 34th ~nfahtry the battalion reassembled at Cotabato~ 
The entire regiment was assembled in the Cotabato area preparatory to 
moving to Fort Pikit and thence overland toward Davao. After rapid movement 
poth day and night for some 140 miles, troops were tired from lack of rest. 
1 May found the regiment nearing Bago preparing to- begin an offensive which 
was to last for fifty-one consecutive days. Colonel Verbeck had recovered 
from his wounds received at Parang and was again in comoand. 
The terrain in this area was a ·continuous climb going north into the 
hinterland. There were numerous streams and deep ravines. The entire area 
was practically covered by abaca groves so thick, moverrent through .them was 
almost impossible. The road net generally consisted of a system of parallel 
. ~ads at intervals of some 3 to 4 thousand yards, running north and south 
with an occasional uni.rrproved road connecting them. 
For three years the Japanese · had pre~ red and perfected the ' defens.e of 
this area. Knowing that any enemy attack must necessarily follow along this 
road net, the Japanese built innumerable pillboxes and a very elaborate sys-
tem of trenches, foxholes, and spider holes. Not only had these been camou-
flaged by the Japanese, but by natural growth as well. It was quite often 
impossible to detect these emplacements when only a few feet from them. Full 
advantage had been taken of the dense abaca groves. Many of their emplace-
ments were very cleverly placed in these groves. Due to the denseness of the 
surrounding vegetation and intense heat, movement off the roads was very 
limited. 
During the period of operations by the 21st Infantry, 1 May - 19 June, 
an area 12,000 yards wide was cleared for a distance of approximately 12 
miles. Elements -of the lOOth Japanese Division, totaling approximately 
6, 500 men, faced this regiment. It is known that elements of the lOOth Di-
vision Artillery and the 30th Division Artillery were also operating in this 
area. An unusually large number of automatic weapons were employed. by the 
enemy. Many AA guns were captured which had been used for ground action. 
Heavy mortars and light machine-guns were also plentiful as were 47mm AT guns. 
The artillery pieces consisted mainly of 75mm guns. 
This offensive action was completed with great loss to the 21st Infan-:-
try. Our casualties both killed and wounded were higher than ever sustained 
in one battle in all the history of the 21st Infantry. The.se officer casu-
alties included the Regimental Commander wounded, two battalion commanders 
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wounded, three company commanders killed, anj ten company co~~nders 
wounded. 
On 2 May the lst Battaliqn, commanded by Major Nicholas Sloan, pushing 
north an-d west from a point 2000 yards southwest of Bago, drove within 1000 
yards of Mintal. This advance was made against sporadic rifle and machine-
gun fire. At the end of the day this battalion was receiving long-range 
artillery fire. The 2nd Battalion, moving forward from the road junction at 
(22.0-50.4), pushed northeast along the road to Libby Drome, then swung south-
east to destroy enemy forces between it and the 2nd Battalion, l9th Infantry. 
At the end of the day this enemy had been forced into a small pocket near the 
south end of the Drome. 
During the night of 2 1~y, the lst Battalion repulsed two strong counter-
attacks. The first attack at 2100 came from the north, while the second at 
0330, was directed from several points on the battalion perimeter. Known 
enemy dead totaled 20 KIA. 
The following morning the battalion received artillery fire. Effectively 
placed counter-battery fire silenced the enemy positions. The battalion re-
sumed its attack to the north against moderate small arms fire. After a sharp 
fire fight in the outskirts of Mintal, the battalion captured the city and push-
ed reconnaissance toward Tugbok. 
Marcy's battalion continuing its drive to destroy enemy forces in the 
Libby Drome area, pushed southeast from Libby Town to within 1000 yards of 
the lst Battalion, 34th Infantry, which was securing the south end of the 
field. The enemy well dug-in in an abaca plantation, offered strong resis-
tance. Closely coordinated infantry, artillery and air attacks destroyed 
many strong points in this area. 
The 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lieut.Colonel Tom Suber, relieved from 
Line of Communication security missions, was moving to an assembly area at 
a point 2500 -yards southwest of Bago. 
The lst Battalion (-C Co) in the Mintal area repulsed counterattacks dur-
ing the night. During the day, strong combat patrols were dispatched toward 
Tugbok, where they directed counter-battery artillery fire on enemy positions. 
Company "C", located southeast of Mintal, during the night successfully pre-
vented. enemy infiltration attempts. During the morning a strong Jap counter-
attack was repulsed. Thirty Japs were counted dead. The 2rid Battalion con-
tinued its assault on the enemy emplacements on the southeast end of Libby 
Drome. By 1200 the battalion had neutralized this resistance, established 
road blocks and secured the high ground in _ the vicinity of (27. 5-54. 5). The 
3rd Battalion advancing northwest toward Mintal along the road on the north-
east side of Libby Drome, encountered enemy emplacements afid barbed wire 
entanglements. 
The morning of 5 May Suber's Battalion contacted the enemy well entrench-
ed in -an abaca field. Trye 2nd Battalion was sent around the left of this 
battalion to flank the enemy position. As the 2nd Battalion made its attack, 
the 3rd B~ttalion pushed forWard in a coordinated Infantry-Tank attack. The 
tanks immediately drew heavy crossfire from 57mm, 75mm and 90mm guns located 
in the hills on the north bank of the Talomo River. All three tanks received 
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hits but were able to return under their own power. By the end of the day 
the _2nq Battalion had crossed the Libby Drome, and from positions on the 
northeast, were firing into the enefl\Y's flank. The airfield was cleared of 
Japs, but the field still received enemy fire from artillery and AT gun 
· positions located on the northeast bank of the Talamo River. 
The 3rd and 2nd Battalions, following an intense artillery and air 
preparatio-n attacked enemy strong-poihts in the abaca fields north of Libby 
Drome. One Jap counterattack was repulsed. Very strong resistance was met 
from mutually supporting pillboxes, and covered by artillery and mortar fire 
still coming from positions irt the hills northeast of this area. Six hun-
dred yards of ground pockmarked with enemy strong-points, were taken by the 
3rd Battalion. The 2nd Battalion, protecting the left flank of the regiment, 
supported the attack. The 1st Battalion continued to block escape routes of 
the enemy to the north. 
At 070645, May, the 3rd Battalion received artillery fire killing 6 men 
and wounding 35. Counter-battery neutralized the enemy's guns. Attacks 
toward Mintal continued by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions . The foll'owing day the 
2nd Battalion broke through the enemy defenses and reached Mintal. One 40mm 
gun, one HMG and one LMG were captured and 32 Japs were killed. Meanwhile, 
the 3rd Battalion continued to receive enemy artillery fire from the high 
ground on the north bank of the Talamo River • 
. The 1st Battalion forced a crossine of the Talamo lli.ver north of Mintal 
preparatory to attacking east along Mintal-Bancal Road, to establish a road-
block in the rear of enemy forces in contact with 1st Battalion, 34th Infan-
try. This plan of action never materialized as the enemy resistance south-
east of Mintal on the northeast bank of the Talamo River was so intense, it 
became necessary to abandon the 1st Battalion's bridgehead. 
During the first crossing of the Talamo River, when heavy sniper fire 
had pinned down the forward elements, Private First Class James Diamond ad-
vanced alone, killed the first sniper and then directed the fire of a self-
propelled howitzer on the pillboxes and the remaining snipers. Later he 
evacuated several wounded comrades across the swift, shoulder-deep Talamo 
River while mortar and ~achinegun fire raked the water and both banks. 
Through painfully injured, he brought the casualties to safety by driving 
an abandoned jeep eight times through fire so intense that all four tires 
were punctured. 
When his battalion was ordered .back, Diamond volunteered to repair the 
blasted Talamo River bridge. With one helper he built a foot span which en-
abled the battalion to withdraw across the river despite a concurrent mortar 
barrage. Private Diamond was killed in action on 14 May and is being recom-
mended for the Medal of Honor. · 
The 1st Battalion was then moved under cover of darkness back to a posi-
tion near Bancal immediately in rear of a Battalion of the 34th Infantry. 
The plan was to attack two Battalions abreast clearing the high ground over-
looking the river and Libby Drome, thereby relieving pressure on the 3rd 
Battalion advancing northwest in the Drome area. This battalion repulsed 
a heavy gr enade attack during the night. 
Japanese forces in the Mintal area realizing the seriousness of their 
position were attacL:ing our Mintal force, harassing them continuously in 
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an effort to dislodge them, before the regiment's positions were consoli-
dated. An enemy patrol attempting to destroy a br~dge in rear of the lst 
Battalion along its supply route were engaged at AT Company during the 
ni~ht and were driven off. Eight enemy dead were counted. An estimated 
100 of the enemy attacked on the morning of 11 May, 59 of whom were killed. 
Four LMGs and two heavy mortars were captured at this time. 
The two day offensive by the 1st Battalion cleare::l. the high ground over-
looking Libby Drome, eliminating the last positions from which the enemy 
could bring the airstrip under fire. The 3rd Battalion, having the pressure 
lifted by the 1st Eattalion's advance, broke through the last enemy defenses 
on its left flank and pushed against scattered resistance to Mintal. 
Postions were consolidated and improved by aggressive patrolling in all 
directions. Tugbok was attacked and after two days of heavy fighting it was 
secured. Snipers were active north of the town and fire was being received 
from posit ions out side the town. 
The 21st Infantry was given the mission of crossing the Talomo River 
above Mintal, driving north to the road junction at (22. 7-59. 8), thence north-
east to cuty off the escape routes of thP. enemy being driven north by the 34th 
Infantry Regiment east of the Talomo Iliver. 
The 3rd Battalion forced a crossing of the Talomo River against excep-
tionally strong positions. The crossing was made under intense fire from 
mortars and small arms, by ~g the arm pit deep river. This battalion· 
secured the high ground overlooking this crossing. Element-s of the 1st Bat~ 
ta.lion passed through the 3rd Battalion and pushed north and secured the road 
junction at (22.7-59o8). The 2nd Battalion remained in Tugbok, where Lt.Col. 
Marcy's men were engaged in fierce combat with the Japanese north and south 
of his position and in the town itself. ' 
The following day the lst Battalion pushed north toward the road junction 
at (22.5-61.4) encountering slight resistance until a point approximately 300 
yards south of its objective was reached. Here a defense consisting of two 
pillboxes supported by a number of individual foxholes connected by trenches,_ 
all surrounded by a double apron fence, halted the advance. A brisk fight en-
sued but an attack supported by tanks overran the position and the road junc-
tion was reached. A small scale night attack at this point was repulsed. Ten 
Japs were killed. · 
The 3rd Battalion, resuming the offensive, passed through the 1st Bat-
talion and pushed east against determined resistance. Numerous pillboxes were 
encountered and overrun along this road. During the night, several counter-
. attacks were repulsed. F~rty-one of the enemy were counted dead. The 1st Bat-
talion in the vicinity of road junction (22.5-61.4) and the 2nd Battalion in 
Tugbok received sporadic harassing, machine-gun and mortar fire. The 3rd Bat-
talion's forward elements reached (24.7-62.8). The order for the regiment to 
_hold the ground it had taken was received. The gallant Lieut.Colonel Tom Suber 
fell seriously wounded at this point after his battalion had taken its final 
objective. Active patrolling in all unit sectors accounted for 25 more enemy 
dead. The reg~ment was relieved on 29 May and withdrawn to the vicinity of 
Lobogan. 
The Regiment's job was now to drive north from Lobogan, generally along 
three roads, clearing the area in a zone adjoi.ning that in which it had oper-
ated fpr the preceeding month. 
BRONZE STAR (OAK .LJAF CLUSTER) 
Captain SOTBOROB K. ABLE, Infantry, United States Army. 
For meritor1ous achievement in connection with military opera-
tions against the enemy at Mindanao, Philippine Islands from 
11 April to 20 June 1944, As a commander of a rifle company 
Captain Able contributed to a marked degree to the successful 
participation of an Infantry Reglment in the Mindanao operation. 
By his outstanding leadership, exemplary conduct and tactical 
ability Captain Able exerted a driving force upon his company 
which kept it on the initiative in spite of strong enemy resis-
tance and heavy los&es to our troops. Captain Able led and di-
rected the advances of his company courageously and continually 
exposes himself to heavy enemy fire until seriously wounded on 
7 May 1945. Throughout the operation he maintained coolness and 
composure in a manner befitting a combat company commander. 
BRONZE STAR (2BD OAK LEAF CLUSTER) 
Major NICHOLAS E. SLOAN, Infantry, United States Army. For 
heroic achievement in connection with military operations against 
the enemy near Mintal, Mindanao, Philippine Island~, on 10 May 
1945. His battalion vas order to withdraw across the Talomo River 
late in the evening in order to be in position for an attack the 
following morning. The enemy detecting the movement, put down a 
mortar and artillery barrage on the narrow corridor through which 
his troops had to move. With the field artillery liaison officer, 
he moved back up the ridge to a position from which they could di-
rect our artillery fire on the enemy's position. Although enemy 
mortar fire was falling near his observation post, Major Sloan 
proceeded to adjust artillery fire upon enemy guns. The enemy 
fire shortly diminished to single sporadic rounds thus enabling 
our troops to continue an orderly withdrawal. Major Sloan's 
courage and resourcefulness reflect credit upon himself and the 
military service. 
SILVER STAR (OAK LEAF CLUSTER) 
Lieutenant Colonel (then Major) TOM W. SUBER, Infantry, United 
States Army. For gallantry in action near Min tal, Mindanao, 'Philip-
pine Islands, from 4 May to 13 May 1945. Lt. Colonel Suber exhibited 
exceptional ability and qualities of l~adership in comw'anding his 
battalion. While attacking up the road toward Mintal, the enemy had 
superior observation from a hill outside the battalion sector to the 
right flank, From this high ground, the enemy constantly subjected 
the troops to rnortar, automatic weapons, artillery and anti-tank fire, 
Through the skillful tactical disposition of his men, Lt. Colonel 
Suber kept casualties at a minimum while continuing to drive forward. 
During the attack he was constantly with the front line rifle com-
panies, under enemy observation, often subjecting himself to small 
arms and mortar fire in order to maintain complete control of his 
troops His extreme coolness under fire, even while member . of his 
command group were wounded around him, his disregard for his ovn 
personal safety, and his determination to accomplish his ' mission, 
gave his officers and me~ complete confidence in his leadership. 
His tactical decisions were alvals sound and well directed. On 25 
May 1945, while with one of his assault companies, Lt. Colonel 
Suber was wounded three times by an enemy machine gun Some of 
his men attempted to evacuate him put he would _not permit them to 
submit themselves to the fire, and dragged himself to safety even 
though seriously injured and in great pain. Lt. Colonel Suber's 
courage, determination and devotion to duty are a credit to himself 
and the military service. 
SILVER STAR (Posthumous) 
Second Lieutenant KEITH 0. CLEMENTS, Corps of Engineers, United 
States Army. For gallantry in action near Min tal, Mindanao, Philip-
pine ,Islands, on 15 May 1945. On this day Lieutenant Clements, a 
platoon commander, was making reconnaissance of a bridge to determine 
the possibilities of repairing the structure. The bridge ,was under 
very heavy enemy motrar fir-e and enemy sniper fire which made his 
approach· to the bridge extremely difficult . After cautiously work-
ing his way to the bridge site and having to take cover from enem7 
action, Lieutenant Clements fQund on arrival that crossing the river 
could only be accomplished by wading the swift ~urrent which was 
armpit deep. On the other side were several litte~ casualties that 
were in urgent need of medical eare. With utter disregard for his 
own safety and with t~e help of two volunteers, Lieutenant Clements, 
under heavy enem7 fire, improvised a foot bridge by which the 'patients 
could be brought acrosR and thus helped in saving the lives of the 
men. His action in the emergency reflects the greatest credit on 
himself and the military service. Lieutenant Clements was later 
killed in action at Bunawan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, on ' 22 
May 1945. 
BRONZE STAR 
Colonel WILLIAM J. VERBECK, General Staff Corps, (then Infan-
try), United States Army. For heroic achievement in connection with 
military operations agai.nst the enemy near Bayab~~Pts, Mindanao, Philip-
pine Islands, on 30 May 1945. · On this day one compan7 of infantr7 
of the United States Army and one compan7 of infantry of the Philippine 
Army were moving toward their objective, the town of Bayabaa The7 
were stopped approximately 1500 yards east of their objective by an 
enemy strong point which consisted of approximately 20 of the eneay 
established in a defensive position in a cave. !his strong point was 
holding up the advance of the two entire companies with heavy machine 
gun fire. Upon learning the situation Colonel Verbeck, at that tize 
a Regizental Commander, took over the command of the lilipino Com-
pany ~nd with guerrillas as guides began a flan~ing move into the 
town through heavy abaca thickets at about 200 hours. · Several times 
during this mo~e they received sniper fire but roached their objec-
tive without casualties. They immediately set up a ro~ block in 
the town and so euccessful had been their move that wh~n six Japs, 
armed with a light machine gun and knee mortar, walked into the area, 
they were killed wi,thout loss to our forces. Due to the flanking 
move the strong point was cut off and the next da7 the Americ~~ in-
fantry company knocked out the enemy ~esistance which had heretofore 
halted the advance. This allowed them to reach their objective of 
Bayabas. Colonel Verbeck's heroic achievement in leading the lili-
pino company on this expedition reflects great credit upon himself 
and the military service. 
FOR VALOR O.N' MINDANAO deapit& a wound, he evacuat~~-· 
· wounded llnd repaired a bridge un· 
Posthumous Medal of Honor der heavy fire. Finally, he gave h • 
Marks Four Heroic Days life drawing fire to enable hia P&·: 
trol to reach safety. 
ll. WASHINGTON, March 17-The 
Medal of Honor has been awarded 
· •posthumously to Pfc. James H. 
Diamond of the Twenty-first . In-
; jfantry Regiment, Twenty-fourth 
(Victory) Divisior,, for four days 
of heroism in action, May 8, 9, 101' 
· 'and 14, 19•5, along the Talamo · 
River on Mindanao in the Philip. 
pines. It will be presented to his 
mother, Mrs. Kate 0. Diamond, of 
Gulfport, Miss. 
Private Diamond killed a Jap-
anese sniper and directed fire 
eliminating enemy pillbOxes. Then, . 
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! .. MEDAL OF HONOR.-By direction of the President, under the provisions 
of the act of Congress approved 9 J'uly 1918 ( wri Bull. 43, 1918), a- Medal of 
Honor for conspicuous gallimtry _and intrepidity at the risk of life above and 
beypnd the call of duty was awarded -posthumously by the War Department 
ln the name of Congress to the following-named officer and enlisted man: 
Private First Class James H. Diamond (Army serial No. 3487Zl09), as a 
member of a machine-gun section, Company D, 21st Infantry Regiment, Army 
of the United States, displayed extt"eme gallantry and intrepidity on 8, 9, 10, 
and 14 May 1945, at Minta!, Mindanao, Philippine Islands. When a Japane~ 
sniper rose from his fox hole to throw a grenade into their midst, this valiant 
soldier charged and killed the enemy with a burst from his submachine gun. 
Then, by delivering sustained fire from his personal arm and simultaneously 
directing the fire of 106-mm and .50 caliber weapons upon the enemy pillboxes 
immobilizing •his and another machine gun section, he enabled them to put 
their guns into action. When two infantry companies established a bridg_ehead, 
he voluntarily assisted in evacuating the wounded under heavy fire and, securing 
an abandoned vehicle, transported casualties to the rear through mortar and 
artillery fire so intense as to render the vehicle inoperative, despite the fact 
he was sulfering from a painful wound. The following day he again volunteered,~ 
this time for the hazardous job of repairing a bridge under heavy enemy fire. 
On 14 May 1945, when leading a patrol to evacuate casualties from his battalion, 
which was cut off, he ran through- a virtual hail of Japapese fire to secure _an 
abandoned machine gun. Though mortally wounded as he reached the gtln, 
he succeeded in drawing sufficient fire upon himself so that the remaining 
members of the patrol could reach safety. Private Diamond's indomitable 
. spirit. constant disregard of danger, and eagerness to assist his comrades wm 
ever remain a symbol of selflessness and heroic sacrifice to- those for whom he 
gavl' his life. 
On 30 May, Company 11 C" of the lst Battalion, reinf0rced, moved out 
from hlampangi to seize and secure Bayabas. Small reconnaissance patrols 
operating in this area several days previous had rerortcd considerable en-
emy activity. This company encountered strong resistance 2000 yards west 
of Mampangi; The resistance was broken, during which, two machine-gun po-
sitions were silenced. 20mm automatic fire from well dug-in positions in 
their flank again halted this advance. A flanking attack was made during 
the night, resulting in the capture of Bayabas. The following day bypassed 
enemy positions were eliminated, opening the road to Bayabas. Enemy entrench-
ments in this area were elaborate. Many pillboxes were destroyed. 
11 K11 Company of the 3rd Battalion attacked northwest toward Alambre. En-
emy contact was made at (19.5-54.7). After breaking this resistance, Alambre 
was captured and secured. In the meantime, Company 111 11 moved northwest on 
Mulig. Nearing the town, fire was received from road junction at (19.3-56.1). 
The road junction was taken and fire from four ~~chine-guns was received from 
the company's right rear. Artillery and SPM fire silenced these positions. 
The 1st Battalion attacked toward Tankelan (13.2-57.3) by sending "A" 
Company north from Bayabas and "B" Company west from Alambre. Eighteen enemy 
pillboxes were encountered in this drive. With Tankelan secured, 11 B11 Com-
pany contacted and eliminated ari enemy position 1000 yards northwest of Alam-
bre. 
The 2nd Battalion advancing north from Alambre pushed "G" Company west 
and seized Manambulail while Companies '1E11 and "F'' pushed .north and seized 
Shangkee. Companies 11E" and "F" secured Naming and ''E" Comp~y then moved 
west taking Monterey. 11 G11 Company at Manambulan pushed northwest against 
scattered resistance to Monterey. Patrols working east from Naming in an 
effort to contact the 34th Infantry at Tugbok, encountered an enemy strong-
point killing 20 Japanese. 
The 1st Battalion launched an attack north from Monterey toward Tagak-
pan. Reaching the south bank of the river, which flows through Taga.kpan, 
strong resistance was met. 11 A" Company moved up the river approximately 
500 yards, made a crossing and moved north to the road, followed by "C" 
Company. Meanwhile, frontal pressure was maintained on the enemy .by 11B11 
Company. This crossing was mad~ undetected. A road block was set up at the 
road junction (13.7-63.9). The following day, a force holding the river line 
in front of the 1st Battalion, was destroyed. 
The regiment continued its drive toward Nangan on a three Battalion front. 
Sixty-six enemy dead were counted after the crossing of the river running 
through Tagakpan. The 1st Battalion on the left flank pushed to the road junc-
tion at (13.3-65.5), when machine-gun fire was encountered. 3rd Battalion 
reached road junction at (16.1-65.9). Scattered sniper fire was encountered 
in this move. The 2nd Battalion on the regiment's right flaok pushed north-
west and secured the ro~d junction at (17.3-66.1). The Japs fought a delay-
ing action along the road as the battalion advanced. The heavy abaca growth 
along both sides of the road favored these delaying actions • . 
Patrols sent to Wangan encountered heavy resistance and were forced to 
return to their units for the night. Gallant Captain Theodore Crouch, Com-
mander of 11B11 Company, was killed here. His loss was keenly felt by the 
Regiment. The following day "A" Company secured the road junction at (14.9-
66.7) and established an effective road block to ambush Japs fleeing north-
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wes t frorn .ia.ngan. The 2nd and Jrd Battalions then attacked and seized 
;;J.ngan. The 3rd Battalion was now commanded by Ma jor Francis R. Dice, 
a veteran of every single regimental action in the Philippines. The 2nd 
Battalion pushed on, supported by tanks, secured ground north of the river 
in vicinity (17.4-67.5). Four attempts were made to force a bridgehead 
while sut j ected to heavy machine-gun and mortar fire. During an air. ~trike, 
l eading elements of t he battalion crossed the rivar, while the Japs were 
still in a dazed condition. The lst Battalion crossed the Talomo River 
assisted by fire from the Jrd Battalion. Later "I" and 1K" Companies re;.. 
lieved the lst Battalion of its bridgehead. To effect this relief units 
had to fight their way in and out of positions, accounting for 23 Jape 
killed. 
The Jrd Battalion in its attack northwest of i'langan encountered very 
strong l'esistance at (14. 8-66.8). This position was attacked twice during 
the day after heavy artillery concentrations had been placed on the enemy. 
Both attacks met heavy mortar and rrachine-gun fire. At the c1ose of the day 
only slight gains had ' been made. The 2nd Battalion supported by tanks met 
heavy resistance at (17.2-67.5). · 
'Agressive combat patrols eliminated enemy pockets to the regiment's 
front, permitting an advance toward Calinan. Stubborn enemy resistance 
along the way made this advance slow and l1ard. After meeting determined 
resistance at the Talomo River, _a bridgehead was made. Patrols from the 
2nd Battalion pushed north into Calinan, contacting elements of the Jrd 
Battalions, 16Jrd Infantry. On 18 June the 3rd Battalion pushed north and 
northeast toward Calinan against diminishing opposition and joined the 2nd 
Battalion at road junction (16.8-70.3). The following day the regiment was 
relieved by the 34th Infantry. 
During this offensive of th'e 21st Infantry on Libby Airdrome and its 
-subsequent dirve north and west it was faced by five Independent Infantry 
Battalions, all part of the Japanese lOOth Infantry Division, plus two air-
field battalions which had been converted to Infantry when the airfield were 
put out of commission. For the most part, these troops had occupied and 
trained i~ this immediate area for three years. Their thorough knowledge of 
the terrain enabled them to perfect the intricate defense system found there. 
They made maximum use of their weapons, their kno\'Jledge of the terrain and 
their commanding position throughout the campaign. Only by dogged determin-
ation, excellently coordinated air and ground attacks, and the skillful em-
ployment of all weapons, was the destruction of this force completed. 
On 9 July, four Filipinos who escaped from t he Japanes e north of Tamogan, 
reported that 1,000 soldiers and more than 5,000 enemy civilians were living 
in the forests without food or medicines; that U. S. artillery· had destroyed. 
the last Japanese food stores in the Tamogan area; that Japanese enlisted men 
and civiliar.3 were willing to surrender, but that Japanese officers killed all 
suspected of planning to escape; and, fir~lly, that the Japanese had taken to 
the practice of killing their own wounded for lack uf medical supplies and 
surgical facilities. 
On 12 July, patrols following up a report found a secret Japanese town 
hidden in the forests. There were many bu ildings, barracY~, officers' quar-
ters, a large sawmill and other equipment. Offal found on the spot indicated 
that the Japs had been living on jungle roots, fruit and foliage. But the 
beaten denizens of this comnrunity had already pulled farther into the moun-
tains. 
In the Battle for Davao, the Tvventy-Fourth Infantry iJivision pc:.id a 
heavy price. In the gorges of the Tolomo River, on the blasted preci-
pices of Hill 550, and in the jungle-like abaca fileds between Libby Drome, 
Mintal and tn.a, the division's teams had paid in blood for the grim satis-
faction of vanquishing some of the most fanatical Japs fighting over the 
toughest fighting terrain on earth. 
The Japs' most murderous weapons in the abaca expanses bordering Libby 
Drome were anti-aircraft cannon laid for level trajectory. Their shells 
would skim the abaca and burst in mid-air, while the riflemen weathering 
this holocaust could barely see beyond their sights. In aJdition, it was 
no rare occurrence that in an already decimated company twenty soldiers 
collapsed from heat exhaustion in the course of a single day. The 21st 
RCT lost two battalion commanders and twelve company commanders killed or 
wounded in abaca fighting. 
Japanese fortifications, dug long ago, had been overgrown with ra tural 
vegetation to an extent which made them virtually invisible. The character-
izations of these pillboxes by one infantry sergeant states the problem in 
a nutshell: "l could have walked past three pillboxes every day for a whole 
year and I would not have noticed them unless some Jap shot at me." 
Characteristic also is the experience of a tank soldier who was blown 
out of hjs tank by a mine. He fell into an abaca thicket, and a following 
tank subjected him to point-blank fire, taking him for a Jap. 
Japanese tunnel positions on the bank of the Tolomo River at Mintal 
were the most intricate every met by veteran fighting men of this division. 
Opening in the hillside which suggested the presence of a small cave were 
actually entrances to complicated tunnel systems with many openings. These 
tunnel mouths were often completely hidden by natural vegetation. Illus-
trative is the fact that one soldier, intending to flush three Japs from a 
c~ve, hurled a satchel charge which set off a tunneled ammunition dump and 
all but blew up the entire hill. 
The Japanese who defended Davao were as fanatical a crew as ever fought 
a tropical war. Suicide banzai charges and night infiltration of kamikaze 
demolition units harassed all forward perimeters and lines of communication 
throughout the campaign. Japs invaded artillery and quartermaster peri~meters, 
and even the division command post, with mines strapped to their bellies. 
Close combat night fighting with enemy suicide detachments was frequent. One 
soldier killed a Jap in the Tolomo River by pushing his assilant 1s head under 
water with his foot. Another pounded a Jap to death with his helmet. An of-
ficer leaning against a banana tree was impaled upon it when a Jap bayoneted 
him from the rear. Japs were killed with pocket knives and with bare fists. 
Japanese crawled to within three feet of anti-tank cannon and then jumped up 
to rush. 
The Japs introduced two tricks, which were more effective then they 
would be elsewhere because the abaca fields gave them such perfect conceal-
ment for their purpose. One was for individual Japs to lie concealed in a 
ditch on the edge of an abaca field and slip a bangalore torpedo under the 
sheels of a vehicle as it passed. The other---and the hardest to stop---
was to bury or c0nceal 500 pound aerial bombs to which pull type igniters 
were attached. Then attach a rope or heavy twine to the igniter and lie 
concealed in a spider hole some 50 to 75 feet away-~-and pull the rope, 
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exploding the bomb wr.en a remunerative target was nearby. These caused us 
an appreciable number of casualties, one such bomb killing 5 and seriousiy 
~ounding 6 of our men. The counter measure was new type point consisting 
of small patrols on either side of the road some thirty or forty yards from 
the forward point of the advance guard on the road and 10 to 15 yards off 
the road. They could locate the rope, cut it---and kill the Jap in the 
spider hole. 
An interesting situation developed near the end of the campaign when 
the bulk of the Japs had been driven into the hills. While in the rela-
tively flat areas with their heavy vegetation, nearly all artillery obser-
vation on targets of opportunity was necessarily by cub plane. The Japs 
became accustomed to moving about in the open or on the roads when cubs 
were not airborne. Shortly after arrival in the higher terrain, an excel-
ground OP (equipped with high powered Jap scope) was located covering an 
irr.po~tant section of a main track. Time and again, Jap working parties 
were caught here with VT fire with heavy casualties inflicted. The enemy 
apparently failed to recognize the altered OP situation. 
The Japs were beaten. In seventy-four days of fighting the 24th In-
fantry Division had completely shattered the lOOth Japanese Division and 
numerous auxiliary air and naval units. The enemy had joined the fight 
with the largest concentration of artillery which the Twenty-Fourth had 
encountered in four campaigns. In the course of the Davao battle 173 
Japanese artillery pieces were captured or destroyed, and a great number 
of automatic dual purpose weapons. 
Victory in Davao was the final chapter in the Philippine Liberation 
Campaign. 
There was one more more anticlimax however. On 10 July 1945 the regi-
ment, less the 1st Battalion, again moved up the Tamogan Trail to work 
over enemy rem~nents who were still in the field. 
On the 16th of July the lst Battalion, still commanded by Major Sloan, 
sailed for the final amphibious landing of the war. This was made against 
scattered enemy un:i.ts holding Sarangani Bay. A protracted and difficult 
campaign of bushwacking destroyed the effectiveness of the enemy in this 
area to the south of the Davao Bay Region. 
Just before the sailing of the lst Battalion for Sarangani a former 
lst Battalion officer, Captain William M. Langford, now Commander of M 
Compar.y, was killed by enemy raiders who made a suicide rush into our rear 
areas. Langford was killed on the night before he was to return to the 
U.s. for his high point score. 
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HEADQUARTERS 21ST INFANTRY 
Office of the Regimental Commander. 
SUBJECT: Commendation. 
APO # 24, 
20 June 1945. 
TO : Officers and Enlisted Men of the 21st Infantry. 
On the 19th June 1945, the 21st Infantry was withdrawn from 
combat and moved to a reserve area. The 18th June 1945 marked the 
sixty-third ( 63) day of continuous combat against a stubborn and 
well trained ene~. 
During practically the entire period this regiment was attack-
ing. Fighting in terrain which favored the ene~ in defense and in 
hemp and cogan grass where the heat of day WGS radiated to an unbear-
able degree, you never once failed to take an assigned objective. 
The 21st Infantry counted 2133 Japanese dead and captured 14 
prisoners. The total for the 24th Division was 5149 enemy casualties. 
fhis regiment, therefore, accounted for 42% of the division total. 
It is difficult for me to find words to express to you the ad-
miration and respect in which I hold you. You and your dead comrades,, 
and those of you who were wounded in action, have kindled in me an 
intense pride in commanding such an organization. 
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W. J. VERBECK, 
Colonel, 21st Infantry, 
Comrranding. 
* JAPANESE ORDER OF BATTLE, DAVAO CAMPAIGN 
Elements of lOOth Japanese Division 
76th lnfantry Brigade 
Estimated 
Strength 
l67th Independent Infantry Battalion 450 
l68th Independent Infantry Battalion 750 
352nd Independent Infantry Battalion 750 
353rd Indep~ndent Infantry Battalion 750 
75th Infantry Brigade 
l63rd Independent Infantry Battalion 600 
Division Service Troops 1750 
Division Headquarters Troops 250 
Elements of Division Artillery 
Elements of 30th Division Artillery 
12th Airfield Battalion 
14th Airfield Battalion 
l26th Airfield Construction Unit 
450 
300 
300 
150 
.,, Only those u!'lits operating in the 21st Infantry's 
zone of action. 
Three Platoon Leader of Company "C", 21st Infantry. 
Lieut. Robert H, Malone ** 
Lieut. Jack Wright * 
Lieut. Charles R. Counts 
Standing near scene where first casualties of the 21st 
Infantry were incurred at Tanahmerah Bay, New Guinea.', 
April 1944. 
* Killed irr action - Leyte 
** Wbunded Leyte and Mindanao 
Major Francis R. Dic.e-
Lt.Colonel Arthur H. Henderson 
Colonel William J. Verbeck 
Captain Julius Berkowitz 
At Toril' Mindanao, May 1945. 
GENERAL CRDERS 
NUMBER 79 
HEADQUARTERS X COF?.PS . 
Office of the Com:randing C'reneral 
APO 310 
7 July 1945 
The following commendation was received by the X Corps from the 
Corr~nding General, Eighth Army: 
C01i!l.ffiNDATION 
X CORPS 
MAJOR GENERAL FRANKLIN C. SIBERT, COM1:ANDING 
It affords me sincere pleasure to extend to the officers and 
men of the X Corps and its attached units my deepest gratification 
and appreciation of their achievement in the successful operations 
on MINDANAO. The unswerving efforts of all commands to accomplish 
their missions were highlighted by the historic march of Major General 
Noodruff 's 24th Infantry Division from Parang to Davao City, the ag-
gressive drive of Major General }Jartin's 31st Infantry Division from 
Kabacan to Malaybala;>', and the difficult advance of Brigadier General 
Shoe 1s l08th Regimental Combat Team from Macajlar Bay to Impalutao. 
These vigorous actions disrupted and shattered the enemy, drove him 
into untenable positions and rendered him incapable of any further 
offensive action. 
I especially wish to praise the officers and enlisted men in 
the smaller infantry units who overcame almost insurmountable ob-
stacles to drive the stubbornly resisting enemy from his long 
established positions. Much praise is due also the members of unit 
staffs who planned and coordinated these arduou; operations. This 
campaign has once again demonstrated the splendid fighting spirit 
of the Americ;an soldier. 
/s/ R. L. Eichelberger 
/ t/ R. L. EICHELBERGER 
Lieutenant General, USA 
Commanding 
BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL SIBERT: 
OFFICIAL: 
/s/ 
/t/ 
F. Nowakowski 
F. NO'NAKONS KI 
Colonel, AGD 
Adjutant General 
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PETER SATHER, JR 
Colonel, GSC 
Chief of Staff 
Written upon news of Japan's surrender request. New York City, 
August 14, 1945. . 
Some are not cheering in Times Square today 
Some who never again will be gay 
People forget them as they sing and they dance 
They're unable to be here; they haven't the chance. 
Jungles of Guinea~ guard well your dead 
Cogon on Leyte where heros once bled 
Churchyard in Lubang, hear you these cheers? 
Sleep there in silence; on through the years. 
Crosses on Breakneck V-day is here 
Hemp fields at Davao, graveyard austere 
/That think you of tickertape dropped from the sky? 
Do laughing and shouting, your lives glorify? 
Clifford and Langford, Crouch and Bruce Hill 
Do sirens and whistles give you a thrill? 
Far from the shining cities gay whirl 
Lie Eddleston, Davis, Diamond and Earle. 
On a day in November, out there in the rain, 
In mud caked fury of the Ormoc campaign 
_No laughing and joking lightened the scene 
Sure, forget all the hardship but remember the sheen. 
Revellers on Broadway what know you of grief? 
Have you seen tired soldiers awaiting relief? 
Have you seen all their faces when once more they move out? 
Have you read in their glances that feeling of doubt? 
VH1at know you of companies of sixty or less? 
Whose men never ask for help or redress 
Are their lives to be forfeit if you make mistake? 
Can you smile when your vitals are crushed for their sake? 
Listen you reveller blowing your horn 
-Nalk up to Mi¢al with me in the morn 
Look over the river and see there our dead 
Or would ynu prefer to shout "Victory" instead? 
So we who are living, forget not this day 
The sacrifice of heros who miss all this play 
They cannot rejoin us; their duty is done 
Pray for them now that victory is won. 
60 
Condition Red Alertl 
Jungle boots~ 
Aussie beer. 
THINGS TO RafFllBER 
Swimming pool in Hollandia. 
Jungle foot. 
Christmas in Barugo. 
"C" Company guarding the WACs in Tacloban. 
Bridge guards along the highways. 
Mud at Daro. 
Mubuhay! Veectorie1 
TUba. Please bring the bottle back. 
Ten in One. 
General Quarters on the L.C.I.l 
Carabaos. 
The Carometa and Pony. 
Wading ashore from the L.S.T. 
Dance in the park at Calipan. 
Feat at Boak. 
Ambush at Gusay. 
Dust in Mindoro. 
Rats in San Jose. 
General Cramer's inspections. 
Chinese welcome in Calipan• 
Jap flags for the Navy. How much? 
Victory party at Lubang. 
Coconuts. 
Gimlet's grove. 
Bongabong, Pinamalayan, Bananas and corn. 
Warm canned beer. . 
Christmas mail in March. All smashed and wet. 
The bridge over the Bugasanga River at Mindoro. 
The A-20s taking off over camp. 
The G.I.s 
Old Soldiers Never Die. 
Hello Bill - Hello Bill - This is Pappy. 
The Moros and their betelnut. 
Jap invasion money. 
Coins in the ground at Mintal. 
Red Beach. 
The woodpeckers. 
The hemp and the heat • 
. Paypayas and limes. 
Rest and rehabilitation (3 days). 
General. Woodruff and his M-1. 
Hello Nick, Hello Nick - give me a long count. 
VF. 
The beach at Dalio. 
Lavanderas at Toril. 
Diamond White six. This is Diamond six. 
Hey Dice1 . 
The Old Monk from Priory Hall. 
NO MEMBEU OF THE 21ST INFANTRY /lAS CAPTURED OR ..VAS LISTED 
AS MISSING IN ACTION. ALL OUR DEAD -NERE RE:COVERED AND BURIED 
/liTH OUR OWN. 
Your devotion to duty. 
Your unqying courage. 
Your sacrifices; the hardships you underwent. 
The elan which marked you as proud men. 
Your spirit of comradeship; your cheerfulness. 
The lives you lost. 
The wounds you bear. 
Your honor. 
This shall be passed to future soldiers of 
the Twenty-first Infantry. 
This shall be given to new generations of 
your countrymen. 
W.J .V. 
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21ST INFANTRY DECORATIONS 
The following is a list of Decorations published in General Orders, 24th 
Division between June 1944 and December 1945. This list only contains Silver 
Star (SS), Bronze Star (BS), Purple Heart (PH) and Oak Leaf Cluster (C) in-
dicating more than one award. The majority of Purple Hearts awarded to mem-
bers of Infantry units are awarded in hospitals and hence do not appear in 
division orders. The Congressional Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service 
Cross and the Legion of Merit are not published in. division orders and there-
fore none are listed hereon. 
NAME': 
Aitken, Malcom D. 
Ashe, Rob 1t. w. 
Byryus, Edward A. 
Able, Sothoron K. 
Adams, Wm. J. 
Anderson, Francis w. 
Adams, Roy B. 
Allen, Shelton P. 
Adam, James 
Baden, Albert H. Jr. 
Birkhard, Leo J. 
Brannen, Ed. 
Banker, . Charles H. 
Blair, Oather 
Bracknell, Artie 
Browning, Newton F. 
Bezich, Peter N. 
Brock, Reinhardt w. 
Babick, Peter 0. 
Baker, Wm. E. 
Benton, Chas. I. 
Bresnahan, John T, 
Bakonyi, Leslie A. 
Beeghly, Harold R. · 
Brodine, Glenn w. 
Bates, Stanley G. 
Bradshaw, Marvin M. 
Baker, La Verne E. 
Berry, Joy C. 
Baughman, Joe H. 
Bardick, LeGrande S. 
Bush, Rob't. C. 
Burton, Charles D. 
Burnett, Eugene 
Brown, Rob 1t. S. 
Blaney, Kermit B. 
Berguch, Raymond c. 
Busse~, Frank T. 
Boyd, Orvil 
Bell, Donald B. 
Clifford, Thom. E. 
Childs, John A. 
Counts, Charles R. 
Cox, Kenneth E. 
1st Lt. 
S/Sgt. 
T/5 
Capt. 
Sgt. 
PFC 
Pvt. 
Maj. 
PFC 
Capt. 
Pvt. 
S/Sgt. 
M/Sgt. 
1st Lt. 
Pvt. 
Capt. 
PFC 
S/Sgt. 
1st Lt. 
S/Sgt. 
S/Sgt. 
PFC 
1st Sgt. 
2nd Lt. 
PFC 
PFC 
S/Sgt. 
S/Sgt. 
Tech/Sgt. 
PFC 
Sgt. 
Pvt. 
T/4 
T/5 
Capt. 
Capt. 
Pvt. 
Maj. 
PFC 
S/Sgt. 
Lt.Col. 
Capt. 
1st Lt. 
$/Sgt. 
ORGANIZATION: 
Hq., 1st Bn. 
RMD 
RMD 
I Co. 
A Co. 
E Co. 
A.Co. 
S-4 
L Co. 
MC 
G Co. 
Hq. 
Sv. 
AT 
C Co. 
S-1 
RMD 
C Co. 
1st Bn. Hq. 
C Co. 
B Co. 
D Co. 
F Co. 
E Co. 
K Co. 
B Co. 
E Co. 
K Co. 
G Co. 
B Co. 
I Co. 
A Co. 
D Co. 
RMD 
Hq. 
L Co. 
3rd Hq. 
Hq. 
RMD 
C Co. 
1st Bn. Hq. 
C Co. 
C Co. 
B Co. 
IECORA TIONS: 
BS 
BS 
PH 
BS & BSC 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS & BSC 
Soldiers Medal 
SS, BS 
ss 
BS 
BS 
BS 
ss 
BS 
ss 
ss 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
ss 
ss 
BS 
BS 
BS 
NAME: ~ ORGANIZATION: DECORATIONS: 
Campbell, Thorn. R. 2nd Lt. C Co. SS,BS 
Castle, Jamice B. Pvt. F Co. BS 
Coers, Burt W. Maj. RMD BS 
Cornfeild, Paul D. Sgt. C Co. BS 
Cameron, Jefferson w. PFC A Co. BS 
Camborn, Robert J. S/Sgt. L Co. BS 
Cheatwood, Wm. L.· Sgt. K Co. BS 
Coker, Clarence E. S/Sgt. c Co. BS 
Castro, Dominic.R. S/Sgt. K Co. ss 
Clemmen, Chas. E. Pvt. K Co. ss 
Castaneda, Francisco PFC F Co. ss 
Champage, Fran=is Pvt. F Co. ss 
Choly, John N. S/Sgt. . F Co. BS 
Cooper, Glee s. 2nd Lt. 
----- BS 
Casey, Jos. R. S/Sgt. I Co. BS 
Cantanzro, Anthony T/Sgt. en. BS 
Carmody, Rob•t. J. 2nd Lt. A Co. BS 
Childs, John A. Capt. C Co. BS 
Coolidge, Stanley J. Cpl. M Co. BS 
Distasi, Nicholas A. S/Sgt. C Co. ss 
De.~r.aree, Elmer E. PFC C Co. BS, SS 
Diehl, George H. PFC A Co. BS 
Dougherty, Wm. J. T/Sgt. I Co. BS 
Dantzler, Le Roy lst Lt. AT BS 
Dice, Francis R. Maj. Hq. BS 
Devoursney, Martin T. Sgt.. I Co. BS 
Erickson, Carol G. S/Sgt. lat Bn. Hq. BS 
Elliot, Idua W. 1st Sgt. C Co. BS 
Eakin, Creas E • Cpl. M Co. BS 
Ethridge, Fredrick 0. S/Sgt. I Co. BS 
Ender, Robert R. · Capt. H Co. Bs 
Farmer, Edward s. lat Lt.- 1st Bn. Hq. ss 
Frantz, Ralph PFC C Co. BS 
Francis, Lester E. PFC M Co. BS 
Furnian, Jack PFC F Co. ss 
Francher, William F. S/Sgt. K Co. BS 
Feebach, Charles w. PFC C Co. BS 
Fiew, James E. Sgt. C Co. BS 
Foster, Clyde A. PFC 3rd Bn. Hq. BS 
Falcon, Keith A. T/3 Med. SS, BS 
Gill, Thomas P. T/Sgt. M Co. BS 
Gasmmill, Morris L. PFC Med. BS 
Gregoric, George A. - PFC Med. ss 
Garmer, Loyd P. S/Sgt. A Co. BS 
. Gomez, Jose A. S/Sgt • K Co. BS 
Groteluschen, Roland S/Sgt. K Co. BS 
Gardner, Joaquin R. PFC B Co. BS 
Garza, Jose PFC F Co. BS 
Graham, Wilbur C. T/Sgt. 1st Bn. Hq. BS 
Goeb, Lawerence L. PFC I Co. BS 
Garrison, James_E. PFC L Co. ss 
Girardeau, John H., Jr. Major Hq. Co. BS 
Galac, John T. 1st Sgt. 1st Bn. Hq. BS 
Haddock, Eugene Sgt. C Co. ss 
Hauskins, Archie J. Pvt. Med. ss 
Hudson, Roger W. 2nd Lt. Hq. Co. BS 
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Hughes, William c. 1st Lt. A Co. BS 
Hiber, Clarence C. Sgt. I Co. BS 
Hull, William R. PFC Med. BS 
Howery, Arthur L. S/Sgt • . C Co. BS 
Halderson, Llewellyn D. 1st Lt. E Co. BS 
Huggins, James PFC B Co. BS 
Henderson, Arthur H. Lt.Col. Regt.Ex. Officer BS-lst BSC- 2nd BSC 
Hasket, Woodrow W. Pvt. E Co. ss 
Heinig, Robert J. 1st Sgt. D Co. BS 
Howard, Enos L. PFC C Co. BS 
Hartman, Robert H. PFC G Co. ss 
Hood, William E. Pvt. B Co. BS 
Hall, Claude H. lst Lt. 2nd Bn. Hq. ss 
Hamrick, J.D. S/Sgt. F Co. BS 
Hartman, William H. 2nd Lt. BS 
Hampton, Calvin E. Pvt. F Co. BS 
Hembrey, Charley J. PFC I Co. BS 
Hodgin, John V. S/Sgt. 1st Bn. Hq. BS · 
Hughes, Carline! T/Sgt. 3rd Bn. Hq. BS 
Hendrickson, Luther v. PFQ Hq. Co. BS 
Hair, Palmas J. fFC BS 
Hammack, Charles V. 2nd Lt. MD BSC 
Haas, Arthur C • 1st Lt. H Co. BS 
Higgins, Paul M. Sgt. 1st Bn. Hq. BS 
Irons, Philip S. III 1st Lt. 1st Bp. Hq. SS-BS-BSC 
Johnson, William Jr. S/Sgt. E Co. Soldiers Medal 
Jullie, Lawerence A. PFC Hq. Co. BS 
Jankowski, Chester G. PFC B Co. BS 
Jasuikiewiez, Anthony J. S/Sgt. K Co. ss 
Jester, George L. PFC A Co. BS 
Ja~eson, Charles R. Capt. F Co. SS-BS 
Johnson, Dale E. lst Lt. ss 
Jackowski, John PFC C Co. BS 
Jones, Erner Capt. Med. BS 
Kaljian, Ara Pvt. D Co. BS 
Kimbrell, James P. PFC 1st Bn. Hq. BS 
Kilgo, Robert L. Capt. E Co. ss 
Kranz, Clifford T. PFC A Co. BS 
Keating, William A. S/Sgt. 0 Co. BS 
Kufhal, Wilbert E. PFC Med. BS 
Kenne:iy, John T. Sgt. I Co. ss 
Kelly, Marvin H. S/Sgt. A Co. BS 
Kepler, Louis G. s/sgt. G Co. ss 
Kaden, Earl E. 2nd Lt. B Co. SS-BS 
Kuehster, John E. PFC I Co. BS 
Kelley, Jack H. Major 2nd Bn. Hq. BS 
Long, William N. S/Sgt. F Co. Soldiers Medal 
Lester, Norman R. S/Sgt. Hq. Co. BS 
Lyman, · Charles B. Col. Hq. Co. ss 
Little, Laman w. Major 2nd Bn. Hq. BS 
Madison, Seymour F; . Lt.Col. 2nd Bn. Hq. BS 
Langford, William M. 1st Lt. D-Co. BS 
Lacy, John R. T/Sgt. G Co. Bs 
Lemkuhl, Merle E. Pvt. Med. Det. ss 
Letzring, Frank C. PFC F Co. BS 
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Liby, Chester D. PFC F Co. BS 
Lee, Robert E. PFC Med. Det. BS 
Lockhart, Gerald L. Major Hq. S-J BS 
Lwrun, Marvin E. PFC 3rd Bn. Hq. BS 
Luria, Sidney B. Capt. Med. SS-BS 
Luke, Carl K. PFC Med. BS 
Lem;, Hilmar w. 2nd Lt. 
----
BS 
Light, Andrew J. T/Sgt. L Co. ss 
Moye, Franklin w. S/Sgt. G Co. ss 
Mauriello, Angelo v. T/5 Hq. Co. BS 
Mumper, David F. S/Sgt. B Co. BS 
Millirons, James L. 1st Sgt. M Co. BS 
Meyer, Jacob S/Sgt. M Co. .BS 
Marlett, Leal M. PFC Yed. BS 
Mashek, John R. , T/Sgt. K Co. BS 
Mosteiro, Francisco PFC K Co. BS 
Miller, Robert B. PFC K Co. BS 
Mott, John Pvt. D Co. - BS 
Marcy, Roy w. Lt .col. Hq.Co. ss 
Miller, George J. Capt. I Co. BS 
McGee, Monroe A. Pvt. C Co. SS-BS 
McLean, Ardell G. 1st Lt. 2nd Bn~ Hq. ss 
McClelland, John W. S/Sgt. F Co. ss 
McGuire, Clarence R. s/sgt. H Co. BS 
McNamara, Warren M. Capt. D Co. BS 
McKeon., Robert G. 1st Lt. 2nd Bn. Hq. BS 
Nixon, De Wayne A. Pvt. D Co. -BS 
Nava, Jesse D. PFC C Co. BS, BSC 
Norman, Donald B. Pvt. . C Co. BS 
Owen, Boyce PFC F Co. BS 
O'Brien, Eugene J. S/Sgt. 1st Bn. Hq. BS 
Olivers, John P. Sgt. I Co. ss 
Polock, Henry 1st Sgt. AT Co. BS 
Prestas, Andrew E. T/Sgt. M Co. ss 
Pietrowsky, Alex. T. 1st Sgt. I Co. BS 
Pursley, Homer S/Sgt. K Co. BS 
Payne, Elva F. T/4 C Co. BS 
Phipps, Wm. Pvt. F Co. ss 
Pepe, Antonia S/Sgt. M Co. ss 
Panting, Farrell Pvt. C Co. BS 
Poppa, Alvin L. PFC C Co. BS 
Pope, Harry D. PFC AT Co. ss 
Powell, James E., Jr. PFC C Co. BS, BSC 
Peha, Charles w. 
' 
PFC M Co. ss 
Parent, James M. ·capt. 2nd Bn. Hq. BS 
Prodnit, Walter U. S/Sgt. Cn. Co. BS 
Riley, Jacob L., Jr. Capt. I Co. ss 
Ross, John M. S/Sgt. G Co. ss 
Ramee, Eric P. Lt.Col. Jrd Bn. Hq. SS, BS 
Reese, Claude A. 1st Lt. Hq. BS 
Rhoda, Sanford S. P.FD B Co. BS 
Reid, Niel P. Capt. M Co. ss 
Rockstadt, Walter E. T/Sgt. I Co. PH 
Rogers, Nolan E. Pvt. c Co. BS 
Rogers, Morgan I. Capt. ---- BS 
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Romack, Lester R. PFC 
Rosenblatt, Benjamin 1st Lt. 
RhodA, Donald B. PFC 
Richard, L~wis PFC 
Ralston, Everett J. PFC 
Riffey, Richard G. T/Sgt. 
Rose, Homer K. . PFC 
Ryan, !)!. vid D. PFC 
Roepke, William ·F. PFC 
Rink, Eugene J. T/Sgt. 
Russell, Crawford C. Cpl. 
Rochelle, Boyd L. S/Sgt. 
Rennaker, Evert D. 1st Lt. 
Shapiro, Edward E. Capt. 
Suber, Tom W. · Capt. 
Short, Clarence E. Major 
Sloan, Nicholas E. 1st Lt.-Capt. 
Scott, John P\rt. 
Shannon, Ernest w. PFC 
Smith, Vinson s. 1st Lt. 
Schneeweis, Earl P. Pvt. 
Shipley, Vernon E. S/Sgt. 
Smith, Orville W. T/5 
Shaw, Frank G. PFC 
Simmons, Truman w. PFC . 
Sinsel, Alvin 1st Sgt. 
Sutterby, George C. · PFC . 
Satangelo, Car~ c. T/4 . . 
Schappert, . Josepb H. S/Sgt. 
Skrobu.ton, Ray.roond J. PFC 
Smith, Hershel L. PFC 
Smoot, Lee R. S/Sgt. 
Stewart, Alvin E. 1st Lt. 
Stimson:, Arthur E. 1st Lt. 
Stockert, Christ P~ PFC 
Sayers, Fred P. T/4 
Scrapper, William, Jr. T/Sgt. 
Slaski, Alvin c. PFC 
S}'e'ro, Frank PFC 
Shook, Willard E. PFC 
Souza, Frank T. Pvt. 
Sundquist, Raymond M. 1st Lt. 
Smith, Cec~l R. Pvt. 
Smith, Norman K. S/Sgt. 
Stein, Leonard I. 2nd Lt. 
Stanford, Don D. Major 
Suber, Tom W. Lt.Col. 
Seyde, Frank W. Capt. 
Spencer, Clarence v. T/Sgt. 
Taylor, Leon W. S/Sgt. 
Tonelli, Raymond J. PFC 
Thompson, James H. Capt. 
Thomas, James A. Pvt. 
Taylor, Melvin L. Pvt. 
Terrell, Millard C. S/Sgt. 
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L Co. 
E Co. 
M Co. 
C Co. 
D Co. 
B Co. 
1st Bn. Hq. 
F Co. 
AT 
~ed. 
I Co. 
L Co. 
Mea. Corp. 
3rd Bn. Hq. 
Hq. Co. 
Hq. Co~ 
C Co. 
B Co. 
Sv. Co. 
C Co. 
D Co. 
B Co. 
G Co. 
L Co. 
A Co. 
L Co • . 
K Co. · 
I Co. 
AT Co. 
·A Co. 
C Co. 
3rd Bn. Hq. 
A Co. 
Med. Det. 
D Co. 
I Co. 
I Co. 
C ·Co. 
D Co. 
Hq. Co. 
AT Co. 
Jrd Bn. Hq. 
I Co. 
Jrd Bn. Hq. 
Jrd Bn. Hq. 
Hq. Co. 
M Co. 
M Co. 
B Co. 
Mea. net. 
M Co. 
C Co. 
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BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
ss 
ss 
BS 
ss 
ss 
ss 
ss 
BS, SS 
BS 
BS-lst BSC -2nd BSC 
BS 
BS 
BS-BSC 
BS-BSC 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
ss 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
ss 
ss 
ss 
ss 
BS 
. ss 
BS 
BS 
ss 
BS 
BS 
BSC 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
BS 
ss 
ss 
BS 
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Trissel, Arthur J. 2nd Lt. D Co, BS s;:. .... 
.<.._ 
Topia, Joaquin R. · Pvt. B Co. BS ~ 
Torres, Andres Cpl. M Co. BS ,..,. 
Teets, Kenneth C. S/Sgt, K Co. BS /\"'-
Trammell, Alonzo K. 1st Lt. H Co. BS 
Thompson, James H. Major Jrd Bn. Hq. BS ~. 
- -Underwood, Richard E. PFC 1st Bn. Hq. BS 
-Verbeck, William Y• Col. Hq. Co.--Regt.Comd. ss-ssc-ss-2.PHC --::::-:-
Vinyard, James T/Sgt, A Co. BS 
Vienneau, Ernest L. Capt. K Co. BS 
Vaughn, Robert D. 1st Sgt. M Co, BS ~ 
Weber, Frederick R. Lt.Col. Hq. Co. ~ sse. 
Woodville, John S, Major Serv. Co. S-4 . BS 
Whitney, Howard H. 2nd Lt. K Co, BS, SS 
Wolf, John H. Pvt. L Co, BS 
Whitney, John S. Pvt. B Co, BS I Witte, Frank L. PFC C Co •. BS 
Wright, Albert J. 1st Lt. C Co. ss J Wingertsman, John C. PFC D Co. BS 
Weber, Bartholomew S/Sgt. A Co, BS, BSC 
Welch, Francis H. Sgt. L Co. BS 
Wiggins, William W. S/Sgt. D Co. BS 
Wilhe, Thomas w., Jr. T/Sgt. C Co. BS 
Woodie, Donovan K. PFC . Med, Det .... BS 
Wisor, Robert L. 1st Lt. D Co. BS 
Wicker, Gle~ese Capt. 2nd Bn. Hq. BS 
Wilson, Milton E. Capt. K Co. BS 
Williams, Jay B. Capt. Jrd Bn, Hq. BS Youngblood, Orlan. T/Sgt. L Co. Bs 
Yarbrough, Winston S/Sgt. lied. ss 
Zines, Francis J. PFC L Co. BS 
67 
', 
. 
¥ 
' ' .. 
;:~ •.. 
